Apr
23
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@SueKDccia: Please don't keep deleting and reposting the same comment over and over until you get a reply.
Apr
19
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@SueKDccia: I feel like this is one of those "unstoppable force" questions where the answer hinges on the definition of the words used. If we are living in a hypercomputer, and we are capable of thinking about illogical things, then by definition the hypercomputer can contain the thing we can think about. Because we wouldn't be able to grasp anything that the hypercomputer couldn't handle. If you start from the premise of reality being a hypercomputer, you immediately accept that the hypercomputer must be able to contain/handle/parse all that reality can.
Apr
18
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@SueKDccia: Those obstacles derive from the premise (the assumption that there is such a supercomputer). You're effectively questioning the premise, how such a hypercomputer could exist with the given definition in the premise. Also, just because it's illogical does not mean that it can't be described in a logical way. "This orange is not an orange" is illogical but I can still write the sentence, be grammatically correct, and you can still parse the alleged logic.
Apr
18
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
The question is not about what a computer can and cannot do with the right peripherals, but whether it can contain the uncomputable. The hypercomputer in question is not one that exists within the universe, but rather the one which houses the universe. There's no point in arguing the external consequences of what a computer can do, because the hypercomputer in question contains the entirety of our reality, there is no space external to the hypercomputer.
Apr
18
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@SueKDccia: I'm also not quite sure how infinite regress detracts from the point (which your comment seems to imply, correct me if I'm wrong). It's not the watchmaker analogy, but rather a continually improved approximation, which is not the same thing.
Apr
18
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
[..] Because the latter interpretation is obviously true. A computer with no peripherals cannot grasp much of reality and therefore exists in a reality that is more complex than it can grasp.
Apr
18
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
I think you're conflating a computation with the outcome of a computation. The roads that computer built is not a computation in and of itself, it is the outcome of the computation that drove the machines to build that road. Similarly 5 is not a subtraction in and of itself, even though it is the outcome of 10 - 5, which is a subtraction. The question, as I understand it, focuses on whether something can exist inside a (hyper)computer that the hypercomputer cannot grasp. Not whether the (hyper)computer can exist in a reality where other things exist (that the hypercomputer cannot grasp)
Apr
18
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@Richard: (1) A computer may have peripherals but not every peripheral performs computation. Computation is not "everything any given computer can do with any peripheral". (2) Assymetric encryption can be cracked (or at least a similarly valid input value can be found for a given hash, even if it's not the value that was originally used) when you have infinite time to test every possible input value. (3) The 3D printed object is not in the computer. The computation of how to print it is. The actual object is the output, not the computation.
Apr
18
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@SueKDccia: Also, I did condense computer/hypercomputer and computable/hypercomputable; because I think the distinction is more of a linguistic hurdle than a benefit in scope of your question.
Apr
18
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@SueKDccia: If something exists, even if it cannot be perceived by its neighbors, and its scope of existence is within a hypercomputer of sorts, then by definition this hypercomputer can grasp the existence of this thing. Otherwise the hypercomputer could not define its existence.
Apr
17
comment In predicate logic, does existential quantification (∃) include universal quantification (∀), i.e. can 'some' imply 'all'?
@FedericoPoloni: Only if statement A (assume "if A then B") is false is it correct that B does not tell you anything about "if A then B" being correct or incorrect. But when A is true, B's correctness (or lack thereof) can make or break the validity of "if A then B". Therefore, the precise definition of A can influence whether A is correct; which in turn can lead to B (dis)proving "if A then B".
Apr
17
revised Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
added 154 characters in body
Apr
17
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@Richard: (1) "Unpersonable" is not to "person" what "computable" is to "computer". That's a semantic difference, not a logical or mathematical one. (2) The computer does not require infinite time, just an impractically large amount of time. Cryptography is a matter of reasonable impracticality. With infinite time, you have the time to test every possible state (of anything, really) and thus will always be able to crack anything. (3) I don't think we need to define "computer" if OP defines "(un)computable" as "uncomputable by any means" (as opposed to by a specific (limited) computer).
Apr
17
answered Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
Apr
17
comment Is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where things that could not be computed by it could exist?
@Richard: In regards to your cryptography mention: a computer cannot create something that is uncomputable (by semantical definition), but a computer can handle values that cannot be reverse engineered. That is a relevant distinction here. Hashes are not uncomputable, they simply aren't (practically) recomputable. And even then, it's often just a matter of partical time required, rather than being provably impossible.
Apr
17
comment Are we facing a new form of social prejudice and discrimination?
Are you focusing on man-made biases (things we program into the AI, consciously or subsonciously), or "self-grown" biases where the AI makes a conclusion (regardless of its objective correctness) which we would consider an unjust bias if a human made the same claim?
Apr
17
comment In predicate logic, does existential quantification (∃) include universal quantification (∀), i.e. can 'some' imply 'all'?
@FedericoPoloni [..] Which means that in logic, "Some newspaper readers are criminal" includes the possibility that all readers are criminal. And because this is a possibility, "Not all readers are criminal" is not provably true (it is false in the case where all readers happen to be criminals). And if that's not true, then "Not all reasonable people are criminal" can also not be provably true.
Apr
17
comment In predicate logic, does existential quantification (∃) include universal quantification (∀), i.e. can 'some' imply 'all'?
@FedericoPoloni If you assume that "Some newspaper readers are criminal" conclusively means "less than all"; then there is at least one reader who is not criminal, at which point your conclusion is correct: at least one reader (and thus reasonable person) is not criminal, which means that not all reasonable people are criminal (since we know of at least one exception, the person who made you say "some" instead of "all"). However, in logic, "some" does not explicitly specify that it is definitely less than all. In everyday language it does, but not in logic.
Mar
8
awarded  Critic
Mar
6
revised Where is the fallacy here?
added 298 characters in body