According to the SEP, this was first tackled by Aristotle in his four-fold theory of causation; he recognises that the theory of causation he had inherited typically distinguished two types of cause: material and efficient and thus he needs to justify his introduction of final cause, which he does:

In Physics II8, by showing that an opponent who claims that material and efficient cause alone suffices to explain natural change fails to account for their *characteristic regularity

Since in the world there are many things occurring at once; and sometimes in one way, and at other times in another; the neccessary character can sometimes be difficult to discern; one might speculate this was why astronomy was seen originally as the science par excellance that reveals the hidden order as the stars move to the music of the spheres - in fact we only need look up at the sky to observe this, and see it directly as theatre of permenance, in contrast to the earth where all things are subject to change: coming to be (genesis) and passing away (phthora).

Of course, on the cosmological scale the heavens are as subject to change as much as all on earth are; but this is our senses magnified by both the instruments of our practical and theoretical sciences; on the human scale - that which we see directly by our own eyes - this distinction remains: and then one can ask is this regularity, this permanence that we see in the skies - the stars in their courses - is illusionary or real; or more deeply, reflects something real.

In Aristotles language, Hume shows that causality is a form of regularity, whose regularity needs explaining; for Hume this was the minds habit of regularising.

Kant replaces habit by what he calls a transcendental argument: arguing from what is, to what the conditions must be to make this possible.

But given Aristotles thesis that such an explanation of the regularity found in nature is a final cause, it's an intriguing question whether Hume or Kant regarded it as such.

According to Andrea Falcon's SEP article, "Aristotle on Causality", this was first tackled by Aristotle in his four-fold theory of causation. Aristotle recognized that the theory of causation he had inherited typically distinguished two types of cause: material and efficient and thus he needed to justify his introduction of final cause, which he did:

Physics II 8 contains Aristotle's most general defense of final causality. Here Aristotle establishes that explaining nature requires final causality by discussing a difficulty that may be advanced by an opponent who denies that there are final causes in nature. Aristotle shows that an opponent who claims that material and efficient causes alone suffice to explain natural change fails to account for their characteristic regularity.

Since in the world there are many things occurring at once, sometimes in one way and at other times in another, the necessary character can sometimes be difficult to discern. One might speculate this was why astronomy was seen originally as the science par excellence that reveals the hidden order as the stars move to the music of the spheres. In fact we only need look up at the sky to observe this, and see it directly as a theater of permanence, in contrast to the earth where all things are subject to change: coming to be (genesis) and passing away (phthora).

Of course, on the cosmological scale the heavens are as subject to change as much as all on earth are, but this is to our senses magnified by both the instruments of our practical and theoretical sciences. On the human scale - that which we see directly by our own eyes - this distinction remains. Then one can ask: is this regularity, this permanence that we see in the skies - the stars in their courses - is this illusionary or real? Or, more deeply, does this reflect something real?

In Aristotle's language, Hume showed that causality is a form of regularity, whose regularity needs explaining. For Hume this was the mind's habit of regularizing.

Kant replaced this habit by what he called a transcendental argument: arguing from what is to what the conditions must be to make this possible.

But given Aristotle's thesis that such an explanation of the regularity found in nature is a final cause, it's an intriguing question whether Hume or Kant regarded it as such.

Falcon, Andrea, "Aristotle on Causality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/aristotle-causality/.

According to the SEP, this was first tackled by Aristotle in his four-fold theory of causation; he recognises that the theory of causation he had inherited typically distinguished two types of cause: material and efficient and thus he needs to justify his introduction of final cause, which he does:

In Physics II8, by showing that an opponent who claims that material and efficient cause alone suffices to explain natural change fails to account for their *characteristic regularity

Since in the world there are many things occurring at once; and sometimes in one way, and at other times in another; the neccessary character can sometimes be difficult to discern; one might speculate this was why astronomy was seen originally as the science that reveals the hidden order as the stars move to the music of the spheres.

In Aristotles language, Hume shows that causality is a form of regularity, whose regularity needs explaining; for Hume this was the minds habit of regularising.

Kant replaces habit by what he calls a transcendental argument: arguing from what is, to what the conditions must be to make this possible.

But given Aristotles thesis that such an explanation of the regularity found in nature is a final cause, it's an intriguing question whether Hume or Kant regarded it as such.

According to the SEP, this was first tackled by Aristotle in his four-fold theory of causation; he recognises that the theory of causation he had inherited typically distinguished two types of cause: material and efficient and thus he needs to justify his introduction of final cause, which he does:

In Physics II8, by showing that an opponent who claims that material and efficient cause alone suffices to explain natural change fails to account for their *characteristic regularity

Since in the world there are many things occurring at once; and sometimes in one way, and at other times in another; the neccessary character can sometimes be difficult to discern; one might speculate this was why astronomy was seen originally as the science par excellance that reveals the hidden order as the stars move to the music of the spheres - in fact we only need look up at the sky to observe this, and see it directly as theatre of permenance, in contrast to the earth where all things are subject to change: coming to be (genesis) and passing away (phthora).

Of course, on the cosmological scale the heavens are as subject to change as much as all on earth are; but this is our senses magnified by both the instruments of our practical and theoretical sciences; on the human scale - that which we see directly by our own eyes - this distinction remains: and then one can ask is this regularity, this permanence that we see in the skies - the stars in their courses - is illusionary or real; or more deeply, reflects something real.

In Aristotles language, Hume shows that causality is a form of regularity, whose regularity needs explaining; for Hume this was the minds habit of regularising.

Kant replaces habit by what he calls a transcendental argument: arguing from what is, to what the conditions must be to make this possible.

But given Aristotles thesis that such an explanation of the regularity found in nature is a final cause, it's an intriguing question whether Hume or Kant regarded it as such.