12

Not on this at least. Wittgenstein is alluding to Frege on logical syntax. From Tractatus:"Frege says that any legitimately constructed proposition must have a sense. I say that any proposition is legitimately constructed". Laws of syntax are similar in form to ethical laws: thou shalt not (form such and such sentences). Wittgenstein's response in both cases ...


11

Yes and no. They both criticize a certain approach to semantic theory that can be called realism about meaning. Roughly, realists see meanings as some kind of entities, although there is a wide range of opinions as to their nature. For Plato and Frege they are ideal forms occupying a separate realm, for Aristotle and Russell they are invariances of sensible ...


11

Because he reads a and b occurring in the atomic proposition f(a,b) (e.g. "a is to the left of b") as referring to two different objects. According to Wittgenstein, the only legitimate use of the sign of identity is at a meta-level, in order to talk about the use of signs, and not to assert anything substantive about the world. Thus he says: 4.241 ...


10

It is not a criticism of recursion theory and recursive definitions [by the way, recursion theory originated in the 1930s while the Tractatus was written during the first world war and was first published in German in 1921. And also, in 1921 Kurt Gödel was only fifteen years old: he published his doctoral dissertation, where he established the completeness ...


8

Kripke is discussing section 193 of Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein draws a distinction between a machine as an idealized symbol of a rule-following or law-governed mechanism, and a machine as a real object whose behaviours and operations are subject to failure. Wittgenstein here was particularly concerned with trying to shed light on the ...


8

This is undeniably difficult. The section at 4.1212 onwards is where he gives his take on the internal/external relations doctrine. The holding of internal relations cannot be asserted by propositions, but rather shows itself in the propositions (in den Saetzen), by an internal property of the proposition which presents a state of affairs. A property is ...


8

There are philosophers that hail Wittgenstein as the greatest of the greats. There are also philosophers that do not. Just like in most areas of philosophy there is disagreement. In the Tractatus 6.54 he states My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, ...


8

There has been a fair bit of discussion of this statement from Wittgenstein. Kripke in Naming and Necessity famously disagrees entirely and offers "the standard metre in Paris is 1 metre long" as an example of an aprioi contingent statement. A priori because we don't have to measure it to know it is 1 metre long, but contingent because that particular rod ...


8

Welcome TCP Russell doesn't so far as I'm aware tell us what the subject was of the 'something' he asked or invited Wittgenstein to write - perhaps he left the topic entirely to Wittenstein. Nor does Wittgenstein provide information from his side. Some slight conjectural indication of what Wittgenstein wrote on is provided by the subject-matter of Russell'...


7

Hume challenged other philosophers to come up with a deductive reason for the inductive connection. If the justification of induction cannot be deductive, then it would beg the question. To Hume, induction itself, cannot explain the inductive connection. Wittgenstein's early account of causation in TLP follows Hume in rejecting the idea of causal necessity. ...


7

The way your source puts it, is very misleading. Logical empiricists had nothing against "metaphysical poetry". This seems to be a recurring misunderstanding. Indeed, according to logical empiricists, poetry is one of the best suited media to express "mystical longings". Long explanation (by Carnap himself) The whole point is clearly ...


7

This is a deceptively complex question, and very on the nose when it comes to Tractarian interpretation. My line on this is to say that we need to pay attention to the distinction in the semantics of TLP between "Propositions" (the German "Satz") and "Elementary Propositions" ("Elementarsatz"), and to note the theoretical difficulties in explaining how to ...


7

Regarding the twenty-one cards and letters from Frege to Wittgenstein discovered in 1988 [None of the letters from Wittgenstein to Frege are thought to have survived the bombing of the Munster library in 1945], you can see into: Enzo De Pellegrin (editor), Interactive Wittgenstein: Essays in Memory of Georg Henrik von Wright (2011): Frege-Wittgenstein ...


7

The answers to your questions are not going to be completely settled because they rely on specific theories of philosophy of language and language's relation to philosophy of mind. One very interesting thing to note before any explanations, however, is that Wittgenstein himself did not believe that machines could think. Additionally, he believes thinking &...


7

The second OP quote (footnote about the mystical streak) refers to a meeting with Wittgenstein by Anscombe herself. For an account of Wittgenstein's relation to the Vienna circle philosophy see Stern's Wittgenstein versus Carnap on physicalism. As for Carnap, Anscombe most likely refers to his self-account of meetings with Wittgenstein in the Autobiography, ...


6

For Wittgenstein, I would strongly recommend the Philosophical Investigations. This is highly exemplary of the type Rorty is speaking about. For Heidegger, just about anything would fit into this category, but I would recommend you choose a brief text, because skimming Heidegger isn't going to get you anywhere. Perhaps "What is Metaphysics?" would be a ...


6

A professor of mine (this guy) once mentioned that Cora Diamond is an advocate of that 'continuum' reading of Wittgenstein. A recent collection edited by Alice Crary and Rupert Read includes a number of such interpretations of Wittgenstein's work (including Diamond's). The interpretations featured in that collection have become collectively known as the "New ...


6

There is no justification for one or the other. Russell's paradox is a paradox if you believe** in unrestricted comprehension (for each P there is a set {x | P}), or at least if you believe** that the set {x | x ∉ x} exists. Russel's paradox is not a paradox if you use it to conclude that the set {x | x ∉ x} does not exist. Cantor's diagonal argument is a ...


6

According to Wittgenstein, what we cannot speak about cannot be defined clearly (hence, cannot be defined at all). Because if it could be defined clearly, it could ipso facto be spoken about. What cannot be spoken about can only be shown, and even that only indirectly, by showing what can be spoken about. The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking,...


6

As far as I can see, Wittgenstein himself wouldn't have considered himself as having solved the problems of philosophy. So why would anyone else think he has? Let me elaborate. For the later Wittgenstein, philosophy was largely a form of "therapy", that cured the asker of philosophical questions of the delusions brought on by language. From the Stanford ...


6

It seems to me that it is a sort of blunder from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein criticizes the logical rules for identity already in 5.434, becuase they are not expressed with a "correct logical notation". It seems to be a critique of Frege's and Russell's theory of quantification and identity. Wittgenstein’s approach seems to be that no adequate logical ...


6

The thing is, that for the early Wittgenstein the Cogito Ergo Sum was just not true. So the Cogito could not be true a priori for him. Like David Hume, Wittgenstein believed that the Cartesian Ego, the thinking subject, was nowhere to be found. 5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I wrote a book called The World ...


5

You might check out Michael Potter's "The Logic of the Tractatus" in the Handbook of the History of Logic Vol. 5: From Russell to Church. In that he discusses Wittgenstein's logical atomism, his presentation of truth-tables for Fregean logic, among other things. In it, Potter claims that Wittgenstein's system is not only quantificational, but admits of ...


5

I believe you're referring to the fallacy of inferring the “sum” (or “I am”) part from the “cogito” (or “I think”) part, right? The “ergo” (or “therefore”) makes it sound like Descartes is expressing an argument which has as its premise that he thinks, and the conclusion that he exists. The potential fallacy in this representation of the Cogito statement ...


5

The key point is the sentence:"Even if this proposition is never true, it is nevertheless significant", I italicized "significant", as Russell does in his text. Russell is talking about manipulating objects in a formal system (of Principia Mathematica). What he says is that while objects can be "actually" distinct if they are "equal" in his system this fact ...


5

Science doesn't have rigorous definitions. Rather, the science worth paying attention to has been created by criticising ideas according to whether or not they explain what they set out to explain. Definitions are used later as a way of summarising ideas so that it is easy to refer to them. Perfectly precise definitions are impossible in any case since any ...


5

The claim that propositions of logic, and analytic truths in general, are tautologies was a consensus view before Frege, and can be found in Locke, Hume and Kant, see Was Locke right that analytic knowledge is vacuous?. This is because the only logic known to them was the Aristotelian one, which only allows syllogisms. Frege famously expanded the scope of ...


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