Timeline for Can Bayes' theorem be used non-fallaciously to argue for miracles?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
19 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Dec 5 at 14:49 | answer | added | Cort Ammon | timeline score: 5 | |
| Dec 5 at 0:59 | vote | accept | user80226 | ||
| Dec 4 at 20:24 | history | edited | J D | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 4 characters in body
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| Dec 4 at 20:19 | answer | added | J D | timeline score: 1 | |
| Dec 4 at 20:09 | answer | added | Ted Wrigley | timeline score: 3 | |
| Dec 4 at 16:18 | answer | added | user80226 | timeline score: 3 | |
| Dec 4 at 11:28 | answer | added | Roger V. | timeline score: 3 | |
| Dec 4 at 5:47 | answer | added | NotThatGuy | timeline score: 2 | |
| Dec 4 at 4:57 | history | became hot network question | |||
| Dec 4 at 0:58 | comment | added | benrg | As far as I can tell, Price didn't use Bayes' ideas at all; e.g. he says on page 407-408 that if past testimony was correct 10 times per 1 time wrong, and you hear testimony for an event for which your prior was 100 to 1 against its happening, then your posterior should be 10 to 1 for its happening, ignoring the prior completely. Hume's argument seems closer to Bayesian than Price's, judging by the summary in Price's essay. | |
| Dec 3 at 23:06 | answer | added | b a | timeline score: 0 | |
| Dec 3 at 23:01 | answer | added | Syed | timeline score: 1 | |
| Dec 3 at 22:42 | comment | added | Kaia | In looking into the other question, there's an abundance of modern papers from the 80s-10s that attempt to answer this question in either direction. Google scholar | |
| Dec 3 at 21:59 | comment | added | Dcleve | One of the challenges in using Bayes theorem is that establishing the values of one's priors, and the weights of supplemental evidence, are both subjective decisions. IF one's prior is very larger or very small, then there is little influence that additional observations for or against add to a decision. AND we are very subject to self-deception about the degree of confidence we have in our priors. Under Bayesian calculus, Hume would still have calculated he should dismiss even thousands of observations, due to his internal degree of certainty in materialism. | |
| Dec 3 at 21:49 | answer | added | Ray | timeline score: 18 | |
| Dec 3 at 21:45 | comment | added | Conifold | Bayes's theorem can obviously be used to show that Hume's argument against miracles does not work, that does not exactly amount to an argument for miracles. And a theorem no more contributes to empirical for/against arguments than arithmetic and probability calculus generally, they are viewpoint-neutral. | |
| Dec 3 at 21:30 | comment | added | Kaia | Some useful links for anyone looking for a quote here: On the importance... from Price, & "Of Miracles" from Hume | |
| Dec 3 at 21:20 | review | Close votes | |||
| Dec 9 at 3:02 | |||||
| Dec 3 at 20:56 | history | asked | user80226 | CC BY-SA 4.0 |