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32 votes
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Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

The concept of a philosophical zombie is incoherent. Take your quote: [T]hey are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’...
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14 votes

Zombies and Occam's razor

Does Occam's razor actually favor (i) over (ii)? No, because although (i) and (ii) both assert the reality of consciousness, (i) further asserts the reality of something that inexplicably mimics it. ...
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13 votes

Is the person in the mirror an example of a philosophical zombie?

This illustrates how removed the concept of 'philosophical zombie' is from reality. The mirror image does not have a brain; it is a trick of light. It is no more a 'zombie' than a photo, a drawing, ...
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11 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

I'm confused about what this means. Isn't a "conscious experience", such as seeing the color red, just a firing of neurons in a certain area of the brain that triggers other neurons and ...
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9 votes
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Is it reasonable to believe that others have sentient minds?

It is more complex and convoluted to explain why other human beings would present such an utterly convincing simulation of consciousness and sentience than to simply assume that they are conscious and ...
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8 votes

Is the person in the mirror an example of a philosophical zombie?

Approach 1 - (4) is false. One line of reasoning has already been presented. (4). The person in the mirror looks and behaves like a conscious, qualia possessing human: you. This is false, because ...
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7 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

You cannot tell other philosophers apart from well-programmed zombies, that is true. But you can tell yourself apart. Your knowledge of yourself comes through your subjective experiences and their ...
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7 votes

Is it reasonable to believe that others have sentient minds?

Asserting that "I have conscousness but no one else does" has a degree of implausibility similar to that of geocentrism: why, out of all of the (more or less) externally similar human beings does ...
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6 votes
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Does having free will presuppose consciousness, can philosophical zombies have it?

Chalmers runs a (semi-serious) site Zombies on the Web with lots of (serious) references, where he makes a 3-way distinction: Hollywood zombies. These are found in zombie B-movies... Haitian zombies. ...
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5 votes

Does a philosophical zombie have mental states?

Philosophical Zombies can have mental states and would still be Zombies. The whole point of Chalmer's Zombie thought experiment is to show that having mental states isn't enough to account for ...
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4 votes

Is the person in the mirror an example of a philosophical zombie?

Your argument has a very straight forward resolution: statements 4 and 5 together are sufficient to prove that "the person in the mirror is a p-zombie." Those two statements form the definition of a ...
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3 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

P-zombies are supposed to be a thought experiment to show the privacy of the mind. Experiences are subjective and we don't have access to what it is like to be something else. That is what ...
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3 votes

Is it immoral to kill a philosophical zombie?

That depends on what the problem is with killing people: A Deontologist could argue that the zombies have no inherent duty of care, being entirely imaginary entities, and so declare Open Season ...
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3 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

Your question seems to boil down to whether existence is purely physical, with science destined to eventually fully understand self-awareness; or whether there could be a metaphysical aspect to our ...
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3 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

So I guess my question is what the philosophy of the mind is really about. Won't physics, chemistry, and neuroscience eventually fully explain why humans act the way they act? It might fully explain ...
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3 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

Do you know about these twin sisters who are joined at the skull and their thalamus , allowing one twin too see, think about, feel what her sister feels and vice-versa. They even have their own ...
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  • 369
3 votes

Can a version of the philosophical zombie concept be used to argue for libertarian freewill?

This seems like a follow-up on Does having free will presuppose consciousness, can philosophical zombies have it?, and FW zombies are Chalmers's Haitian zombies. Two preliminary remarks. First, ...
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3 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

The Knowledge Argument might be a good thought experiment for seeing why many people believe qualia exist. Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world ...
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2 votes

Is it reasonable to believe that others have sentient minds?

Analogy is one of Bertrand Russell's five postulates that validate scientific method. It states that "the behavior of other people is in many ways analogous to our own, and we suppose that it must ...
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  • 2,120
2 votes

Zombies and Occam's razor

Occam's razor favors hypothesis (ii). There is only one way for everybody to have consciousness; thus consciousness is just part of the definition of person. Figuratively, this is just one extra ...
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  • 5,096
2 votes

Can zombies have meaningful lives?

It depends what you mean with meaningful lives. Assuming that zombies do not have emotions and thoughts, but are functioning like an organic robot. (1) They can have meaningful lives when they are ...
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2 votes

Can a version of the philosophical zombie concept be used to argue for libertarian freewill?

You write: If anything a FW-zombie seems like a more realistic concept than a P-zombie. Although P-zombies are purely conceptual, many people go through FW-zombie like experiences in real life, if ...
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  • 4,457
2 votes

What is the physicalist response to the explanatory gap for conciousness?

Physicalists have several responses: 16+% of all philosophers actualy disagree with P1. See page 16: https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP The reason would be a belief in the logical necessity of ...
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  • 4,161
2 votes

Is the person in the mirror an example of a philosophical zombie?

You write: The person in the mirror looks and behaves like a conscious, qualia possessing human: you. But what do you mean by the person in the mirror? Is there a person in the mirror? I ...
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  • 4,457
2 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

Another thought experiment that is useful to consider here is the inverted spectrum scenario. The thought experiment is as follows: suppose you and I are neurophysiologically alike, but somehow, ...
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2 votes

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

The problem is simple: OP's conclusions do not follow. A lot of logical issues. So I guess my question is what the philosophy of the mind is really about. Won't physics, chemistry, and neuroscience ...
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  • 4,351
1 vote

Aren't we all philosophical zombies?

Isn't a "conscious experience", such as seeing the color red, just a firing of neurons in a certain area of the brain that triggers other neurons and eventually leads to us saying "I ...
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  • 1,540
1 vote

What is the physicalist response to the explanatory gap for conciousness?

Question: The zombie argument against physicalism usually goes like this Physically identical zombies are conceivable. If zombies are conceivable, they are metaphysically possible. Therefore ...
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