Timeline for Are your memories part of you?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
8 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Nov 14 at 22:03 | comment | added | keshlam | I believe the self is a set of wetware running on the neurons of the body. Since damages to the neurons can damage the self, there is clearly a material basis. However, like software, I believe the self/mind is a set of stored and interacting neuronal states rather than being a separate physical object. Any conflict between the two comes from refusing to recognize that they are a single system. | |
| Jun 9 at 18:51 | history | edited | Jo Wehler | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 6 characters in body
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| Jun 9 at 17:41 | history | edited | Jo Wehler | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
edited body
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| Jun 9 at 5:06 | comment | added | Rushi | Here you come to the nub of the matter @leepappas. Materialists are inconsistent — so hopelessly iinconsistent and fundamentally self-defeating that they cannot recognize it. | |
| Jun 8 at 22:59 | comment | added | lee pappas | You stated: In any case, the self is net of mental processes, hence a dynamic structure. It cannot be localized. I strongly disagree. The self is a unit, a one thing, so it can be localized. It is a dynamic structure on the microscopic scale, but macroscopically it is a body that is localized. | |
| Jun 8 at 22:14 | comment | added | Jo Wehler | @lee pappas Please recall my previous definition of the self as a self-model in the sense of Metzinger's self-model theory. | |
| Jun 8 at 21:48 | comment | added | lee pappas | your response seems to me to be coming from an AI program. Do you really believe the self is a set of incorporeal processes. Many of your beliefs seem intelligent, but this one seems artificially unintelligent. | |
| Jun 8 at 21:10 | history | answered | Jo Wehler | CC BY-SA 4.0 |