If Etymonline's article on 'grounding' is to be believed, 'grounding' as a term for arguments goes back to the 14th century with potential roots back into Old English. From the article:
mid-13c., "to put on the ground, to strike down to the ground;" late 14c., "lay the foundation of," also, figuratively, "to base" (an argument, sermon, etc.), from ground (n.). Meaning "instruct thoroughly in the basics" is from late 14c. Of ships, "to run into the ground," from mid-15c. (intransitive), transitive sense from 1650s. Of arms, from 1711. Electrical sense from 1881. Meaning "deny privileges" is 1940s, originally a punishment meted out to pilots (in which sense it is attested from 1930). In the sense "establish firmly" Old English had grundweallian, grundstaðelian; also gryndan "descend," gegryndan "to found."
Clearly, an electrical ground state comes 400 years after the sense we use in philosophy. I would suggest this makes sense because "laying the foundation of an argument" is a metaphor for the beginning stages of building an edifice or structure and thus is metaphorical. Intuitively, grounding of meaning or argument appeals to the intuitions that a building without a good foundation will not stand, quite literally.
For instance, Robert Audi makes deliberate and extensive use of the metaphor in several of his works. In particular, The Architecture of Reason (GB) (one of my go-to's on rationality) he explicitly discusses the metaphor. He then goes on to explain the core tenets of the theory he presents in the first two chapters before moving forward. Thus, any similarities drawn that exceed this notion of metaphor would seem to be from commonalities between electrical thinking and architectural thinking, or stem from a very imaginative brain, conceivability being an important skill in philosophy naturally.
Thus, from your own citation:
Ultimately, however, it seems that the “Is grounding old or new?” question should give way to nuanced and text-based discussions of structural similarities and causal continuities between specific thinkers.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to in specific cases, consider certain hair-splitters may directly be inspired by QM in the development of their idiolect. Such claims, however, would not apply in the general case, as it seems the intuitive power of the metaphor is a much more likely motivation for use, and that any specific claims for any specific thinker would need to be supported with historical evidence.