If we're outside of logic (you wish to learn about noninferential judgments of authorities) then what good is any argument we offer to justify the legitimacy of illogical judgments. Note though that this, what I posit, may be a false dichotomy i.e. noninferential may not equate with illogical (vide infra)

Insofar as truth is concerned, have you encountered the notions of truthiness and verissimilitude which I consider to be noninferential judgments as regards truth/falsehood (some statements just feel true/false - our very own, inbuilt lasso of truth, aka lie/BS detector that has probably saved many lives).

What also of the concept of the virtuous person (re: Aristotle's virtue ethics) in ethics? It remains ill-defined or "means", mathematically, something divided by zero. A shift in focus from reason (Kant, Bentham-Mill) to an authority (the sophos, the rishi, the sage, kind courtesy of Aristotle).

Too, there seems to a thin line between argumentum ad verecundiam and argumentum ad baculum, which is a pity.

If we're outside of logic (you wish to learn about noninferential judgments of authorities) then what good is any argument we offer to justify the legitimacy of illogical judgments. Note though that this, what I posit, may be a false dichotomy i.e. noninferential may not equate with illogical (vide infra)

Insofar as truth is concerned, have you encountered the notions of truthiness and verisimilitude which I consider to be noninferential judgments as regards truth/falsehood (some statements just feel true/false - our very own, inbuilt lasso of truth, aka lie/BS detector that has probably saved many lives).

What also of the concept of the virtuous person (re: Aristotle's virtue ethics) in ethics? It remains ill-defined or "means", mathematically, something divided by zero. A shift in focus from reason (Kant, Bentham-Mill) to an authority (the sophos, the rishi, the sage, kind courtesy of Aristotle).

Too, there seems to be a thin line between argumentum ad verecundiam and argumentum ad baculum, which is a pity.

If we're outside of logic (you wish to learn about noninferential judgments of authorities) then what good is any argument we offer to justify the legitimacy of illogical judgments. Note though that this, what I posit, may be a false dichotomy i.e. noninferential may not equate with illogical.

Insofar as truth is concerned, have you encountered the notions of truthiness and verissimilitude which I consider to be noninferential judgments as regards truth/falsehood (some statements just feel true/false - our very own, inbuilt lasso of truth, aka lie/BS detector that has probably saved many lives).

What also of the concept of the virtuous person (re: Aristotle's virtue ethics) in ethics? It remains ill-defined or "means", mathematically, something divided by zero. A shift in focus from reason (Kant, Bentham-Mill) to an authority (the sophos, the rishi, the sage, kind courtesy of Aristotle).

Too, there seems to a thin line between argumentum ad verecundiam and argumentum ad baculum, which is a pity.

If we're outside of logic (you wish to learn about noninferential judgments of authorities) then what good is any argument we offer to justify the legitimacy of illogical judgments. Note though that this, what I posit, may be a false dichotomy i.e. noninferential may not equate with illogical (vide infra)

Insofar as truth is concerned, have you encountered the notions of truthiness and verissimilitude which I consider to be noninferential judgments as regards truth/falsehood (some statements just feel true/false - our very own, inbuilt lasso of truth, aka lie/BS detector that has probably saved many lives).

What also of the concept of the virtuous person (re: Aristotle's virtue ethics) in ethics? It remains ill-defined or "means", mathematically, something divided by zero. A shift in focus from reason (Kant, Bentham-Mill) to an authority (the sophos, the rishi, the sage, kind courtesy of Aristotle).

Too, there seems to a thin line between argumentum ad verecundiam and argumentum ad baculum, which is a pity.