Russell's paradox forced a restriction of the natural abstraction principle (that every predicate determines a set) so that set theory could be consistent; the standard one being ZF.

However paraconsistency allows one to retain the natural abstraction principle by allowing a degree of inconsistency in the logic which allows a revival of naive set theory as a fully formal one. It has the positive advantage of proving the axiom of choice and disproving the continuum hypothesis.

Now Gödel's incompleteness theorem says that one cannot have a theory that is both complete and consistent. One must be given up. Usually this is completeness. But in view of paraconsistency, consistency can be given up.

1. Is it correct to say then that a paraconsistent theory will always be complete?

2. Since the theory is paraconsistent, Gödel's second theorem about not being able to prove the consistency of a theory loses its traction. (Or does it? Should one be able to prove paraconsistency?)

Russell's paradox forced a restriction of the natural abstraction principle (that every predicate determines a set) so that set theory could be consistent; the standard one being ZF.

However paraconsistency allows one to retain the natural abstraction principle by allowing a degree of inconsistency in the logic which allows a revival of naive set theory as a fully formal one. It has the positive advantage of proving the axiom of choice and disproving the continuum hypothesis.

Now Gödel's incompleteness theorem says that one cannot have a theory that is both complete and consistent. One must be given up. Usually this is completeness. But in view of paraconsistency, consistency can be given up.

1. Is it correct to say then that a paraconsistent theory will always be complete?

2. Since the theory is paraconsistent, Gödel's second theorem about not being able to prove the consistency of a theory loses its traction. (Or does it? Should one be able to prove paraconsistency?)

Russells paradox forced a restriction of the natural abstraction principle (that every predicate determines a set) so that Set Theory could be consistent. The standard one being ZF.

However paraconsistency allows one to retain the natural abstraction principle by allowing a degree of inconsistency in the logic which allows a revival of naive set theory as fully formal one. It has the positive advantage of proving Choice and disproving the Continuum Hypothesis.

Now Godels incompleteness theorem says that one cannot have a theory that is both complete and consistent. One must be given up. Usually this is completeness. But in view of paraconsistency, consistency can be given up.

a. Is it correct to say then that a paraconsistent theory will always be complete?

b. Since the theory is paraconsistent, then Godels second theorem about not being able to prove the consistency of a theory loses its traction. (Or does it? Should one be able to prove paraconsistency?)

Russell's paradox forced a restriction of the natural abstraction principle (that every predicate determines a set) so that set theory could be consistent; the standard one being ZF.

However paraconsistency allows one to retain the natural abstraction principle by allowing a degree of inconsistency in the logic which allows a revival of naive set theory as a fully formal one. It has the positive advantage of proving the axiom of choice and disproving the continuum hypothesis.

Now Gödel's incompleteness theorem says that one cannot have a theory that is both complete and consistent. One must be given up. Usually this is completeness. But in view of paraconsistency, consistency can be given up.

1. Is it correct to say then that a paraconsistent theory will always be complete?

2. Since the theory is paraconsistent, Gödel's second theorem about not being able to prove the consistency of a theory loses its traction. (Or does it? Should one be able to prove paraconsistency?)