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In other words, Spirit has to "fall into time" not because of some formal analogy (which applies to everything in Hegel) but because of how Hegel set it up to "grasp" itself. As Heidegger puts it, "Spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it has not grasped its pure concept, that is, has not annulled time."

In other words, the Spirit has to "fall into time" not because of some formal analogy (which applies to everything in Hegel) but because of how Hegel set it up to "grasp" itself. As Heidegger puts it, "Spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it has not grasped its pure concept, that is, has not annulled time."

Hegel is not known for making "formal logical correlations", in fact he despised formal logic, on time specifically see Safatle's Hegel Against a Formal Concept of Time. As for Heidegger's grounds for his interpretations, in this case he is very explicit about them on the pages preceding the quote. The parts on time come from Philosophy of Nature, and the parts on spirit from Phenomenology of the Spirit, he even gives page numbers. Here is Philosophy of Nature §260 (quoted from Foldes' Hegel’s Deduction Of Matter):

Hegel is not known for making "formal logical correlations", in fact he despised formal logic, on time specifically see Safatle's Hegel Against a Formal Concept of Time. As for Heidegger's grounds for his interpretations, in this case he is very explicit about them on the pages preceding the quote. The parts on Time come from Philosophy of Nature, and the parts on Spirit from Phenomenology of the Spirit, he even gives page numbers. Here is Philosophy of Nature §260 (quoted from Foldes' Hegel’s Deduction Of Matter):

One of Heidegger's problem with all of this is the most people's problem with Hegel in general, that he spins the concrete out of the abstract, the world out of nothing, and randomly at that, that he reaches "each category from the last preceding by virtually calling 'next'!", as Peirce put it. Heidegger's approach is the opposite (as one would expect from existentialist vs. essentialist), it "begins with the "concretion" of factically thrown existence, and reveals temporality as what makes such existence primordially possible. "Spirit" does not first fall into time, but exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality", i.e. time is not encountered externally but is a primordial aspect of "self"'s existence.

One of Heidegger's problems with all of this is the most people's problem with Hegel in general, that he spins concrete out of abstract, the world out of nothing, and randomly at that, that he reaches "each category from the last preceding by virtually calling 'next'!", as Peirce put it. Heidegger's approach is the opposite (as one would expect from existentialist vs. essentialist), it "begins with the "concretion" of factically thrown existence, and reveals temporality as what makes such existence primordially possible. "Spirit" does not first fall into time, but exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality", i.e. time is not encountered externally but is a primordial aspect of "self"'s (Dasein's) existence.