Timeline for Why is Multiple Realizability considered to have refuted the type-identity theory of the mind?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
6 events
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| Jun 17, 2020 at 8:34 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
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| Jun 3, 2019 at 13:30 | comment | added | Michael Angelo | @Cain yes, and I’m saying that this is not a problem because there no sensible reason to assume that the pain you experience now is the same as what you experienced as a child. | |
| Jun 3, 2019 at 13:16 | comment | added | Cain | @MichaelAngelo Exactly. You felt pain as a child, and you feel pain now, but clearly your brain state can't be the same as it was when you were a child on too granular a level. This then implies that two different brain states both caused "pain", aka pain was Multiply Realized. | |
| Jun 1, 2019 at 13:55 | comment | added | Michael Angelo | Of course you still felt pain as a child, pain is something very broad and vague. It’s like saying you never experienced fruit juice as a child because you moved to another country where the oranges are a different species. | |
| Apr 6, 2018 at 15:35 | comment | added | JAB | "Even more important, if you change mental states, i.e you stop liking Metallica, this would mean a large physical change has occurred in your brain, but this is something that's never been detected." Brain activity is a well-measured phenomenon, though. Brains do go through physical changes based on what they are thinking. An example would be something like ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29573366, though I guess that's not exactly what you meant as you're talking about a higher-level concept. Put another way, brain state isn't just neuron arrangement but also neuron activity. | |
| Aug 25, 2015 at 22:31 | history | answered | Cain | CC BY-SA 3.0 |