Timeline for Have any philosophers applied the concept of "underdetermination" to non-scientific contexts?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
11 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 5, 2020 at 17:33 | comment | added | gonzo | It seems that what we have ended up with is a radical/global skepticism and anti-realism as to the traditionally conceived “real world” (your “classics”), increasingly coupled with radical realism with respect to systemic abstract objects [with causal powers]: cf. structural realism, systemic realism, moral realism, etc. In this way, the “goal of inquiry” remains, “truth,” but truth of an entirely different sort. One which, because founded upon linguistic idealism, rather than, say, ontological realism, is highly unstable. | |
| Aug 5, 2020 at 17:33 | comment | added | gonzo | The question is at what point did the swing become "too much,” too much [Rortian] linguistic idealism, the linguistic turn's over-seeping into the notion of rational basis in science (qua Zammito], and into the folk epistemology of our culture. (qua Zammito), for instance. And once the substance of your first three sentences are granted, what constraints have we against, the, slide/descent into the exuberance described in your final two sentences. | |
| Aug 5, 2020 at 10:12 | history | edited | Conifold | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 3 characters in body
|
| Aug 5, 2020 at 10:10 | comment | added | Conifold | @gonzo Thank you. Yes, I do think that after classics overdid it with absolutes the pendulum has swung the other way much too far. | |
| Aug 5, 2020 at 3:17 | comment | added | gonzo | Well done Conifold. Do not recall having the pleasure of reading this earlier. Is this pretty much what you believe today? | |
| Apr 13, 2017 at 12:42 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
replaced http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/ with https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/
|
|
| Jul 20, 2016 at 2:09 | history | edited | Conifold | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
added 1 character in body
|
| May 16, 2016 at 19:11 | comment | added | Conifold | @Matt There is a nuance, undetermination goes hand in hand with the theory-ladenness of observations thesis, so adequacy is not to be taken as individual matching of theory to "neutral facts", but as overall effectiveness of scientific schemes, methodology included, in their domains of application. This is the gist of Quine's naturalized epistemology, developed around the time of Word and Object, and its current popularity has much to do with it being far more defensible philosophically than traditional scientific realism. Zammito even uses it to criticize Quine's own excesses. | |
| May 16, 2016 at 19:04 | history | edited | Conifold | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
added 2 characters in body
|
| May 16, 2016 at 1:00 | comment | added | Matt Diamond | Interesting point about empirical adequacy being safe... would this imply that it IS a problem for scientific realists but not for constructive empiricists? | |
| May 15, 2016 at 23:08 | history | answered | Conifold | CC BY-SA 3.0 |