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14

This illustrates how removed the concept of 'philosophical zombie' is from reality. The mirror image does not have a brain; it is a trick of light. It is no more a 'zombie' than a photo, a drawing, or a terse sentence in a bad novel. More specifically; the concept of a philosophical zombie is that there can exist something in principle indistinguishable ...


14

Does Occam's razor actually favor (i) over (ii)? No, because although (i) and (ii) both assert the reality of consciousness, (i) further asserts the reality of something that inexplicably mimics it. So (i) inevitably involves greater complexity; it has multiplied the entities involved with the assertion that there are really existing p-zombies. If so, in ...


13

It certainly seems plausible to claim that we occasionally behave like p-zombies. However, philosophers such as Daniel Dennett and Susan Blackmore have taken the claim one step further, arguing that everybody is always a p-zombie. How exactly do they pull this off? Well, they simply deny that consciousness exists at all! They say that what we think is ...


8

Approach 1 - (4) is false. One line of reasoning has already been presented. (4). The person in the mirror looks and behaves like a conscious, qualia possessing human: you. This is false, because the person in the mirror simply reflects the behavior of something else, which is not the behavior of a conscious human, but that of a reflection. Approach 2 -...


7

It is more complex and convoluted to explain why other human beings would present such an utterly convincing simulation of consciousness and sentience than to simply assume that they are conscious and sentient.


6

Asserting that "I have conscousness but no one else does" has a degree of implausibility similar to that of geocentrism: why, out of all of the (more or less) externally similar human beings does this one (me) have consciousness (i.e. a special place in the universe)? Basically it's an assumption of uniformity of properties across the class of objects we ...


6

Chalmers runs a (semi-serious) site Zombies on the Web with lots of (serious) references, where he makes a 3-way distinction: Hollywood zombies. These are found in zombie B-movies... Haitian zombies. These are found in the voodoo (or vodou) tradition in Haiti. Their defining feature seems to be that they lack free will, and perhaps lack a soul... ...


5

Philosophical Zombies can have mental states and would still be Zombies. The whole point of Chalmer's Zombie thought experiment is to show that having mental states isn't enough to account for subjective/phenomenological first person experience. After all, computers have "mental states" - their internal memory states and software configurations - but don't ...


4

Your argument has a very straight forward resolution: statements 4 and 5 together are sufficient to prove that "the person in the mirror is a p-zombie." Those two statements form the definition of a p-zombie. That's the easy part. The hard part is your justification of those statements. In particular, how do you justify 5. If you assume it to be true ...


3

This seems like a follow-up on Does having free will presuppose consciousness, can philosophical zombies have it?, and FW zombies are Chalmers's Haitian zombies. Two preliminary remarks. First, functionalists (and physicalists) would deny that they fail to account for subjective experience. There is an equivocation in "account for", to them it is accounted ...


2

Analogy is one of Bertrand Russell's five postulates that validate scientific method. It states that "the behavior of other people is in many ways analogous to our own, and we suppose that it must have analogous causes." This is the postulate that the belief in the minds of others requires. (Source: Russell bertrand. _Human, Knowlege, Its scope and limits. ...


2

Occam's razor favors hypothesis (ii). There is only one way for everybody to have consciousness; thus consciousness is just part of the definition of person. Figuratively, this is just one extra feature of the world, and is required in order to explain why other people seem to respond to situations similar to the way I do. If some people have ...


2

It depends what you mean with meaningful lives. Assuming that zombies do not have emotions and thoughts, but are functioning like an organic robot. (1) They can have meaningful lives when they are useful in a way (are there helpful zombies?). In the same way machines can have a meaningful existence for humans. (2) If you asking about meaningful lives in a ...


2

You write: If anything a FW-zombie seems like a more realistic concept than a P-zombie. Although P-zombies are purely conceptual, many people go through FW-zombie like experiences in real life, if only for brief amounts of time. I suppose you are thinking about a scenario similar to scratching an itch. You ask person A "did you consciously choose to ...


2

Physicalists have several responses: 16+% of all philosophers actualy disagree with P1. See page 16: https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP The reason would be a belief in the logical necessity of Identity Theory -- and that anyone who held that Identity Theory was untrue was simply confused. 36+% of philosophers reject P2. Our imagination is not ...


2

You write: The person in the mirror looks and behaves like a conscious, qualia possessing human: you. But what do you mean by the person in the mirror? Is there a person in the mirror? I think most people would disagree. You probably mean to say: "The image of the person in the mirror..." You conclude: Therefore, the mirror image of you is an ...


1

That depends on what the problem is with killing people. A Deontologist could argue that the zombies have no inherent duty of care, being entirely imaginary entities, and so declare Open Season without qualm. A Consequentialist could notice that killing philosophical zombies has no effect IRL, and grab a shotgun. A Virtue Ethicist could acknowledge the ...


1

I would suggest that you examine this question without reference to zombies. They will do your head in and are not necessary to the argument. It is obvious that zombies as defined by Chalmers cannot exist even if we could conceive them. No zombie would have this present discussion. The explanatory gap has nothing to do with zombies, which are just a way of ...


1

Question: The zombie argument against physicalism usually goes like this Physically identical zombies are conceivable. If zombies are conceivable, they are metaphysically possible. Therefore physicalism is false. Response Physically identical zombies are conceivable. ...This assertion is wrong. & 3. follow from the physically invalid 1., so they are ...


1

I think it's a very good argument and shows that the philosophical zombie is a legitimate concept. (I have never understood arguments saying it isn't). So behaviorism alone as a test for consciousness (like the Turing test) doesn't make sense imo. Your argument reminds me of the Chinese room argument, in that we can get seemingly conscious behaviors out of ...


1

I think this question should be examined from the sociological perspective, as well as the physio-biological. If one equates meaning in life to rational thought then zombies, or any animal other than humans and dolphins I suppose, would have little chance to find meaning to their lives aside from simply satisfying basic instincts. However, we can give ...


1

In Solipsism everyone else is a "philosophical zombie"; and all the time. However, I am not aware of any (serious) solipsist philosophers.


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