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I'd be surprised; the intuitive way of looking at Gödel's theorems is to consider the following statement:

What is proveable is true

Given the intuitive understanding of what is understood by proof, this appears to be trivially true, and not a statement that one would object to; but consider now it's converse:

What is true is proveable

This is much more problematic: that God exists may be true, but unprovable.

Now, Gödel showed, via formal languages, that there are true statements that are unproveable; so the above is actually false.

Can Kantian antinomies show the same thing? If so, one can largely say they, if not anticipating Gödel's exact result, have a family resemblence to them.

But this doesn't appear to be possible, since both statements in a Kantian antimony are plausibly true, in Kants own hands this means there is a limit to reason, whereas in Hegels and Priests readings they are more akin to dialethism.

I'd be surprised; the intuitive way of looking at Gödel's theorems is to consider the following statement:

What is proveable is true

Given the intuitive understanding of what is understood by proof, this appears to be trivially true, and not a statement that one would object to; interestingly, this means in Kants terminology, that it is an analytic proposition.

but consider now it's converse:

What is true is proveable

This is much more problematic: that God exists may be true, but unprovable.

Now, Gödel showed, via formal languages, that there are true statements that are unproveable; so the above is actually false.

Can Kantian antinomies show the same thing? If so, one can largely say they, if not anticipating Gödel's exact result, have a family resemblence to them.

But this doesn't appear to be possible, since both statements in a Kantian antimony are plausibly true, in Kants own hands this means there is a limit to reason, whereas in Hegels and Priests readings they are more akin to dialethism.

I'd be surprised; the intuitive way of looking at Godels theorems is to consider the following statement:

What is proveable is true

Given the intuitive understanding of what is understood by proof, this appears to be trivially true, and not a statement that one would object to; but consider now it's converse:

What is true is proveable

This is much more problematic: that God exists may be true, but unprovable.

Now, Godel showed, via formal languages, that there are true statements that are unproveable; so the above is actually false.

Can Kantian antinomies show the same thing? If so, one can largely say they, if not anticipating Godels exact result, have a family resemblence to them.

But this doesn't appear to be possible, since both statements in a Kantian antimony are plausibly true, in Kants own hands this means there is a limit to reason, whereas in Hegels and Priests readings they are more akin to dialethism.

I'd be surprised; the intuitive way of looking at Gödel's theorems is to consider the following statement:

What is proveable is true

Given the intuitive understanding of what is understood by proof, this appears to be trivially true, and not a statement that one would object to; but consider now it's converse:

What is true is proveable

This is much more problematic: that God exists may be true, but unprovable.

Now, Gödel showed, via formal languages, that there are true statements that are unproveable; so the above is actually false.

Can Kantian antinomies show the same thing? If so, one can largely say they, if not anticipating Gödel's exact result, have a family resemblence to them.

But this doesn't appear to be possible, since both statements in a Kantian antimony are plausibly true, in Kants own hands this means there is a limit to reason, whereas in Hegels and Priests readings they are more akin to dialethism.

I'd be surprised; the intuitive way of looking at Godels theorems is to consider the following statement:

What is proveable is true

Given the intuitive understanding of what is understood by proof, this appears to be trivially true, and not a statement that one would object to; but consider now it's converse:

What is true is proveable

This is much more problematic: that God exists may be true, but unprovable.

Now, Godel showed, via formal languages, that there are true statements that are unproveable; so the above is actually false.

Kantian antinomies, demonstrate, that certain ontological commitments such as there is a beginning to time or that there isn't have good arguments for both; in the line of argument taken by Hegel and Priest, it's more akin to dialethism, and this kind of argument is different in kind to Godels; though, I think that there is a family resemblence.

I'd be surprised; the intuitive way of looking at Godels theorems is to consider the following statement:

What is proveable is true

Given the intuitive understanding of what is understood by proof, this appears to be trivially true, and not a statement that one would object to; but consider now it's converse:

What is true is proveable

This is much more problematic: that God exists may be true, but unprovable.

Now, Godel showed, via formal languages, that there are true statements that are unproveable; so the above is actually false.

Can Kantian antinomies show the same thing? If so, one can largely say they, if not anticipating Godels exact result, have a family resemblence to them.

But this doesn't appear to be possible, since both statements in a Kantian antimony are plausibly true, in Kants own hands this means there is a limit to reason, whereas in Hegels and Priests readings they are more akin to dialethism.