Timeline for Does the denial of epiphenomenalism involve positing more hard problems?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
6 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 4 at 22:08 | comment | added | mudskipper | I don't see that. A theory that embeds consciousness into the physical world by causal links, should explain those links both ways (to and from consciousness as it were). Also, in my definition of epiphenomalism consciousness strictly speaking has no cause. (Some kind of event that precedes it and that would "create" it as it were. Causes that preceded events in time are problematic anyway.) | |
| Nov 4 at 21:09 | comment | added | Syed | your point 1.) begs the question: "that very same theory will (or should) also explain the reverse, namely, "how consciousness causally impacts the material world"". How do you know that it causally impacts the material world in the first place? Secondly, "Strictly speaking, there is no "cause" for consciousness -- at least not according to an epiphenomenalist point of view." This just seems to be incorrect. Epiphenomenalism does not state that there is no cause for consciousness, just that consciousness plays no causal role. | |
| Nov 4 at 18:34 | history | edited | J D | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 2 characters in body
|
| Nov 4 at 18:34 | comment | added | J D | +1 "I believe what makes this confusing is that consciousness (or sentience) is very real (as we all know), but that the unity of consciousness, the unity and "immediacy" of experience, its "luminosity" -- all that which convinced Descartes that the mind exists, is indivisible and therefore not physical -- is an illusion (or rather: it's something constructed and to be explained" The ever increasingly abstract path from concrete sensation to highly obtuse conception. The OP may find en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operationalization of some interest. | |
| Nov 4 at 17:51 | history | edited | mudskipper | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 3 characters in body
|
| Nov 4 at 17:31 | history | answered | mudskipper | CC BY-SA 4.0 |