When does permission equal moral permissibility?

I definitely feel there is a difference, but am struggling to verbalize it.

In nazi germany, I may be legally permitted to execute jewish people, but not morally so. Likewise, I have would prefer not to eat sardines for dinner again this evening, and I won't allow it of myself, but I am morally permitted to. Again, I do not give you explicit permission to do many things (I've not read the ToS closely, but I have never explicitly agreed to e.g. anyone at all following me here from other parts of the internet and real life, though my use of an public access site suggests I may do so anyway), and do not even implicitly give you permission to do others (following me for personal gain), but there may be no deontic prohibition against doing so, and it may be in the greater good.

Indeed, what I permit of someone may be different from what others permit of them (unlike Jake did, I do not permit my wife to sleep with Jake).

There does seem to be a non moral permission.

The obvious is when it is moral. Is that all that can be said?

When does permission equal moral permissibility?

I definitely feel there is a difference, but am struggling to verbalize it.

In Nazi Germany, I may be legally permitted to execute Jewish people, but not morally so. Likewise, I have would prefer not to eat sardines for dinner again this evening, and I won't allow it of myself, but I am morally permitted to. 

Again, I do not give you explicit permission to do many things (I've not read the Terms of Service closely, but I have never explicitly agreed to: e.g., anyone at all following me here from other parts of the internet and real life, though my use of an public access site suggests I may do so anyway), and do not even implicitly give you permission to do others (following me for personal gain); but there may be no deontic prohibition against doing so, and it may be in the greater good.

Indeed, what I permit of someone may be different from what others permit of them (unlike Jake did, I do not permit my wife to sleep with Jake).

There does seem to be a non-moral permission.

The obvious is when it is moral. Is that all that can be said?

When does permission equal moral permissibility? I definitely feel there is a difference, but am struggling to verbalize it.

In nazi germany, I may be legally permitted to execute jewish people, but not morally so. Likewise, I have would prefer not to eat sardines for dinner again this evening, and I won't allow it of myself, but I am morally permitted to. Again, I do not give you explicit permission to do many things (I've not read the ToS closely, but I have never explicitly agreed to e.g. anyone at all following me here from other parts of the internet and real life, though my use of an public access site suggests I may do so anyway), and do not even implicitly give you permission to do others (following me for personal gain), but there may be no deontic prohibition against doing so, and it may be in the greater good.

Indeed, what I permit of someone may be different from what others permit of them (unlike Jake did, I do not permit my wife to sleep with Jake).

There does seem to be a non moral permission.

Is that all there is to it or is permissibility constructed out of a social contract that does not allow for permission that is not a moral permission?

When does permission equal moral permissibility?

I definitely feel there is a difference, but am struggling to verbalize it.

In nazi germany, I may be legally permitted to execute jewish people, but not morally so. Likewise, I have would prefer not to eat sardines for dinner again this evening, and I won't allow it of myself, but I am morally permitted to. Again, I do not give you explicit permission to do many things (I've not read the ToS closely, but I have never explicitly agreed to e.g. anyone at all following me here from other parts of the internet and real life, though my use of an public access site suggests I may do so anyway), and do not even implicitly give you permission to do others (following me for personal gain), but there may be no deontic prohibition against doing so, and it may be in the greater good.

Indeed, what I permit of someone may be different from what others permit of them (unlike Jake did, I do not permit my wife to sleep with Jake).

There does seem to be a non moral permission.

The obvious is when it is moral. Is that all that can be said?

When does permission equal moral permissibility? I definitely feel there is a difference, but am struggling to verbalize it.

In nazi germany, I may be legally permitted to execute jewish people, but not morally so. Likewise, I have would prefer not to eat sardines for dinner again this evening, and I won't allow it of myself, but I am morally permitted to. Again, I do not give you explicit permission to do many things (I've not read the ToS closely, but I have never explicitly agreed to e.g. anyone at all following me here from other parts of the internet and real life, though my use of an public access site suggests I may do so anyway), and do not even implicitly give you permission to do others (following me for personal gain), but there may be no deontic prohibition against doing so, and it may be in the greater good.

Indeed, what I permit of someone may be different from what others permit of them (I do not permit my life to sleep with Jake, but Jake did).

There does seem to be a non moral permission.

Is that all there is to it or is permissibility constructed out of a social contract that does not allow for permission that is not a moral permission?

When does permission equal moral permissibility? I definitely feel there is a difference, but am struggling to verbalize it.

In nazi germany, I may be legally permitted to execute jewish people, but not morally so. Likewise, I have would prefer not to eat sardines for dinner again this evening, and I won't allow it of myself, but I am morally permitted to. Again, I do not give you explicit permission to do many things (I've not read the ToS closely, but I have never explicitly agreed to e.g. anyone at all following me here from other parts of the internet and real life, though my use of an public access site suggests I may do so anyway), and do not even implicitly give you permission to do others (following me for personal gain), but there may be no deontic prohibition against doing so, and it may be in the greater good.

Indeed, what I permit of someone may be different from what others permit of them (unlike Jake did, I do not permit my wife to sleep with Jake).

There does seem to be a non moral permission.

Is that all there is to it or is permissibility constructed out of a social contract that does not allow for permission that is not a moral permission?