I don’t understand definitions.

  Let’s take this question: “What is a woman?”

Now if I am a Platonic Idealist (or some other essentialist) then I think that all women share the same essence and will attempt to give a comprehensive (as opposed to extensive) definition of “woman” according to its nature. I realize that not all instances of the “woman” class will be accurately described by its essential properties (a.k.a “proper accidents” as opposed to non-essential a.k.a “accidental” properties), but the nature of the concept “woman” will be adequate.

If I am a nominalist, then I reject the concept of natures or essences in so far as they actually objectively exist, so I can only define “woman” extensively (by including and describing every instance of the “woman” class).

The problem in the first case is that the definition might not describe all instances of the subject - is this a bad definition or is it just a case of every rule having an exception?

The problem in the second case is that the definition seems to be very loose and opposite to objective material reality.

  How are we supposed to define anything?

When people define woman as “humans who can give birth”, it is met with the response “not all woman are capable of giving birth, so you must think they aren’t women!” Does this mean that the definition is bad or does it mean that there are implications in the word “woman” (like “healthy” woman, or “humans who, 'if healthy’, can give birth” implying that a normal, healthy woman is capable of giving birth and that a woman incapable of giving birth is not healthy)? Commonsensically, a woman who can’t give birth is still a woman, so is “giving birth” an accidental property of "woman" as opposed to an essential one? It seems like if you give any property, even if it seems essential, there are instances where what we normally call “woman” doesn’t exhibit this essential property which either means the property is non-essential (and thus a bad definition) or we are dealing with an exception to the rule...

Am I making myself clear? How do we know that we define something properly when any exception could either mean that the definition itself is bad and needs to be changed to fit better data or the exception to the definition is inconsequential because of some implicit understanding in the word/definition itself?

I don’t understand how to create definitions. Let’s take this question: “What is a woman?”

Now if I am a Platonic Idealist (or some other essentialist) then I think that all women share the same essence and will attempt to give a comprehensive (as opposed to extensive) definition of “woman” according to its nature. I realize that not all instances of the “woman” class will be accurately described by its essential properties (a.k.a “proper accidents” as opposed to non-essential a.k.a “accidental” properties), but the nature of the concept “woman” will be adequate.

If I am a nominalist, then I reject the concept of natures or essences in so far as they actually objectively exist, so I can only define “woman” extensively (by including and describing every instance of the “woman” class).

The problem in the first case is that the definition might not describe all instances of the subject, the problem in the second case is that the definition seems to be very loose and opposite to objective material reality. How are we supposed to define anything?

Thus, I am led to how do we know we've defined a thing properly when all definitions seem to have exceptions?

I don’t understand definitions.

Let’s take this question: “What is a woman?”

Now if I am a Platonic Idealist (or some other essentialist) then I think that all women share the same essence and will attempt to give a comprehensive (as opposed to extensive) definition of “woman” according to its nature. I realize that not all instances of the “woman” class will be accurately described by its essential properties (a.k.a “proper accidents” as opposed to non-essential a.k.a “accidental” properties), but the nature of the concept “woman” will be adequate.

If I am a nominalist, then I reject the concept of natures or essences in so far as they actually objectively exist, so I can only define “woman” extensively (by including and describing every instance of the “woman” class).

The problem in the first case is that the definition might not describe all instances of the subject - is this a bad definition or is it just a case of every rule having an exception?

The problem in the second case is that the definition seems to be very loose and opposite to objective material reality.

How are we supposed to actually define anything?

When people define woman as “humans who can give birth”, it is met with the response “not all woman are capable of giving birth, so you must think they aren’t women!” Does this mean that the definition is bad or does it mean that there are implications in the word “woman” (like “healthy” woman, or “humans who, 'if healthy’, can give birth” implying that a normal, healthy woman is capable of giving birth and that a woman incapable of giving birth is not healthy)? Commonsensically, a woman who can’t give birth is still a woman, so is “giving birth” an accidental property of "woman" as opposed to an essential one? It seems like if you give any property, even if it seems essential, there are instances where what we normally call “woman” doesn’t exhibit this essential property which either means the property is non-essential (and thus a bad definition) or we are dealing with an exception to the rule.

Am I making myself clear? How do we know that we define something properly when any exception could either mean that the definition itself is bad and needs to be changed to fit better data or the exception to the definition is inconsequential because of some implicit understanding in the word/definition itself?

I don’t understand definitions.

Let’s take this question: “What is a woman?”

Now if I am a Platonic Idealist (or some other essentialist) then I think that all women share the same essence and will attempt to give a comprehensive (as opposed to extensive) definition of “woman” according to its nature. I realize that not all instances of the “woman” class will be accurately described by its essential properties (a.k.a “proper accidents” as opposed to non-essential a.k.a “accidental” properties), but the nature of the concept “woman” will be adequate.

If I am a nominalist, then I reject the concept of natures or essences in so far as they actually objectively exist, so I can only define “woman” extensively (by including and describing every instance of the “woman” class).

The problem in the first case is that the definition might not describe all instances of the subject - is this a bad definition or is it just a case of every rule having an exception?

The problem in the second case is that the definition seems to be very loose and opposite to objective material reality.

How are we supposed to define anything?

When people define woman as “humans who can give birth”, it is met with the response “not all woman are capable of giving birth, so you must think they aren’t women!” Does this mean that the definition is bad or does it mean that there are implications in the word “woman” (like “healthy” woman, or “humans who, 'if healthy’, can give birth” implying that a normal, healthy woman is capable of giving birth and that a woman incapable of giving birth is not healthy)? Commonsensically, a woman who can’t give birth is still a woman, so is “giving birth” an accidental property of "woman" as opposed to an essential one? It seems like if you give any property, even if it seems essential, there are instances where what we normally call “woman” doesn’t exhibit this essential property which either means the property is non-essential (and thus a bad definition) or we are dealing with an exception to the rule...

Am I making myself clear? How do we know that we define something properly when any exception could either mean that the definition itself is bad and needs to be changed to fit better data or the exception to the definition is inconsequential because of some implicit understanding in the word/definition itself?

I don’t understand definitions.

Let’s take this question: “What is a woman?”

Now if I am a Platonic Idealist (or some other essentialist) then I think that all women share the same essence and will attempt to give a comprehensive (as opposed to extensive) definition of “woman” according to its nature. I realize that not all instances of the “woman” class will be accurately described by its essential properties (a.k.a “proper accidents” as opposed to non-essential a.k.a “accidental” properties), but the nature of the concept “woman” will be adequate.

If I am a nominalist, then I reject the concept of natures or essences in so far as they actually objectively exist, so I can only define “woman” extensively (by including and describing every instance of the “woman” class).

The problem in the first case is that the definition might not describe all instances of the subject - is this a bad definition or is it just a case of every rule having an exception?

The problem in the second case is that the definition seems to be very loose and opposite to objective material reality.

How are we supposed to actually define anything?

When people define woman as “humans who can give birth”, it is met with the response “not all woman are capable of giving birth, so you must think they aren’t women!” Does this mean that the definition is bad or does it mean that there are implications in the word “woman” (like “healthy” woman, or “humans who, 'if healthy’, can give birth” implying that a normal, healthy woman is capable of giving birth and that a woman incapable of giving birth is not healthy)? Commonsensically, a woman who can’t give birth is still a woman, so is “giving birth” an accidental property of "woman" as opposed to an essential one? It seems like if you give any property, even if it seems essential, there are instances where what we normally call “woman” doesn’t exhibit this essential property which either means the property is non-essential (and thus a bad definition) or we are dealing with an exception to the rule.

Am I making myself clear? How do we know that we define something properly when any exception could either mean that the definition itself is bad and needs to be changed to fit better data or the exception to the definition is inconsequential because of some implicit understanding in the word/definition itself?

I don’t understand definitions.

Let’s take this question: “What is a woman?”

Now if I am a Platonic Idealist (or some other essentialist) then I think that all women share the same essence and will attempt to give a comprehensive (as opposed to extensive) definition of “woman” according to its nature. I realize that not all instances of the “woman” class will be accurately described by its essential properties (a.k.a “proper accidents” as opposed to non-essential a.k.a “accidental” properties), but the nature of the concept “woman” will be adequate.

If I am a nominalist, then I reject the concept of natures or essences in so far as they actually objectively exist, so I can only define “woman” extensively (by including and describing every instance of the “woman” class).

The problem in the first case is that the definition might not describe all instances of the subject - is this a bad definition or is it just a case of every rule having an exception?

The problem in the second case is that the definition seems to be very loose and opposite to objective material reality.

How are we supposed to actually define anything?

When people define woman as “humans who can give birth”, it is met with the response “not all woman are capable of giving birth, so you must think they aren’t women!” Does this mean that the definition is bad or does it mean that there are implications in the word “woman” (like “healthy” woman, or “humans who, 'if healthy’, can give birth” implying that a normal, healthy woman is capable of giving birth and that a woman incapable of giving birth is not healthy)? Commonsensically, a woman who can’t give birth is still a woman, so is “giving birth” an accidental property of "woman" as opposed to an essential one? It seems like if you give any property, even if it seems essential, there are instances where what we normally call “woman” doesn’t exhibit this essential property which either means the property is non-essential (and thus a bad definition) or we are dealing with an exception to the rule.

Am I making myself clear? How do we know that we define something properly when any exception could either mean that the definition itself is bad and needs to be changed to fit better data or the exception to the definition is inconsequential because of some implicit understanding in the word/definition itself?