Timeline for Has there ever been a successful, philosophically defensible refutation of the Epicurean Paradox?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
16 events
when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
May 27 at 11:05 | answer | added | Rosha. | timeline score: 0 | |
Jun 17, 2023 at 13:29 | comment | added | Hudjefa | Why does illumination, like gravity, follow the inverse square law? 🤔 | |
Jun 15, 2023 at 8:42 | answer | added | Ludwig V | timeline score: 3 | |
Jun 14, 2023 at 20:53 | comment | added | Ludwig V | @Swami Vishwananda You are right, of course, that the argument only works against certain conceptions of God. So it is odd that it is attributed to Epicurus who lived 341–270 B.C.E; the attribution is by one Lactantius c. 250 – c. 325 CE. Christianity was very much around at that time, but vigorously contested. It is hard to understand what Epicurus would have been attacking in this argument, when he wouldn't have had the relevant conception of God or even of atheism, so I'm not convinced it was his - not in this form anyway. Which doesn't make it any easier to "solve". | |
Jun 14, 2023 at 19:13 | answer | added | Braeden Tang-Munn | timeline score: 1 | |
Mar 10, 2021 at 15:00 | history | tweeted | twitter.com/StackPhilosophy/status/1369664354786959364 | ||
Mar 2, 2021 at 18:34 | comment | added | Conifold | If 'good' and 'evil' are only culturally defined and contradictory then there is no problem of evil in the first place, and no Epicurean argument to respond to. It does not even get to free will. | |
Mar 2, 2021 at 17:08 | comment | added | Uncle Kurt | "Preserving free will" is not defensible. Free will itself is not an irrefutable given, and its 'preservation' as a function of any viable deity is not justifiable. Since both 'good' and 'evil' are culturally defined and often contradictory, the deity creating them would, in fact, be situational and at odds with itself. So why call him god? | |
Mar 2, 2021 at 13:21 | comment | added | Conifold | Because preventing evil with free will around is nonsense like round squares, if it is free there are no constraints to do the preventing. Omnipotence or lack thereof is irrelevant. Those in heaven freely choose to follow God's will, but it is their choice, not God's doing. Those here can choose that too, but don't. | |
Mar 2, 2021 at 10:49 | comment | added | ThisIsMe | @Conifold; why would an omnipotent god have any problems allowing free will without evil. After all; he did so in heaven, right? | |
Mar 2, 2021 at 5:15 | comment | added | Swami Vishwananda | The question of why a 'good' God allows evil exists only in dualistic religions/philosophies which assert an extra-cosmic Godhead. The question does not arise in monistic traditions as it is incongruous with monistic logic. Read Plotinus' Six Enneads. | |
Mar 1, 2021 at 22:44 | comment | added | Hypnosifl | In addition to the free will argument against the second horn, there is also the "defense from plenitude" at jstor.org/stable/40012554 and also available from the paywall-bypassing site sci-hub.st at sci-hub.st/10.1007/BF00135826 ...see in particular the discussion starting on p. 31 of various arguments that a world with a mix of "significantly free creatures (sfc's)" of varying degrees of virtue is in some sense "better" than a world where everyone is perfectly virtuous, even if that virtue is compatible with free will. | |
Mar 1, 2021 at 20:37 | answer | added | user50380 | timeline score: 4 | |
Mar 1, 2021 at 20:36 | comment | added | Conifold | Yes, the standard response is that the inference in the second horn ("if he is able but unwilling, then he is malevolent") is invalid. There is a reason for God to tolerate evil other than malevolence - preserving free will. Subverting free will to prevent evil would be a greater evil. The issue is generally discussed under the name of theodicy, see SEP, The Problem of Evil. | |
Mar 1, 2021 at 19:11 | review | First posts | |||
Mar 10, 2021 at 16:07 | |||||
Mar 1, 2021 at 19:02 | history | asked | Uncle Kurt | CC BY-SA 4.0 |