As an illustration of the scope of explanations, by one adequate description WWI started with the assassination of an archduke; by another with formal State declarations of war; by another the start goes back to ancient Rome... We simply do not know enough about the causal processes in the brain to adequately explain consciousness with the same molecular precision which we use to describe water as H2O instead of "colorless, tasteless liquid"; and explain features like "potable", "delicious", "undrinkable" or aspects like "steam" or "ice".
Controlling our surroundings with our thoughts depends some on how the terms "thought" and "control" are used. Don't we all just agree and think that, for example, ink and carbon fibers in a certain configuration are paper money? The status of the "base" material in the certain configuration and its status function are matters of institutional fact (as compared to "brute fact" - per Anscombe), i.e. something we create with language (speech acts). Could we achieve such control of our surroundings without language? Without collective intentionality? If consciousness were just interpretation?
As for physically changing (i.e. exercising a control over) our immediate environment, the motor nervous system can be intentionalistically engaged, for example, to swat a fly without thinking just as the motor nervous system can be engaged to inadvertently jump at a loud bang perceived through the sensory nervous system. There is an explanatory behaviorist/materialist/determinist I/O analogy, but think more about how you breathe consciously at times and yet when you sleep you do not die from oxygen starvation in your brain.
You might also enjoy, "The Phenomenological Illusion"
