I'll just add this regarding one form of intuition, from the Critique of Pure Reason 1781:-

4. Provisional explanation of the possibility of the categories as a priori cognitions.

There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or non-being take place. If one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accor­dance with concepts.

A111

Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us.

"Intuition without thought" (gedankenlose Anschauung) would be the myriad sensory reception of experience, except it is handled unconsciously so it appears as nothing, and yet it is the biophysical ground for cognition. But biophysics belongs to practical reason, not pure reason ie phenomenology, so by the latter it is not discerned. (Excuse me if I'm speculating beyond my sketchy knowledge.)

As discussed on Heidegger Forum 2022, it is aligned with Being in Heidegger's oeuvre, which also doubles-up as nothing.

The nothing is the "not" of beings, and is thus being, experienced from the perspective of beings. (Pathmarks p.97)

ie Being is not beings. Likewise intuition without thought is not thought experience. In both Kant's and Heidegger's cases add time and cognition to produces the 'beings', the things in experience. Thus is the phenomenological container put on the source of beings.

I'll just add this regarding one form of intuition, from the Critique of Pure Reason 1781:-

4. Provisional explanation of the possibility of the categories as a priori cognitions.

There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or non-being take place. If one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accor­dance with concepts.

A111

Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us.

"Intuition without thought" (gedankenlose Anschauung) would be the myriad sensory reception of experience, except it is handled unconsciously so it appears as nothing, and yet it is the biophysical ground for cognition. But biophysics belongs to practical reason, not pure reason ie phenomenology, so by the latter it is not discerned. (Excuse me if I'm speculating beyond my sketchy knowledge.)

As discussed on Heidegger Forum 2022, it is aligned with Being in Heidegger's oeuvre, which also doubles-up as nothing.

The nothing is the "not" of beings, and is thus being, experienced from the perspective of beings. (Pathmarks p.97)

ie Being is not beings. Likewise intuition without thought is not thought experience. In both Kant's and Heidegger's cases add time and cognition to produces the 'beings', the things in experience. Thus is the phenomenological container put on the source of beings.

I'll just add this regarding one form of intuition, from the Critique of Pure Reason 1781:-

4. Provisional explanation of the possibility of the categories as a priori cognitions.

There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all forms of appearance and all relationb of being or non-being take place. If one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accor­dance with concepts.

A111

Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us.

"Intuition without thought" (gedankenlose Anschauung) would be the myriad sensory reception of experience, except it is handled unconsciously so it appears as nothing, and yet it is the biophysical ground for cognition. But biophysics belongs to practical reason, not pure reason ie phenomenology, so by the latter it is not discerned. (Excuse me if I'm speculating beyond my sketchy knowledge.)

As discussed on Heidegger Forum 2022, it is aligned with Being in Heidegger's oeuvre, which also doubles-up as nothing.

The nothing is the "not" of beings, and is thus being, experienced from the perspective of beings. (Pathmarks p.97)

ie Being is not beings. Likewise intuition without thought is not thought experience. In both Kant's and Heidegger's cases add time and cognition to produces the 'beings', the things in experience. Thus is the phenomenological container put on the source of beings.

I'll just add this regarding one form of intuition, from the Critique of Pure Reason 1781:-

4. Provisional explanation of the possibility of the categories as a priori cognitions.

There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or non-being take place. If one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accor­dance with concepts.

A111

Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us.

"Intuition without thought" (gedankenlose Anschauung) would be the myriad sensory reception of experience, except it is handled unconsciously so it appears as nothing, and yet it is the biophysical ground for cognition. But biophysics belongs to practical reason, not pure reason ie phenomenology, so by the latter it is not discerned. (Excuse me if I'm speculating beyond my sketchy knowledge.)

As discussed on Heidegger Forum 2022, it is aligned with Being in Heidegger's oeuvre, which also doubles-up as nothing.

The nothing is the "not" of beings, and is thus being, experienced from the perspective of beings. (Pathmarks p.97)

ie Being is not beings. Likewise intuition without thought is not thought experience. In both Kant's and Heidegger's cases add time and cognition to produces the 'beings', the things in experience. Thus is the phenomenological container put on the source of beings.