A solid history chronicling how traditional philosophy of science and scientific positivism evolved during the 20th C into post positivism and anti-realism, bringing about the (to some extent) displacement of the philosophy of science/knowledge (by blurring boundary between epistemology and ontology), and its replacement with the sociology of science/ knowledge, and the extent to which the project was and was not warranted by some of the factors mentioned in your post) is John Zammito’s A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour. (https://www.amazon.com/Nice-Derangement-Epistemes-Post-positivism-Science/dp/0226978621).

Zammito concludes that three "hyperbolic dogmas" of antiempiricist theory are primarily responsible for this shift: The theory ladeness of observations; the underdetermination of of scientific theories by evidence, and the incommensurability between competing theories. The books footnotes constitute an impressive bibliography of the primary texts in the area.

It occurred to me that before reading Zammito (whose goal is to put moderate and put the "radical skepticism" into context), you may wish to first actually sample first hand a taste of the skepticism about traditional scientific empirical rationality by reading an introductory anthology or two, giving you an idea of what the foundations of the skepticism is all about. For instance, Challenges to Empiricism (Edited by Harold Morrick in 1972), or Post-Analytic Philosophy (Edited by John Rajhman and Cornel West in 1985) are quite good, or anything by Richard Rorty.

Or, as suggested in another answer, auditing a "science studies" class in the humanities or social sciences might also be a good idea. These classes are generally taught by professors that were raised on and are steeped not in science, but rhetoric. Maybe one in the "Sociology of Science" or "Science and Technology Studies" (see here: https://areomagazine.com/2020/07/23/science-and-technology-studies-and-its-interdisciplinarity-problem/).

Aside: Finally, given the use of the term "radical skepticism" in your post, you may also find this post of interest: How do philosophers respond to global skepticism?.

A solid history chronicling how traditional philosophy of science and scientific positivism evolved during the 20th C into post positivism and anti-realism, bringing about the (to some extent) displacement of the philosophy of science/knowledge (by blurring boundary between epistemology and ontology), and its replacement with the sociology of science/ knowledge, and the extent to which the project was and was not warranted by some of the factors mentioned in your post) is John Zammito’s A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour. (https://www.amazon.com/Nice-Derangement-Epistemes-Post-positivism-Science/dp/0226978621).

Zammito contends that while some skepticism about empiricism, positivism, and the claim that scientific theory choice is premised always and exclusively upon rational bases, is warranted, he laments that three "hyperbolic dogmas" of anti-empiricist theory are primarily responsible for the unfortunately and unwarrantedly radical epistemological "shift" described above, and which likely informs your question about the "assumptions" which underlie scientific practice: the theory ladeness of perceptions/observations; the underdetermination of of scientific theories by evidence, and the incommensurability between competing theories [the claim that disparate incommensurable theories equally well describe/explain phenomena, or "reality"]. The bookss footnotes constitute an impressivly extensive bibliography of the primary texts in the area.

Addendum: It occurred to me that before reading Zammito (whose goal is to moderate and contextualize the trending "radical skepticism"), you may wish to first actually sample first hand the skepticism about traditional scientific empirical rationality upon which the more radical skepticism is based, by reading an introductory text or two. For instance, the anthologies Challenges to Empiricism (Edited by Harold Morrick in 1972), or Post-Analytic Philosophy (Edited by John Rajhman and Cornel West in 1985) are quite good. Or Simon Blackburn's 2005 On Truth: A Guide, or anything by the philosopher of Science Hillary Putnam, or the much more radical Richard Rorty.

Moreover, as suggested in another answer, auditing a "science studies" class in the humanities or social sciences might also be a good idea. These classes are generally taught by professors that were raised on and are steeped not in science, the philosophy of science, but rhetoric. Maybe a class in the "Sociology of Science" or "Science and Technology Studies" (see here: https://areomagazine.com/2020/07/23/science-and-technology-studies-and-its-interdisciplinarity-problem/).

Aside: Finally, given the use of the term "radical skepticism" in your post, you may also find this post of interest: How do philosophers respond to global skepticism?.

A solid history of how traditional philosophy of science and scientific positivism evolved during the 20th C into post positivism and anti-realism, bringing about the (to some extent) displacement of the philosophy of science/knowledge (by blurring boundary between epistemology and ontology), and its replacement with the sociology of science/ knowledge, and the extent to which the project was and was not warranted by some of the factors mentioned in your post) is John Zammito’s A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour. (https://www.amazon.com/Nice-Derangement-Epistemes-Post-positivism-Science/dp/0226978621).

Zammito concludes that three "hyperbolic dogmas" of antiempiricist theory are primarily responsible for this shift: The theory ladeness of observations; the underdetermination of of scientific theories by evidence, and the incommensurability between competing theories. The books footnotes constitute an impressive bibliography of the primary texts in the area.

A solid history chronicling how traditional philosophy of science and scientific positivism evolved during the 20th C into post positivism and anti-realism, bringing about the (to some extent) displacement of the philosophy of science/knowledge (by blurring boundary between epistemology and ontology), and its replacement with the sociology of science/ knowledge, and the extent to which the project was and was not warranted by some of the factors mentioned in your post) is John Zammito’s A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour. (https://www.amazon.com/Nice-Derangement-Epistemes-Post-positivism-Science/dp/0226978621).

Zammito concludes that three "hyperbolic dogmas" of antiempiricist theory are primarily responsible for this shift: The theory ladeness of observations; the underdetermination of of scientific theories by evidence, and the incommensurability between competing theories. The books footnotes constitute an impressive bibliography of the primary texts in the area.

It occurred to me that before reading Zammito (whose goal is to put moderate and put the "radical skepticism" into context), you may wish to first actually sample first hand a taste of the skepticism about traditional scientific empirical rationality by reading an introductory anthology or two, giving you an idea of what the foundations of the skepticism is all about. For instance, Challenges to Empiricism (Edited by Harold Morrick in 1972), or Post-Analytic Philosophy (Edited by John Rajhman and Cornel West in 1985) are quite good, or anything by Richard Rorty.

Or, as suggested in another answer, auditing a "science studies" class in the humanities or social sciences might also be a good idea. These classes are generally taught by professors that were raised on and are steeped not in science, but rhetoric. Maybe one in the "Sociology of Science" or "Science and Technology Studies" (see here: https://areomagazine.com/2020/07/23/science-and-technology-studies-and-its-interdisciplinarity-problem/).

Aside: Finally, given the use of the term "radical skepticism" in your post, you may also find this post of interest: How do philosophers respond to global skepticism?.