From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on Pseudoscience:

There is widespread agreement for instance that creationism, astrology, homeopathy, Kirlian photography, dowsing, ufology, ancient astronaut theory, Holocaust denialism, Velikovskian catastrophism, and climate change denialism are pseudosciences. (Emphasis mine)

The fact that the US court system and others routinely have to deal with the reality of non-scientific practice being asserted as science is just an inescapable aspect of life, sorry. (See Kitzmiller) While many eggheads aim for deductive certainty before declaring something absolutely, positively objectively true, one can apply other standards of truth, such as pragmatic theories of truth. The word 'pseudoscience' is used widely, and with good purpose. There's A LOT of people claiming to do science that are doing NOTHING of the sort. How do philosophers characterize pseudoscience? Well, reading the article in full is your best path to knowledge, but here are a few major points from the article:

An Indifference to Epistemological and Empirical Foundations

Read section 6.4.

The term “bullshit” was introduced into philosophy by Harry Frankfurt, who first discussed it in a 1986 essay (Raritan Quarterly Review) and developed the discussion into a book (2005). Frankfurt used the term to describe a type of falsehood that does not amount to lying. A person who lies deliberately chooses not to tell the truth, whereas a person who utters bullshit is not interested in whether what (s)he says is true or false, only in its suitability for his or her purpose. Moberger (2020) has proposed that pseudoscience should be seen as a special case of bullshit, understood as “a culpable lack of epistemic conscientiousness”.

Many people who make pseudoscientific claims are well-educated, well-intentioned, but simply lack epistemic capacity and conscientiousness. A perfect example of such real-world tom foolery is anyone trying to pass-off multiverse pseudoscience (Hossenfelder) or the simulation hypothesis (more pseudoscience) (Hossenfelder) as science. According to SEP's Epistemology of Modality's section on conceivability, the notion of conceivability:

The main idea of (E2-D) is that there are two different ways in which we can evaluate statements across possible worlds, i.e., two different ways of conceiving hypothetical situations, based on two different constraints. The first constraint binds what is true in some possible world to what one knows a priori. A statement is primarily conceivable if nothing that is knowable a priori is incompatible with the statement being true... By contrast, it has been discovered empirically that water is H2O.

Some simply cannot understand or refuse to accept that empirical necessity is an unavoidable part of fallibilism (IEP), one which clearly has a role for modal empiricism and empiricism and physicalism more broadly. Watering down empirical positions and attacking empirical strawmen accompanies protests from pseudoscientists.

The Demarcation Problem Is Not the Denial of Dichotomy

There are things that are clearly not scientific being passed off as such is clearly a consensus of philosophers of science. Again, from SEP:

Kuhn observed that although his own and Popper’s criteria of demarcation are profoundly different, they lead to essentially the same conclusions on what should be counted as science respectively pseudoscience (Kuhn 1974, 803). This convergence of theoretically divergent demarcation criteria is a quite general phenomenon. Philosophers and other theoreticians of science differ widely in their views on what science is. Nevertheless, there is virtual unanimity in the community of knowledge disciplines on most particular issues of demarcation.

Some Criteria

The three big ones from the logical positivists are falsification (IEP), confirmation, and verification. None of them are perfect, but they are good rules of thumb.

The SEP even in section 4.6 offers an example list:

• Belief in authority: It is contended that some person or persons have a special ability to determine what is true or false. Others have to accept their judgments.
• Unrepeatable experiments: Reliance is put on experiments that cannot be repeated by others with the same outcome.
• Handpicked examples: Handpicked examples are used although they are not representative of the general category that the investigation refers to.
• Unwillingness to test: A theory is not tested although it is possible to test it.
• Disregard of refuting information: Observations or experiments that conflict with a theory are neglected.
• Built-in subterfuge: The testing of a theory is so arranged that the theory can only be confirmed, never disconfirmed, by the outcome.
• Explanations are abandoned without replacement. Tenable explanations are given up without being replaced, so that the new theory leaves much more unexplained than the previous one.

Conclusion

There's no universal tool for categorizing pseudoscience, and certainly there are cases that strain the thinker, but pseudoscience is a frequently used rhetorical tool to try to smuggle clearly non-empirical, non-scientific thought into forums that teach science.