In Canada, there are two limiting principles at play. You have quoted one, but have imported concepts from a second.
- Automatism: Conduct over which one does not have volitional control cannot be criminal.
- Not criminally responsible due to mental disorder: No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong.
Automatism
Conduct that is involuntary (in the sense of having no conscious control or awareness of one's actions) "cannot be criminal" (R. v. Brown, 2022 SCC 18):
To deprive a person of their liberty for that involuntary conduct committed in a state akin to automatism — conduct that cannot be criminal — violates the principles of fundamental justice in a system of criminal justice based on personal responsibility for one’s actions.
That is a very high bar. This kind of automatism is where a person has "no voluntary control" over their actions. There is "no connection between mind and body." Examples include "the involuntary physical movement of an individual who has suffered a heart attack or seizure" or "conditions such as sleepwalking or delirium, where the body moves but there is no link between mind and body."
Physical voluntariness is a principle of fundamental justice and a requirement of all true criminal offences, central to the criminal law’s desire to avoid convicting the morally innocent. ... Absent a willed movement of the body, the Crown cannot prove the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.
Not criminally responsible due to mental disorder
This is a defence created by Parliament. It was a choice of Parliament to not hold people criminally responsible when they suffer from a mental disorder preventing them from appreciating the wrongness of their actions.
Glanville Williams notes that this sort of defence is a mens rea defence. See Textbook of Criminal Law, p. 644: "Did he know what he was doing?... Did he know he was killing someone; did he know that he was sticking a knife into someone."
As for the second prong of the test (whether the accused lacks the capacity to know the act was wrong), the Supreme Court has described it like this:
The crux of the inquiry is whether the accused lacks the capacity to rationally decide whether the act is right or wrong and hence to make a rational choice about whether to do it or not. The inability to make a rational choice may result from a variety of mental disfunctions; as the following passages indicate these include at a minimum the states to which the psychiatrists testified in this case -- delusions which make the accused perceive an act which is wrong as right or justifiable, and a disordered condition of the mind which deprives the accused of the ability to rationally evaluate what he is doing.
...
A person may have adequate intelligence to know that the commission of a certain act, e.g., murder, is wrong but at the time of the commission of the act in question he may be so obsessed with delusions or subject to impulses which are the product of insanity that he is incapable of bringing his mind to bear on what he is doing and the considerations which to normal people would make the act right or wrong. In such a situation the accused should be exempt from criminal liability.
Canadian law does not require a person to have "full control" or understand the "full implications" of an impulse in order to be subject to criminal penalties. It is enough that their mind is controlling their body and that they don't have a mental disorder that prevents them from knowing what they're doing or that it is wrong.