I would agree with @Conifold that the 'gerrymandering' confuses the question. It is an excellent question but could do with a lot of tidying up. The main problem is the casual use of words like 'exist' and 'identity'.

Conifold mentions Plotinus and the 'One'. This takes us to the heart of the matter. If Plotinus had argued that the One exists then he would have fallen foul of the OP's objections. Rather, his One transcends the exist/not-exist distinction. It would be incoherent to argue that the source of existence exists. Plotinus does not do this. His philosophy is non-dualism, not monism.

These complications mean that to discuss these issues at this depth and avoid confusion would require a very clear definition of words like 'existence'.

As to 'identity' and 'definition' again some clarity would help. The question states that a thing with no identity is not a thing. Plotinus argues that things are not really things but appearances, and all would share a fundamental identity. This 'fundamental identity' cannot be positively- defined or distinguished (from what?) and cannot be said to exist or not-exist. Yet this would all that is truly Real. The word 'Real' would not mean the same as 'exist'. To exist would be to be created and thus to be reducible in physics and metaphysics.

This is not an attempt to explain this philosophy but just to indicate that the subtleties we are dealing with here demand very clear questions and definitions of terms and concepts.

All this may suggest that the way to make progress on metaphysical questions is to keep trying to clarify them. It is not easy to do.

I believe it is logically impossible for just one thing or substance to exist or for existence to arise from a composite phenomena. This suggests that Plotinus endorses the only view of these matters that survives analysis.

Great question and I'd agree with your conclusion if not all of your argument.

I would agree with @Conifold that the 'gerrymandering' confuses the question. It is an excellent question but could do with a lot of tidying up. The main problem is the casual use of words like 'exist' and 'identity'.

Conifold mentions Plotinus and the 'One' and this takes us to the heart of the matter. If Plotinus had argued that the One exists then he would have fallen foul of the OP's objections. He does not do this. His One transcends the exist/not-exist distinction. It would be incoherent to argue that the source of existence exists. Plotinus' philosophy is non-dualism, not monism. His 'One' is not a numerical quantity.

These complications entail that to discuss these issues at this depth and avoid confusion requires a very clear definition of words like 'existence'.

As to 'identity' and 'definition' again some clarity would help. The question states that a thing with no identity is not a thing. True enough, but there are subtleties. Plotinus argues that things are not really things but mere appearances and all would share a fundamental identity. This 'fundamental identity' cannot be positively-defined or distinguished and cannot be said to exist or not-exist. This would not be a thing but would be all that is truly Real. To exist would be to be created and thus to be reducible in physics and metaphysics.

This is not an attempt to explain this philosophy but to indicate that the subtleties we are dealing with here demand very clear definitions of our terms and concepts, and great care to avoid building unnecessary assumptions into our questions. It may suggest that the way to make progress on metaphysical questions is to keep trying to clarify them. By the time we've defined our terms we've done most of the work.

I believe it is logically impossible for just one thing or substance to exist or for existence to arise from a composite 'phenomenon' or substance. I conclude that Plotinus endorses the only view of these matters that survives analysis.

Great question and I'd agree with your conclusion if not all of your argument.

I would agree with @Conifold that the 'gerrymandering' confuses the question. It is an excellent one but needs a lot of tidying up. The main problem is the casual use of 'exist' and 'identity'.

Conifold mentions Plotinus and the 'One' and this takes us to the heart of the matter. If Plotinus argued that the 'One' exists then he would fall foul of the OP's objections. Rather. he says the One transcends the exist/not-exist distinction. It would be incoherent to argue that the source of existence exists. This is why his philosophy is non-dualism and not monism, thus can be called 'perennial'. To discuss these issues at this depth and avoid confusion requires a very clear definition 'existence'. This would need more than a quick edit.

As to 'identity' and 'definition' again some clarity would help. The question states a thing with no identity is not a thing, but Plotinus argues that all things are not really things at all since they share a fundamental identity, and that this 'fundamental identity' cannot be positively defined or distinguished and cannot be said to exist or not-exist but is all that is truly Real. Thus 'Real' would not mean the same as 'exist'. To exist would be to be created and thus to be reducible in physics and metaphysics.

This is not an attempt to explain this philosophy but just to indicate that the subtleties here demand very clear questions and definitions. It may also suggest that the best way to make progress on metaphyscial questions is to calrify our quickest way to

I would agree with @Conifold that the 'gerrymandering' confuses the question. It is an excellent question but could do with a lot of tidying up. The main problem is the casual use of words like 'exist' and 'identity'.

Conifold mentions Plotinus and the 'One'. This takes us to the heart of the matter. If Plotinus had argued that the One exists then he would have fallen foul of the OP's objections. Rather, his One transcends the exist/not-exist distinction. It would be incoherent to argue that the source of existence exists. Plotinus does not do this. His philosophy is non-dualism, not monism.

These complications mean that to discuss these issues at this depth and avoid confusion would require a very clear definition of words like 'existence'.

As to 'identity' and 'definition' again some clarity would help. The question states that a thing with no identity is not a thing. Plotinus argues that things are not really things but appearances, and all would share a fundamental identity. This 'fundamental identity' cannot be positively- defined or distinguished (from what?) and cannot be said to exist or not-exist. Yet this would all that is truly Real. The word 'Real' would not mean the same as 'exist'. To exist would be to be created and thus to be reducible in physics and metaphysics.

This is not an attempt to explain this philosophy but just to indicate that the subtleties we are dealing with here demand very clear questions and definitions of terms and concepts.

All this may suggest that the way to make progress on metaphysical questions is to keep trying to clarify them. It is not easy to do.

I believe it is logically impossible for just one thing or substance to exist or for existence to arise from a composite phenomena. This suggests that Plotinus endorses the only view of these matters that survives analysis.

Great question and I'd agree with your conclusion if not all of your argument.