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31

The concept of a philosophical zombie is incoherent. Take your quote: [T]hey are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness. Let's imagine, for the sake of argument, two ...


14

Does Occam's razor actually favor (i) over (ii)? No, because although (i) and (ii) both assert the reality of consciousness, (i) further asserts the reality of something that inexplicably mimics it. So (i) inevitably involves greater complexity; it has multiplied the entities involved with the assertion that there are really existing p-zombies. If so, in ...


13

This illustrates how removed the concept of 'philosophical zombie' is from reality. The mirror image does not have a brain; it is a trick of light. It is no more a 'zombie' than a photo, a drawing, or a terse sentence in a bad novel. More specifically; the concept of a philosophical zombie is that there can exist something in principle indistinguishable ...


11

I'm confused about what this means. Isn't a "conscious experience", such as seeing the color red, just a firing of neurons in a certain area of the brain that triggers other neurons and eventually leads to us saying "I see red"? Right, you should be confused. (Def)-Type-Identity reductionism: "The view that mental state are directly ...


9

It is more complex and convoluted to explain why other human beings would present such an utterly convincing simulation of consciousness and sentience than to simply assume that they are conscious and sentient.


8

Approach 1 - (4) is false. One line of reasoning has already been presented. (4). The person in the mirror looks and behaves like a conscious, qualia possessing human: you. This is false, because the person in the mirror simply reflects the behavior of something else, which is not the behavior of a conscious human, but that of a reflection. Approach 2 -...


7

You cannot tell other philosophers apart from well-programmed zombies, that is true. But you can tell yourself apart. Your knowledge of yourself comes through your subjective experiences and their specific qualities or qualia. Your present experience is in fact the one and only thing you can be absolutely sure of. Everything else - the dynamic flow of ...


7

Asserting that "I have conscousness but no one else does" has a degree of implausibility similar to that of geocentrism: why, out of all of the (more or less) externally similar human beings does this one (me) have consciousness (i.e. a special place in the universe)? Basically it's an assumption of uniformity of properties across the class of objects we ...


6

Chalmers runs a (semi-serious) site Zombies on the Web with lots of (serious) references, where he makes a 3-way distinction: Hollywood zombies. These are found in zombie B-movies... Haitian zombies. These are found in the voodoo (or vodou) tradition in Haiti. Their defining feature seems to be that they lack free will, and perhaps lack a soul... ...


5

Philosophical Zombies can have mental states and would still be Zombies. The whole point of Chalmer's Zombie thought experiment is to show that having mental states isn't enough to account for subjective/phenomenological first person experience. After all, computers have "mental states" - their internal memory states and software configurations - but don't ...


4

Your argument has a very straight forward resolution: statements 4 and 5 together are sufficient to prove that "the person in the mirror is a p-zombie." Those two statements form the definition of a p-zombie. That's the easy part. The hard part is your justification of those statements. In particular, how do you justify 5. If you assume it to be true ...


3

P-zombies are supposed to be a thought experiment to show the privacy of the mind. Experiences are subjective and we don't have access to what it is like to be something else. That is what consciousness is - what it is like to be X. Unless you think consciousness is physical then no matter how much of the physical facts we had we could never have access to ...


3

That depends on what the problem is with killing people: A Deontologist could argue that the zombies have no inherent duty of care, being entirely imaginary entities, and so declare Open Season without qualm. A Consequentialist could notice that killing philosophical zombies has no effect IRL, and grab a shotgun. A Virtue Ethicist could acknowledge the ...


3

Your question seems to boil down to whether existence is purely physical, with science destined to eventually fully understand self-awareness; or whether there could be a metaphysical aspect to our existence. If we are purely physical, then it stands to reason that only sufficiently complex structures (such as our brain) can become self aware. Or else the ...


3

So I guess my question is what the philosophy of the mind is really about. Won't physics, chemistry, and neuroscience eventually fully explain why humans act the way they act? It might fully explain the way humans act, but this is what David Chalmers calls the "easy problem" of consciousness ('easy' from a philosophical point of view, not a ...


3

Do you know about these twin sisters who are joined at the skull and their thalamus , allowing one twin too see, think about, feel what her sister feels and vice-versa. They even have their own different opinions, and yet, a boundary between them appears if you watch them talk. What is this boundary made of? It is still "one system", connected with ...


3

This seems like a follow-up on Does having free will presuppose consciousness, can philosophical zombies have it?, and FW zombies are Chalmers's Haitian zombies. Two preliminary remarks. First, functionalists (and physicalists) would deny that they fail to account for subjective experience. There is an equivocation in "account for", to them it is accounted ...


3

The Knowledge Argument might be a good thought experiment for seeing why many people believe qualia exist. Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the ...


2

Analogy is one of Bertrand Russell's five postulates that validate scientific method. It states that "the behavior of other people is in many ways analogous to our own, and we suppose that it must have analogous causes." This is the postulate that the belief in the minds of others requires. (Source: Russell bertrand. _Human, Knowlege, Its scope and limits. ...


2

Occam's razor favors hypothesis (ii). There is only one way for everybody to have consciousness; thus consciousness is just part of the definition of person. Figuratively, this is just one extra feature of the world, and is required in order to explain why other people seem to respond to situations similar to the way I do. If some people have ...


2

It depends what you mean with meaningful lives. Assuming that zombies do not have emotions and thoughts, but are functioning like an organic robot. (1) They can have meaningful lives when they are useful in a way (are there helpful zombies?). In the same way machines can have a meaningful existence for humans. (2) If you asking about meaningful lives in a ...


2

You write: If anything a FW-zombie seems like a more realistic concept than a P-zombie. Although P-zombies are purely conceptual, many people go through FW-zombie like experiences in real life, if only for brief amounts of time. I suppose you are thinking about a scenario similar to scratching an itch. You ask person A "did you consciously choose to ...


2

Physicalists have several responses: 16+% of all philosophers actualy disagree with P1. See page 16: https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP The reason would be a belief in the logical necessity of Identity Theory -- and that anyone who held that Identity Theory was untrue was simply confused. 36+% of philosophers reject P2. Our imagination is not ...


2

You write: The person in the mirror looks and behaves like a conscious, qualia possessing human: you. But what do you mean by the person in the mirror? Is there a person in the mirror? I think most people would disagree. You probably mean to say: "The image of the person in the mirror..." You conclude: Therefore, the mirror image of you is an ...


2

Another thought experiment that is useful to consider here is the inverted spectrum scenario. The thought experiment is as follows: suppose you and I are neurophysiologically alike, but somehow, unbeknownst to us, the subjective experience that I have when I see red is the same as the subjective experience that you have when you see green, and vice versa. ...


2

The problem is simple: OP's conclusions do not follow. A lot of logical issues. So I guess my question is what the philosophy of the mind is really about. Won't physics, chemistry, and neuroscience eventually fully explain why humans act the way they act? Absolutely not! You can't reduce love, religion or mysticism -or consciousness- to physics, chemistry ...


1

Isn't a "conscious experience", such as seeing the color red, just a firing of neurons in a certain area of the brain that triggers other neurons and eventually leads to us saying "I see red"? Likely yes, but there could be a similar way for neurons to fire and trigger other neurons that on the outside looks similar, but works different ...


1

Question: The zombie argument against physicalism usually goes like this Physically identical zombies are conceivable. If zombies are conceivable, they are metaphysically possible. Therefore physicalism is false. Response Physically identical zombies are conceivable. ...This assertion is wrong. & 3. follow from the physically invalid 1., so they are ...


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