Timeline for What are the consequences of pragmatism for empirical research?
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5 events
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| Oct 19, 2012 at 18:49 | comment | added | Rex Kerr | @AronLindberg - You'd have to contrast stances, then. Adding philosophical pragmatism to current research practice changes nothing, in my opinion. Adding something else might. In that philosophical pragmatism can keep that other thing at bay, whatever it is, it may have an impact. | |
| Oct 19, 2012 at 17:16 | comment | added | histelheim | It's not a historical question. Also, I didn't mean to suggest a vast chasm between the extremes of positivism and interpretivisim - I think this view is outdated - even if I also disagree with the complete overlap you are suggesting in your post. My assumption is that any philosophical stance has implications on empirical research. Suggesting that there are none sounds like nihilism to me, and is not a suitable basis for constructive research. | |
| Oct 19, 2012 at 16:40 | comment | added | Rex Kerr | @AronLindberg - Sorry, I thought that was clear: none. It's already built in (now). Or are you asking for a historical answer, explaining how the ambitions of the scientific endeavor as conceived during the Enlightenment had to be curtailed, and how philosophical pragmatism could be seen to inform that necessary curtailing? (That it was a question about the history of science and philosophy was not obvious from the question, if that was your intent.) | |
| Oct 19, 2012 at 16:32 | comment | added | histelheim | Your post provides some good (but generic) reflections on the overlaps between positivist (or postpositivist rather) and interpretivist research. However, it still does not answer the question: what are the consequences of philosophical pragmatism on empirical research? | |
| Oct 19, 2012 at 16:13 | history | answered | Rex Kerr | CC BY-SA 3.0 |