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Free will and determinism are co-dependent. There's no one without the other.

IMHO There are ambiguities in the question, derived of the lack of concretion about the term "will" and "freedom"

The free will you ask is a physical-laws bound free will. I can have the will to override and revert the energy-conservation principle of physics, but since it is a physical law, there's no way to fulfill this particular deed. We can conceive or imagine a non physical bounded will, although it is out of the question.

In second place, determining one's will is a NP problem, or a non computable one, because one can simply imagine, in any given moment, infinite possibilities (even those physically restricted ones). So, there's a numberability or finitude restriction, a computational restriction if you like, implicit in the definition. Infinity is a non physical concept.

The question is then translated as follows:

Is there an ability to choose between a finite and physical-bounded set of options with freedom?

Lets speak then about freedom. The freedom definition working here is -i guess- that in a given set of options (let's call it information), there's no dependence between the previous information that pre-determines the output.

But, how do we know that in any moment an output of a decision system is independent from the environment and the previous set of decisions? We have no way to know it until we compute the solution. And the Turing-Church theorems of undecidability proof that there's no way to predict the output of any given algorithm unless we run it fully.

So, we can only tell whether any given election (choosing or decision) is free or not a posteriori, or so to say: after having executed an decision-taking algorithms, which are intrinsically determined. Freedom lies then in the inherent not-knowing of the answer to that particular decision-taking-assessment problem, a process that is utterly deterministic, rather than the no physical or logical dependence of the output on the premises of election.

In other words, the apparent freedom of any given decision is merely a consequence of the intrinsic uncertainty (undecidability) of any decision taking or assessment algorithm.

So, yes, free-will, as stated before, is a product of the physical and mathematic-logical laws.

Free will and determinism are co-dependent. There's no one without the other.

IMHO There are ambiguities in the question, derived of the lack of concretion about the term "will" and "freedom"

The free will you ask is a physical-laws bound free will. I can have the will to override and revert the energy-conservation principle of physics, but since it is a physical law, there's no way to fulfill this particular deed. We can conceive or imagine a non physical bounded will, although it is out of the question.

In second place, determining one's will is a NP problem, or a non computable one, because one can simply imagine, in any given moment, infinite possibilities (even those physically restricted ones). So, there's a numberability or finitude restriction, a computational restriction if you like, implicit in the definition. Infinity is a non physical concept.

The question is then translated as follows:

Is there an ability to choose between a finite and physical-bounded set of options with freedom?

Lets speak then about freedom. The freedom definition working here is -i guess- that in a given set of options put within a physical environment (let's call it information). Freedom menans then there's no dependence or relation between the previous information that pre-determines the output.

But, how do we know that in any moment an output of a decision system is independent from the environment and the previous finite set of options? We have no way to know it until we compute the solution. And the Turing-Church theorems of undecidability proof that there's no way to predict the output of any given algorithm unless we run it fully.

So, we can only tell whether any given election (choosing or decision) is free or not a posteriori, or so to say: after having executed an decision-taking algorithms, which are intrinsically determined. Freedom lies then in the inherent not-knowing of the answer to that particular decision-taking-assessment problem, a process that is utterly deterministic, rather than the no physical or logical dependence of the output on the premises of election.

In other words, the apparent freedom of any given decision is merely a consequence of the intrinsic uncertainty (undecidability) of any decision taking or assessment algorithm.

So, yes, free-will, as stated before, is a product of the physical and mathematic-logical laws.

Free will and determinism are co-dependent. There's no one without the other.

IMHO There are ambiguities in the question, derived of the lack of concretion about the term "will" and "freedom"

The free will you ask is a physical-laws bound free will. I can have the will to override and revert the energy-conservation principle of physics, but since it is a physical law, there's no way to fulfill this particular deed. We can conceive or imagine a non physical bounded will, although it is out of the question.

In second place, determining one's will is a NP problem, or a non computable one, because one can simply imagine, in any given moment, infinite possibilities (even those physically restricted ones). So, there's a numberability or finitude restriction, a computational restriction if you like, implicit in the definition. Infinity is a non physical concept.

The question is then translated as follows:

Is there an ability to choose between a finite and physical-bounded set of options with freedom?

Lets speak then about freedom. The freedom definition working here is -i guess- that in a given set of options (let's call it information), there's no dependence between the previous information that pre-determines the output.

But, how do we know that in any moment an output of a decision system is independent from the environment and the previous set of decisions? We have no way to know it until we compute the solution. And the Turing-Church theorems of undecidability proof that there's no way to predict the output of any given algorithm unless we run it fully.

So, we can only tell whether any given election (choosing or decision) is free or not a posteriori, or so to say: after having executed an decision-taking algorithms, which are intrinsically determined. Freedom lies then in the inherent not-knowing of the answer to that particular decision-taking-assessment problem, a process that is utterly deterministic, rather than the no physical or logical dependence of the output on the premises of election.

In other words, the apparent freedom of any given decision is merely a consequence of the intrinsic uncertainty of any decision taking or assessment algorithm.

So, yes, free-will, as stated before, is a product of the physical and mathematic-logical laws.

Free will and determinism are co-dependent. There's no one without the other.

IMHO There are ambiguities in the question, derived of the lack of concretion about the term "will" and "freedom"

The free will you ask is a physical-laws bound free will. I can have the will to override and revert the energy-conservation principle of physics, but since it is a physical law, there's no way to fulfill this particular deed. We can conceive or imagine a non physical bounded will, although it is out of the question.

In second place, determining one's will is a NP problem, or a non computable one, because one can simply imagine, in any given moment, infinite possibilities (even those physically restricted ones). So, there's a numberability or finitude restriction, a computational restriction if you like, implicit in the definition. Infinity is a non physical concept.

The question is then translated as follows:

Is there an ability to choose between a finite and physical-bounded set of options with freedom?

Lets speak then about freedom. The freedom definition working here is -i guess- that in a given set of options (let's call it information), there's no dependence between the previous information that pre-determines the output.

But, how do we know that in any moment an output of a decision system is independent from the environment and the previous set of decisions? We have no way to know it until we compute the solution. And the Turing-Church theorems of undecidability proof that there's no way to predict the output of any given algorithm unless we run it fully.

So, we can only tell whether any given election (choosing or decision) is free or not a posteriori, or so to say: after having executed an decision-taking algorithms, which are intrinsically determined. Freedom lies then in the inherent not-knowing of the answer to that particular decision-taking-assessment problem, a process that is utterly deterministic, rather than the no physical or logical dependence of the output on the premises of election.

In other words, the apparent freedom of any given decision is merely a consequence of the intrinsic uncertainty (undecidability) of any decision taking or assessment algorithm.

So, yes, free-will, as stated before, is a product of the physical and mathematic-logical laws.

Free will and determinism are co-dependent. There's no one without the other.

IMHO There are ambiguities in the question, derived of the lack of concretion about the term "will" and "freedom"

The free will you ask is a physical-laws bound free will. I can have the will to override and revert the energy-conservation principle of physics, but since it is a physical law, there's no way to fulfill this particular deed. We can conceive or imagine a non physical bounded will, although it is out of the question.

In second place, determining one's will is a NP problem, or a non computable one, because one can simply imagine, in any given moment, infinite possibilities (even those physically restricted ones). So, there's a numberability or finitude restriction, a computational restriction if you like, implicit in the definition. Infinity is a non physical concept.

The question is then translated as follows:

Is there an ability to choose between a finite and physical-bounded set of options with freedom?

Lets speak then about freedom. The freedom definition working here is -i guess- that in a given set of options (let's call it information), there's no dependence between the previous information that determine the output.

But, how do we know that in any moment an output of a decision system is independent from the environment and the previous set of decisions? We have no way to know it until we compute the solution. And the Turing-Church theorems of undecidability proof that there's no way to predict the output of any given algorithm unless we run it fully.

So, we can only tell whether any given election (choosing or decision) is free or not a posteriori, or so to say: after having executed an decision-taking algorithmS, all of which are intrinsically determined. Freedom lies then in the inherent not-knowing of the answer to that particular decision-taking-assessment problem, a process that is utterly deterministic, rather than the no phisical or logical dependence of the premises of election.

In other words, the apparent freedom of any given decision is merely a consequence of the intrinsic uncertainty of any decision taking or assessment algorithm.

So, yes, free-will, as stated before, is a product of the physical and mathematic-logical laws.

Free will and determinism are co-dependent. There's no one without the other.

IMHO There are ambiguities in the question, derived of the lack of concretion about the term "will" and "freedom"

The free will you ask is a physical-laws bound free will. I can have the will to override and revert the energy-conservation principle of physics, but since it is a physical law, there's no way to fulfill this particular deed. We can conceive or imagine a non physical bounded will, although it is out of the question.

In second place, determining one's will is a NP problem, or a non computable one, because one can simply imagine, in any given moment, infinite possibilities (even those physically restricted ones). So, there's a numberability or finitude restriction, a computational restriction if you like, implicit in the definition. Infinity is a non physical concept.

The question is then translated as follows:

Is there an ability to choose between a finite and physical-bounded set of options with freedom?

Lets speak then about freedom. The freedom definition working here is -i guess- that in a given set of options (let's call it information), there's no dependence between the previous information that pre-determines the output.

But, how do we know that in any moment an output of a decision system is independent from the environment and the previous set of decisions? We have no way to know it until we compute the solution. And the Turing-Church theorems of undecidability proof that there's no way to predict the output of any given algorithm unless we run it fully.

So, we can only tell whether any given election (choosing or decision) is free or not a posteriori, or so to say: after having executed an decision-taking algorithms, which are intrinsically determined. Freedom lies then in the inherent not-knowing of the answer to that particular decision-taking-assessment problem, a process that is utterly deterministic, rather than the no physical or logical dependence of the output on the premises of election.

In other words, the apparent freedom of any given decision is merely a consequence of the intrinsic uncertainty of any decision taking or assessment algorithm.

So, yes, free-will, as stated before, is a product of the physical and mathematic-logical laws.