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Dec 27, 2023 at 21:20 comment added SystemTheory Psychogenesis transcends maps of belief. My conclusion, as an applied philosopher, and student of electrical engineering and intellectual property law, is that the concept of a natural source of cause only arises in contrast to the concept of a moral source of cause. Law maps sources of cause to moral or natural causes; to proximate or ultimate causes; and to Acts of God (supernatural ultimate cause). Philosophers only invent names for distinct patterns of expression in human discourse. Philosophy and science arise in the context of self-other communication which arises via psychogenesis.
Dec 27, 2023 at 20:53 comment added J D "Does this mean the mind arises only as the product of a natural process?" To answer this question, we would first have to resolve 'natural'.
Dec 27, 2023 at 20:52 comment added J D @SystemTheory It is as wonderous as anything that can be observed. If you believe it is the result of the Wonderous and Starchy Creator of All Things Pasta, then I wouldn't begrudge you that experience. spaghettimonster.org/join
Dec 27, 2023 at 19:56 comment added SystemTheory "I would argue at this point in cognitive science, to see the mind as a product of anything other neural and chemical activity that captures the essence of the changes of state in the body is naive." Does this mean the mind arises only as the product of a natural process? But our models of natural processes arise as concepts in the mind! I find the origin of the mind is a mysterious Divine or Natural process. I call it the nameless God and/or Psychogenesis! Evaluation of truth-values in context, and the context in which concepts are tested, both arise as products of the nameless process.
Nov 27, 2023 at 18:21 comment added J D @user21312 When you're done with that introductory material, I have some other suggestions for you depending on how the theory integrates into your personal metaphysics. There are topics like categorial grammars, quantifier variance, and the Sellarsian "categorial given" that you might find relevant. ; ) It's a never ending rabbit hole of papers and theories if I'm honest.
Nov 27, 2023 at 17:21 comment added user21312 Thanks, this is gonna take some time to evalute!
Nov 27, 2023 at 17:13 history edited J D CC BY-SA 4.0
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Nov 27, 2023 at 16:58 comment added J D And if you haven't, understand Quine's argument in Two Dogmas where he undermines analyticity by rejecting reliable synonymy. That will save you from some grief when you get to the linguistics where linguists essentially reject that different syntax can in anyway lead to identical semantics.
Nov 27, 2023 at 16:57 history edited J D CC BY-SA 4.0
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Nov 27, 2023 at 16:54 comment added J D The best book I've found so far to see the representational theory of mind from a connectionist perspective is Shea's Representation in Cognitive Science. If any of this makes sense with you, or you want to escalate the conversation, let me know. I'm currently involved in NLP work regarding semantic systems, natural language ontology, and categories, so I'm knee deep in resources in this direction.
Nov 27, 2023 at 16:52 comment added J D the gap between empirical experience and the language that describes it, mathematics. In fact, there are actually a plurality of languages that describe that experience as made manifest by Curry-Howard-Lambek.
Nov 27, 2023 at 16:52 comment added J D Yes, the classical theory uses real definitions based on N&S. Lakoff follows Wittegenstein and Rosch down an alternative path of prototype theory. As far as intuition, of course, what one has to do is reject anything that leans towards the language of thought paradigm of intuition. Connectionist models like those of ML are better formal semantics for understanding what happens under the hood. Psychological reality is no problem at all, because reality can be dealt with as a domain of discourse that applies to self-awareness that bridges...
Nov 27, 2023 at 16:49 comment added J D You said: "So far I take concepts to be mental representations i.e "semantically evaluable mental objects" and according to the "classical theory" they are characterised by sets of necessary and sufficent conditions. The only problem that I dont think I will be able to get rid of is called "The Problem of Psychological Reality" in my reference. I seems impossible to argue or prove that concepts(even in math) actually work this way, I still think there is something called intution which is hard to explain in this way, at least formally"
Nov 27, 2023 at 16:49 history answered J D CC BY-SA 4.0