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No sentence, true or false, can be a lie. A lie, or lying, involves mens rea, a guilty mind - i.e. in the case of a lie, intentionality by a person to deceive.

More specifically a lie is generally defined as any statement (the use of a sentence) that is false, known to be false, and is intended to deceive. There is nothing conceptually wrong with this definition but is the notion of a lie so clear-cut that it excludes another definition? This, for instance:

(1) I state that p to S

(2) I believe that p is false.

(3) By making this statement, I intend to deceive S in regard to p.

Moral terms, such as 'a lie', are seldom open to essentialist definition. If this variant definition is allowed, then p can be a true sentence by means of (the use of) which I lie to S.

No sentence, true or false, can be a lie. A lie, or lying, involves mens rea, a guilty mind - i.e. in the case of a lie, intentionality by a person to deceive.

More specifically a lie is generally defined as any statement that is false, known to be false, and is intended to deceive - where a statement is the declarative use of an indicative sentence. There is nothing conceptually wrong with this definition but is the notion of a lie so clear-cut that it excludes another definition? This, for instance:

(1) I state that p to S

(2) I believe that p is false.

(3) By making this statement, I intend to deceive S in regard to p.

Moral terms, such as 'a lie', are seldom open to essentialist definition. If this variant definition is allowed, then p can be a true sentence by means of (the use of) which I lie to S.

No sentence, true or false, can be a lie. A lie, or lying, involves mens rea, a guilty mind - i.e. in the case of a lie, intentionality by a person to deceive.

More specifically a lie is generally defined as any statement (the use of a sentence) that is intentionally false and is intended to deceive. There is nothing conceptually wrong with this definition but is the notion of a lie so clear-cut that it excludes another definition? This, for instance:

(1) I state that p to S

(2) I believe that p is false.

(3) By making this statement, I intend to deceive S in regard to p.

Moral terms, such as 'a lie', are seldom open to essentialist definition. If this variant definition is allowed, then p can be a true sentence by means of (the use of) which I lie to S.

No sentence, true or false, can be a lie. A lie, or lying, involves mens rea, a guilty mind - i.e. in the case of a lie, intentionality by a person to deceive.

More specifically a lie is generally defined as any statement (the use of a sentence) that is false, known to be false, and is intended to deceive. There is nothing conceptually wrong with this definition but is the notion of a lie so clear-cut that it excludes another definition? This, for instance:

(1) I state that p to S

(2) I believe that p is false.

(3) By making this statement, I intend to deceive S in regard to p.

Moral terms, such as 'a lie', are seldom open to essentialist definition. If this variant definition is allowed, then p can be a true sentence by means of (the use of) which I lie to S.

A lie is generally defined as any statement that is intentionally false and is intended to deceive. There is nothing conceptually wrong with this definition but is the notion of a lie so clear-cut that it excludes another definition? This, for instance:

(1) I state that p to S

(2) I believe that p is false.

(3) By making this statement, I intend to deceive S in regard to p.

Moral terms, such as 'a lie', are seldom open to essentialist definition. If this variant definition is allowed, then p can be a true sentence by means of which I lie to S.

No sentence, true or false, can be a lie. A lie, or lying, involves mens rea, a guilty mind - i.e. in the case of a lie, intentionality by a person to deceive.

More specifically a lie is generally defined as any statement (the use of a sentence) that is intentionally false and is intended to deceive. There is nothing conceptually wrong with this definition but is the notion of a lie so clear-cut that it excludes another definition? This, for instance:

(1) I state that p to S

(2) I believe that p is false.

(3) By making this statement, I intend to deceive S in regard to p.

Moral terms, such as 'a lie', are seldom open to essentialist definition. If this variant definition is allowed, then p can be a true sentence by means of (the use of) which I lie to S.