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Dec 6, 2021 at 18:22 history edited Geoffrey Thomas CC BY-SA 4.0
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Dec 6, 2021 at 16:53 comment added J D Added epistemological tags since the question is primarily regarding knowledge.
Dec 6, 2021 at 16:53 history edited J D
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Dec 6, 2021 at 16:52 answer added J D timeline score: 1
Dec 4, 2021 at 3:00 history tweeted twitter.com/StackPhilosophy/status/1466965683984547848
Dec 1, 2021 at 12:00 answer added Jencel timeline score: 2
Nov 6, 2019 at 10:29 history edited christo183 CC BY-SA 4.0
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Nov 6, 2019 at 10:00 history edited christo183 CC BY-SA 4.0
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Nov 6, 2019 at 6:36 comment added Conifold Look at Mormann's recent survey Toward a Theory of the Pragmatic A Priori: From Carnap to Lewis and Beyond. Of course, Kuhn also comes to mind, and the elaboration on him by Lakatos.
Nov 5, 2019 at 10:42 comment added christo183 @Conifold Thanks, I see. So Reichenbach and Friedman, any others? Did they take knowledge to be only declarative? Did anyone try to make a case for relativized a priori, or more likely a precursor concept, being somehow metaphysical, pre-linguistic or observer independent?
Nov 5, 2019 at 9:35 comment added Conifold The evolution of a priori is a side issue. What I meant is that relativized a priori are exactly the "confirmation bias" and the "gravity" you are looking for. They are the structuring patterns/principles used to shape new knowledge, and change much slower than that which they shape. The stuff paradigms are made of, if you will.
Nov 5, 2019 at 9:28 comment added christo183 @Conifold Fallibilism certainly shares a core conception of "knowledge" with the premise of this question. Your linked answer mentions how the notion of a priori has changed; what I'm asking about here could be said to be a principle or a mechanism that would act to limit the rate of change, if knowledge had mass this would be gravity.
Nov 1, 2019 at 23:29 comment added Conifold Again this sounds very Kantian, the patterns we get out of experience are the ones we ourselves put into it. Making those patterns relative to the priors makes it neo-Kantian, but "confirmation bias" is not used this way. You can look at Friedman's relativized a priori, and fallibilistic apriorism generally.
Nov 1, 2019 at 17:31 answer added Ted Wrigley timeline score: 1
Nov 1, 2019 at 12:45 history edited christo183 CC BY-SA 4.0
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Nov 1, 2019 at 12:20 review Close votes
Nov 9, 2019 at 9:40
Nov 1, 2019 at 11:19 history asked christo183 CC BY-SA 4.0