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Well of COURSE logic has some part mathematical but not all like mathematical that mathematics can not reduce it in tautology as in Witgensteins LOGİC.


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As a matter of terminology, some logicians use 'tautology' as a synonym for a logical truth, while others restrict it to logical truths of the propositional calculus. I shall use the more general term logical truth. For a given logic, such as classical logic, a logical truth is a proposition that comes out true under all circumstances, or all interpretations,...


6

Wittgenstein was reviving Kant's old view that logical deduction only brings out what is implicitly thought in the premises. Of course, Kant had in mind Aristotle's term logic, which is roughly equivalent to the logic of one place predicates (monadic predicate calculus) in modern terms, and Wittgenstein had in mind Boole's logic of propositions (classes), ...


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This scene seems to imply that Russell didn't view logic as tautologies. Correct. Wittgenstein's view about "logic=tautologies" was grounded on propositional logic and truth table. Unfortunately, truth table is not applicable to predicate logic and thus valid predicate logic formulas are not tautologies in the propositional sense. In addition, ...


0

Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus era) was invested in Russell's paradigm: he wanted to help create a rational, scientific philosophy that supplemented the Empiricist worldview prominent in the Anglophone world. He wasn't against 'philosophical' questions as much as he was against 'metaphysical' questions — questions which could not be reduced to 'natural ...


1

What Wittgenstein thought in his second phase is often difficult to parse out -- as he often did not articulate his views in unambiguous terms. Note Wittgenstein himself described Philosophical Investigations as being exploratory and fragmented. Quotes from it can often be used to support directly self-contradicting claims or interpretations. One way to ...


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Wittgenstein is bordering on Daoism here, interestingly enough... I'm not sure from what period of Wittgenstein's life this comes from, but it sounds more in line with his early philosophy. In essence, he's saying that whenever one talks about morality and ethics, one is reaching for a universal that cannot possibly be expressed in language. For early ...


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