Haven't got direct quotes from Kant but found some references that may be of use — interesting question.

When you say somebody has a means to choose their own end, it's more-so we aren't using somebody else as an end. Your own agency is impacted by others but there may be nothing you can do about that. However, you have a great deal of volition over your own actions (notwithstanding metaphysical free-will questions). Kant was of the position that somebody who commits a crime should be punished proportionality to the crime, but saw certain forms of punishment, such as only punishing somebody to deter others, as using a human being merely as a means (see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/#Pun). He wouldn't be arguing for keeping somebody out of jail if they committed a crime because this would be an encroachment on our autonomy, although he considered the question of autonomy to be one of utmost importance.

I interpret Kant here as saying that we shouldn't view other humans aren't mere instruments. Humans are an "end-in-themselves" or intrinsically valuable, regardless of what value they provide to other people (a formulation of the Categorical Imperative). We should, therefore, respect the sanctity of humanity nature (typified by rationality) as a good thing in-itself.

According to Kerstein (2009):

An agent treats another merely as a means if it would be unreasonable for the agent to believe that the other can share the end the agent is pursuing in treating him in some way.

And the relevant section from Kant's moral philosophy on the SEP: "The Humanity Formula":

supposing that [a] taxi driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these capacities as a means only if we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent to — for instance, by paying an agreed on price.

Haven't got direct quotes from Kant but found some references that may be of use — interesting question.

When you say somebody has a means to choose their own end, it's more-so we aren't using somebody else as a means to an end. Your own agency is impacted by others but there may be nothing you can do about that. However, you have a great deal of volition over your own actions (notwithstanding metaphysical free-will questions). Kant was of the position that somebody who commits a crime should be punished proportionality to the crime, but saw certain forms of punishment, such as only punishing somebody to deter others, as using a human being merely as a means (see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/#Pun). He wouldn't be arguing for keeping somebody out of jail if they committed a crime because this would be an encroachment on our autonomy, although he considered the question of autonomy to be one of utmost importance.

I interpret Kant here as saying that we shouldn't view other humans aren't mere instruments. Humans are an "end-in-themselves" or intrinsically valuable, regardless of what value they provide to other people (a formulation of the Categorical Imperative). We should, therefore, respect the sanctity of humanity nature (typified by rationality) as a good thing in-itself.

According to Kerstein (2009):

An agent treats another merely as a means if it would be unreasonable for the agent to believe that the other can share the end the agent is pursuing in treating him in some way.

And the relevant section from Kant's moral philosophy on the SEP: "The Humanity Formula":

supposing that [a] taxi driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these capacities as a means only if we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent to — for instance, by paying an agreed on price.

Haven't got direct quotes from Kant but found some references that may be of use — interesting question.

When you say somebody has a means to choose their own end, it's more-so we aren't using somebody else as an end. Your own agency is impacted by others but there may be nothing you can do about that. However, you have a great deal of volition over your own actions (notwithstanding metaphysical free-will questions). Kant was of the position that somebody who commits a crime should be punished proportionality to the crime but saw certain forms of punishment, such as only convicting somebody to deter others, as using a human being merely as a means (see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/#Pun). He wouldn't be arguing for keeping somebody out of jail if they committed a crime because this would be an encroachment on our autonomy, although he considered the question of autonomy to be one of utmost importance.

I interpret Kant here as saying that we shouldn't view other humans aren't mere instruments. Humans are an "end-in-themselves" or intrinsically valuable, regardless of what value they provide to other people (a formulation of the Categorical Imperative). We should, therefore, respect the sanctity of humanity nature (typified by rationality) as a good thing in-itself.

According to Kerstein (2009):

An agent treats another merely as a means if it would be unreasonable for the agent to believe that the other can share the end the agent is pursuing in treating him in some way.

And the relevant section from Kant's moral philosophy on the SEP: "The Humanity Formula":

supposing that [a] taxi driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these capacities as a means only if we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent to — for instance, by paying an agreed on price.

Haven't got direct quotes from Kant but found some references that may be of use — interesting question.

When you say somebody has a means to choose their own end, it's more-so we aren't using somebody else as an end. Your own agency is impacted by others but there may be nothing you can do about that. However, you have a great deal of volition over your own actions (notwithstanding metaphysical free-will questions). Kant was of the position that somebody who commits a crime should be punished proportionality to the crime, but saw certain forms of punishment, such as only punishing somebody to deter others, as using a human being merely as a means (see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/#Pun). He wouldn't be arguing for keeping somebody out of jail if they committed a crime because this would be an encroachment on our autonomy, although he considered the question of autonomy to be one of utmost importance.

I interpret Kant here as saying that we shouldn't view other humans aren't mere instruments. Humans are an "end-in-themselves" or intrinsically valuable, regardless of what value they provide to other people (a formulation of the Categorical Imperative). We should, therefore, respect the sanctity of humanity nature (typified by rationality) as a good thing in-itself.

According to Kerstein (2009):

An agent treats another merely as a means if it would be unreasonable for the agent to believe that the other can share the end the agent is pursuing in treating him in some way.

And the relevant section from Kant's moral philosophy on the SEP: "The Humanity Formula":

supposing that [a] taxi driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these capacities as a means only if we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent to — for instance, by paying an agreed on price.