12

Yes, there is a connection, as you point out. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes: 3.332 No proposition can say anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the whole "theory of types"). Gödel, as you know, proceeded to do precisely that. Wittgenstein's argument against type theory is one of many ...


12

Not on this at least. Wittgenstein is alluding to Frege on logical syntax. From Tractatus:"Frege says that any legitimately constructed proposition must have a sense. I say that any proposition is legitimately constructed". Laws of syntax are similar in form to ethical laws: thou shalt not (form such and such sentences). Wittgenstein's response in both cases ...


12

I would take this completely literally. We feel as though logic and formal mathematics really produce or contain meaning, but in fact they just rearrange the meaning we put into them. They are nothing but extremely sophisticated tautologies, and once we have seen the path through them, and gotten the clarity they can help us achieve, we are left with no ...


12

Yes and no. They both criticize a certain approach to semantic theory that can be called realism about meaning. Roughly, realists see meanings as some kind of entities, although there is a wide range of opinions as to their nature. For Plato and Frege they are ideal forms occupying a separate realm, for Aristotle and Russell they are invariances of sensible ...


10

Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico Philosophicus was the first major attempt to create a formal representation of a language, though the idea of this as a useful project goes back at least as far as Descartes. The basis of Wittgenstein's work was Frege's 'concept script', developed a few decades earlier for the purpose of reducing arithmetic to logic, and a ...


10

I see two parts in your question. Firstly, what did Wittgenstein think about rule-following and what is his critique meant to teach us? Secondly, how can we, in the light of this paradox, ever know we are following a rule. I take them in turn - my answer to the second question will be informed by the Wittgensteinian analysis that grows out of the first. ...


10

It is not a criticism of recursion theory and recursive definitions [by the way, recursion theory originated in the 1930s while the Tractatus was written during the first world war and was first published in German in 1921. And also, in 1921 Kurt Gödel was only fifteen years old: he published his doctoral dissertation, where he established the completeness ...


9

why can't all words mean an exact thing? The most concise answer you are going to find is in Section 293: the famous "beetle in a box" thought experiment. If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? ...


8

Based on your summary, it appears both methods of reading interpret the writings of the Tractatus as senseless (irresolute) or nonsense (resolute). In other words, both readings, if applied to the whole of the text, would classify it as belonging to something beyond the limits of "world, thought and language". It seems safe to assume that Wittgenstein's ...


8

Kripke is discussing section 193 of Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein draws a distinction between a machine as an idealized symbol of a rule-following or law-governed mechanism, and a machine as a real object whose behaviours and operations are subject to failure. Wittgenstein here was particularly concerned with trying to shed light on the ...


8

This is undeniably difficult. The section at 4.1212 onwards is where he gives his take on the internal/external relations doctrine. The holding of internal relations cannot be asserted by propositions, but rather shows itself in the propositions (in den Saetzen), by an internal property of the proposition which presents a state of affairs. A property is ...


8

There are philosophers that hail Wittgenstein as the greatest of the greats. There are also philosophers that do not. Just like in most areas of philosophy there is disagreement. In the Tractatus 6.54 he states My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, ...


8

There has been a fair bit of discussion of this statement from Wittgenstein. Kripke in Naming and Necessity famously disagrees entirely and offers "the standard metre in Paris is 1 metre long" as an example of an aprioi contingent statement. A priori because we don't have to measure it to know it is 1 metre long, but contingent because that particular rod ...


7

The way your source puts it, is very misleading. Logical empiricists had nothing against "metaphysical poetry". This seems to be a recurring misunderstanding. Indeed, according to logical empiricists, poetry is one of the best suited media to express "mystical longings". Long explanation (by Carnap himself) The whole point is clearly stated by Carnap in ...


7

This is a deceptively complex question, and very on the nose when it comes to Tractarian interpretation. My line on this is to say that we need to pay attention to the distinction in the semantics of TLP between "Propositions" (the German "Satz") and "Elementary Propositions" ("Elementarsatz"), and to note the theoretical difficulties in explaining how to ...


7

Regarding the twenty-one cards and letters from Frege to Wittgenstein discovered in 1988 [None of the letters from Wittgenstein to Frege are thought to have survived the bombing of the Munster library in 1945], you can see into: Enzo De Pellegrin (editor), Interactive Wittgenstein: Essays in Memory of Georg Henrik von Wright (2011): Frege-Wittgenstein ...


7

The answers to your questions are not going to be completely settled because they rely on specific theories of philosophy of language and language's relation to philosophy of mind. One very interesting thing to note before any explanations, however, is that Wittgenstein himself did not believe that machines could think. Additionally, he believes thinking "is ...


6

The similiarity between Kant's and Wittgenstein's trains of thought has been expounded before for sure. A good example is found in a book review by Eric Loomis. Where as Kant's 'Copernican revolution' was a defence against skepticism, i.e. David Hume's theory of causation, Wittgenstein's language games is closely linked to theories of truth and meaning. ...


6

But minds also think, and this is a private activity What's more, Wittgenstein makes this argument explicitly with his "Beetle Box" thought experiment (in the Philosophical Investigations.) And, what's more, he also shows that much thought is not of a propositional nature, and does not work well with traditional notions of epistemology; one cannot be ...


6

For Wittgenstein, I would strongly recommend the Philosophical Investigations. This is highly exemplary of the type Rorty is speaking about. For Heidegger, just about anything would fit into this category, but I would recommend you choose a brief text, because skimming Heidegger isn't going to get you anywhere. Perhaps "What is Metaphysics?" would be a ...


6

Hume challenged other philosophers to come up with a deductive reason for the inductive connection. If the justification of induction cannot be deductive, then it would beg the question. To Hume, induction itself, cannot explain the inductive connection. Wittgenstein's early account of causation in TLP follows Hume in rejecting the idea of causal necessity. ...


6

A professor of mine (this guy) once mentioned that Cora Diamond is an advocate of that 'continuum' reading of Wittgenstein. A recent collection edited by Alice Crary and Rupert Read includes a number of such interpretations of Wittgenstein's work (including Diamond's). The interpretations featured in that collection have become collectively known as the "New ...


6

According to Wittgenstein, what we cannot speak about cannot be defined clearly (hence, cannot be defined at all). Because if it could be defined clearly, it could ipso facto be spoken about. What cannot be spoken about can only be shown, and even that only indirectly, by showing what can be spoken about. The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking,...


6

As far as I can see, Wittgenstein himself wouldn't have considered himself as having solved the problems of philosophy. So why would anyone else think he has? Let me elaborate. For the later Wittgenstein, philosophy was largely a form of "therapy", that cured the asker of philosophical questions of the delusions brought on by language. From the Stanford ...


6

The thing is, that for the early Wittgenstein the Cogito Ergo Sum was just not true. So the Cogito could not be true a priori for him. Like David Hume, Wittgenstein believed that the Cartesian Ego, the thinking subject, was nowhere to be found. 5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I wrote a book called The World ...


6

The second OP quote (footnote about the mystical streak) refers to a meeting with Wittgenstein by Anscombe herself. For an account of Wittgenstein's relation to the Vienna circle philosophy see Stern's Wittgenstein versus Carnap on physicalism. As for Carnap, Anscombe most likely refers to his self-account of meetings with Wittgenstein in the Autobiography,...


5

I am basically in the same boat as you are, although I'm maybe a few months ahead, so I will just give you my experience so far. First of all, give up hope of a quick understanding. Wittgenstein is difficult, in part because 1) he is going after at some very subtle points, 2) he uses an entirely original approach, and 3) he adopts a stance that is ...


5

For example he said that you cannot know your pain because you cannot doubt that you are in pain. I don't quite understand this thinking and am wondering if anyone can clarify this concept. I'm not sure I can write it any more than Wittgenstein, but I'll try to unpack it a bit: Another way in which the grammars of "I have toothache" and "He has toothache"...


5

Even though his style is rather simple and direct, Wittgenstein is not someone whose writing you can just pick up and 'dive into.' I'd recommend familiarizing yourself with a lot of context before even beginning to read - not only as far as the content is concerned but also as far as the dialectical form. The Investigations for instance make little sense ...


5

Wittgenstein famously argues that there can be no private language; that language, in order to be language, must be (at least theoretically) public. I've not come across a convincing refutation. There have been a number of philosophers (such as Rousseau) who have written (speculatively) on the origin of language, although this field is more currently the ...


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