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moved the first sentence on the third paragraph to be the last sentence on the second paragraph for better understanding of the argument, also added some important context OP wrote in the comments
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I wish to understand how Hegelian dialectics, further carried, through Marxism, from an idealist to materialist orientation, positions itself with respect to the Enlightenment and liberalism.

It is clear that dialectic methods, particularly the materialist orientation championed by Marx, share a common direction with the broader Enlightenment project of refining objective and rational methods of inquiry, toward challenging authoritarian and dogmatic claims of truth or knowledge.

  Yet, more narrowly, it may appear that dialectic methods also endeavor to address limitations in liberal modes of argumentation. 

Liberal discourse may be considered as comprising a succession of observations and inferences obeying objective and formal methods. Arguments are largely considered as capable of transcending contextual constraints, and are offered in a linear progression, intended to increase incrementally a base of universal knowledge. An essential demand of liberal thought has been to appraise the value of any argument as completely independent from the individual providing it.

Hegel, in contrast, championed the inherent tension represented in each proposition, due to its evaluation from a verbal form being inseparable from the linguistic, cultural, ontological, and other facets of the background of any individual giving or receiving argument.

In such light, it may appear that, for Hegel and Marx, argumentation was essentially dependent, not independent, of the participants in the argument.

It is of little doubt that Marx's preferences about social and material relations are sharply opposed to the views of Enlightenment giants such as the likes of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith. Methodologically, Marx's emphasis on the historic determinism of social change starkly challenges the liberal belief in the supreme capacity of ideas alone to determine the form of social relations.

Best representing mainstream scholarly consensus, do the dialectics of Hegel and Marx stand essentially in support of or in opposition to the liberal traditions emerging from the Enlightenment?

More context from comments:

The core question is whether the dialectic method, specifically the observation that propositions carry in themselves an inherent tension, or contextual ambiguity, has been offered by Hegel, and those he influenced, largely and perhaps deliberately as an attack against the flavor of reasoning and argument, from liberalism, best represented by those at the forefront of the Enlightenment, such as Locke and Mill. - brainchild

I wish to understand how Hegelian dialectics, further carried, through Marxism, from an idealist to materialist orientation, positions itself with respect to the Enlightenment and liberalism.

It is clear that dialectic methods, particularly the materialist orientation championed by Marx, share a common direction with the broader Enlightenment project of refining objective and rational methods of inquiry, toward challenging authoritarian and dogmatic claims of truth or knowledge.

  Yet, more narrowly, it may appear that dialectic methods also endeavor to address limitations in liberal modes of argumentation. Liberal discourse may be considered as comprising a succession of observations and inferences obeying objective and formal methods. Arguments are largely considered as capable of transcending contextual constraints, and are offered in a linear progression, intended to increase incrementally a base of universal knowledge. An essential demand of liberal thought has been to appraise the value of any argument as completely independent from the individual providing it.

Hegel, in contrast, championed the inherent tension represented in each proposition, due to its evaluation from a verbal form being inseparable from the linguistic, cultural, ontological, and other facets of the background of any individual giving or receiving argument.

In such light, it may appear that, for Hegel and Marx, argumentation was essentially dependent, not independent, of the participants in the argument.

It is of little doubt that Marx's preferences about social and material relations are sharply opposed to the views of Enlightenment giants such as the likes of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith. Methodologically, Marx's emphasis on the historic determinism of social change starkly challenges the liberal belief in the supreme capacity of ideas alone to determine the form of social relations.

Best representing mainstream scholarly consensus, do the dialectics of Hegel and Marx stand essentially in support of or in opposition to the liberal traditions emerging from the Enlightenment?

I wish to understand how Hegelian dialectics, further carried, through Marxism, from an idealist to materialist orientation, positions itself with respect to the Enlightenment and liberalism.

It is clear that dialectic methods, particularly the materialist orientation championed by Marx, share a common direction with the broader Enlightenment project of refining objective and rational methods of inquiry, toward challenging authoritarian and dogmatic claims of truth or knowledge. Yet, more narrowly, it may appear that dialectic methods also endeavor to address limitations in liberal modes of argumentation. 

Liberal discourse may be considered as comprising a succession of observations and inferences obeying objective and formal methods. Arguments are largely considered as capable of transcending contextual constraints, and are offered in a linear progression, intended to increase incrementally a base of universal knowledge. An essential demand of liberal thought has been to appraise the value of any argument as completely independent from the individual providing it.

Hegel, in contrast, championed the inherent tension represented in each proposition, due to its evaluation from a verbal form being inseparable from the linguistic, cultural, ontological, and other facets of the background of any individual giving or receiving argument.

In such light, it may appear that, for Hegel and Marx, argumentation was essentially dependent, not independent, of the participants in the argument.

It is of little doubt that Marx's preferences about social and material relations are sharply opposed to the views of Enlightenment giants such as the likes of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith. Methodologically, Marx's emphasis on the historic determinism of social change starkly challenges the liberal belief in the supreme capacity of ideas alone to determine the form of social relations.

Best representing mainstream scholarly consensus, do the dialectics of Hegel and Marx stand essentially in support of or in opposition to the liberal traditions emerging from the Enlightenment?

More context from comments:

The core question is whether the dialectic method, specifically the observation that propositions carry in themselves an inherent tension, or contextual ambiguity, has been offered by Hegel, and those he influenced, largely and perhaps deliberately as an attack against the flavor of reasoning and argument, from liberalism, best represented by those at the forefront of the Enlightenment, such as Locke and Mill. - brainchild

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Does Relation of dialectics, as pioneered byof Hegel and Marx, support or challengetoward Enlightenment liberalism?

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I wish to understand how Hegelian dialectics, further carried, through Marxism, from an idealist to materialist orientation, positions itself with respect to the Enlightenment and liberalism.

It is clear that dialectic methods, particularly the materialist orientation championed by Marx, share a common direction with the broader Enlightenment project of refining objective and rational methods of inquiry, toward challenging authoritarian and dogmatic claims of truth or knowledge.

Yet, more narrowly, it may appear that dialectic methods also endeavor to address dissatisfaction withlimitations in liberal methodsmodes of argumentation. Liberal discourse may be considered as comprising a succession of observations and inferences obeying objective and formal methods. Arguments are largely considered as capable of transcending contextual constraints, and are offered in a linear progression, intended to increase incrementally a base of universal knowledge. An essential demand of liberal thought has been thatto appraise the value of any argument be taken as completely independent from the individual providing it.

Hegel, in contrast, championed the inherent tension represented in each proposition, due to its evaluation from a verbal form being inseparable from the linguistic, cultural, ontological, and other facets of the background of any individual giving or receiving argument.

In such light, it may appear that, for Hegel and Marx, argumentation was essentially dependent, not independent, of the participants in the argument.

It is of little doubt that Marx's preferences about social and material relations are sharply opposed to the views of Enlightenment giants such as the likes of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith. Methodologically, Marx's emphasis on the historic determinism of social change starkly challenges the liberal belief in the supreme capacity of ideas alone to determine the form of social relations.

Best representing mainstream scholarly consensus, do the dialectics of Hegel and Marx stand essentially in support of or in opposition to the liberal traditions emerging from the Enlightenment?

I wish to understand how Hegelian dialectics, further carried through Marxism from an idealist to materialist orientation, positions itself with respect to the Enlightenment and liberalism.

It is clear that dialectic methods, particularly the materialist orientation championed by Marx, share a common direction with the broader Enlightenment project of refining objective and rational methods of inquiry, toward challenging authoritarian and dogmatic claims of truth or knowledge.

Yet, more narrowly, it may appear that dialectic methods also endeavor to address dissatisfaction with liberal methods of argumentation. Liberal discourse may be considered as comprising a succession of observations and inferences obeying objective and formal methods. Arguments are largely considered as capable of transcending contextual constraints, and are offered in a linear progression, intended to increase incrementally a base of universal knowledge. An essential demand of liberal thought has been that the value of argument be taken as completely independent from the individual providing it.

Hegel, in contrast, championed the inherent tension represented in each proposition, due to its evaluation from a verbal form being inseparable from the linguistic, cultural, ontological, and other facets of the background of any individual giving or receiving argument.

In such light, it may appear that, for Hegel and Marx, argumentation was essentially dependent, not independent, of the participants in the argument.

It is of little doubt that Marx's preferences about social and material relations are sharply opposed to the views of Enlightenment giants such as the likes of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith. Methodologically, Marx's emphasis on the historic determinism of social change starkly challenges the liberal belief in the supreme capacity of ideas alone to determine the form of social relations.

Best representing mainstream scholarly consensus, do the dialectics of Hegel and Marx stand essentially in support of or in opposition to the liberal traditions emerging from the Enlightenment?

I wish to understand how Hegelian dialectics, further carried, through Marxism, from an idealist to materialist orientation, positions itself with respect to the Enlightenment and liberalism.

It is clear that dialectic methods, particularly the materialist orientation championed by Marx, share a common direction with the broader Enlightenment project of refining objective and rational methods of inquiry, toward challenging authoritarian and dogmatic claims of truth or knowledge.

Yet, more narrowly, it may appear that dialectic methods also endeavor to address limitations in liberal modes of argumentation. Liberal discourse may be considered as comprising a succession of observations and inferences obeying objective and formal methods. Arguments are largely considered as capable of transcending contextual constraints, and are offered in a linear progression, intended to increase incrementally a base of universal knowledge. An essential demand of liberal thought has been to appraise the value of any argument as completely independent from the individual providing it.

Hegel, in contrast, championed the inherent tension represented in each proposition, due to its evaluation from a verbal form being inseparable from the linguistic, cultural, ontological, and other facets of the background of any individual giving or receiving argument.

In such light, it may appear that, for Hegel and Marx, argumentation was essentially dependent, not independent, of the participants in the argument.

It is of little doubt that Marx's preferences about social and material relations are sharply opposed to the views of Enlightenment giants such as the likes of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith. Methodologically, Marx's emphasis on the historic determinism of social change starkly challenges the liberal belief in the supreme capacity of ideas alone to determine the form of social relations.

Best representing mainstream scholarly consensus, do the dialectics of Hegel and Marx stand essentially in support of or in opposition to the liberal traditions emerging from the Enlightenment?

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