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Nov 5 at 13:37 answer added Mr. Tea timeline score: 1
Apr 23 at 7:15 answer added Pertti Ruismäki timeline score: -2
Jan 21, 2023 at 23:16 comment added Somatic Custard Douglas Hofstadter's I Am a Strange Loop is a very intriguing exploration of how -- even if it is not actually the case that the mental can influence the physical -- it can still be helpful to imagine that it does. This touches on (at least) two notions: the notion of a metaphorical truth, and the fact that you can conceive of an object or a process in more than one way. Why did the basketball go in the hoop? Because I have been practicing. Or because I shot it at a certain angle. Or because of statistical mechanical interactions at the particle level. Or...
Aug 9, 2018 at 13:56 answer added present timeline score: 1
Oct 5, 2017 at 11:10 comment added user20253 Likewise, if matter is psycho-physical then you have a false dichotomy.
Dec 13, 2016 at 14:36 comment added Cdn_Dev "Regardless of whether the mental is ultimately physical or not" -- doesn't the answer to this question fundamentally alter what you're proposing? If the body is a totality then mental/physical is a false dichotomy.
Sep 20, 2016 at 21:09 history edited Conifold CC BY-SA 3.0
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Aug 17, 2016 at 22:03 comment added user9166 When you learn where the restaurant is, physical recording of the information in our brain occurs, (which you simplify in your memory of the experience as "learning") and so your body can use that to find the restaurant back. There is no problem with that unless you pretend your brain does not exist.
Aug 17, 2016 at 21:55 comment added user9166 The idea is that we simplify things to refer to them, so we cannot simplify the cause and not simplify the effect, you have to do both or neither.
Aug 17, 2016 at 21:49 comment added user9166 You are talking about the mental events that lead to knowledge. But in epiphenomenalism, there would be no such thing, there would be physical events that lead to memory, and we would reinterpret those as mental events that lead to knowledge. You can't mix real phenomena and epiphenomena without tracing causality closer, or you are putting up a straw man. Epiphenomenalism presupposes a perfect causal link between the phenomena of brain activity taking place in real time and the epiphenomena of mental activity which we will later recall those phenomena as.
Aug 17, 2016 at 21:30 comment added Ameet Sharma @jobermark, what do you mean by "at the granularity where the rest of your post speaks" ? I'm simply taking epiphenomenalism as no causal link between mental and physical. If this is wrong please define epiphenomenalism for me. Thanks.
Aug 17, 2016 at 19:38 comment added user9166 Epiphenomenalism and parallelism do not in any way presume no effect of the mental on the physical at the granularity where the rest of your post speaks. If the mental is an expression of the physical, then the physical it espresses has effects on the other physical, and that is an effect of the mental on the physical as far as the analysis here goes. Obviously when I speak my mentation is having physical effects in the vague terms you are speaking in. Don't put up straw men.
Aug 16, 2016 at 10:54 answer added Potts timeline score: 2
Aug 16, 2016 at 1:20 history edited Conifold
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May 22, 2016 at 1:46 history edited Conifold CC BY-SA 3.0
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May 6, 2016 at 0:32 history edited Conifold CC BY-SA 3.0
edited tags; edited title
Apr 12, 2016 at 1:59 answer added user20502 timeline score: 1
Mar 1, 2016 at 8:20 answer added Guill timeline score: 0
Feb 28, 2016 at 15:09 answer added E... timeline score: 3
Feb 28, 2016 at 14:03 answer added Marco Disce timeline score: 1
Feb 27, 2016 at 12:13 history tweeted twitter.com/StackPhilosophy/status/703553514509881344
Feb 25, 2016 at 23:40 vote accept Ameet Sharma
Feb 25, 2016 at 20:51 answer added Conifold timeline score: 13
Feb 25, 2016 at 12:10 comment added Mozibur Ullah It's not enough, I suppose for some, to posit or demonstrate a link; when the link is non-specific and abstract, as in a non-constructive existential proof in mathematics; some, I suppose want every detail spelled out.
Feb 25, 2016 at 6:15 comment added Ameet Sharma @AlexanderSKing, yes you're basically asking the same question. I think this argument against epiphenomenalism (conceptual knowledge is mental which clearly affects the physical), is a more powerful argument than talking about mental events like "desires" or "willing".
Feb 25, 2016 at 6:08 comment added Alexander S King I asked a similar question a few months ago, and didn't get any answers. I suppose the jury is out on this one. philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/29876/…
Feb 25, 2016 at 5:44 history asked Ameet Sharma CC BY-SA 3.0