Timeline for What does Judith Jarvis Thomson's looped trolley problem show about Kant?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
7 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 18, 2022 at 13:17 | comment | added | haxor789 | That paper isn't Thomson but a response to Thompson from Kleingeld. Thompson apparently attempted to argue that Kantian reasoning would fail in the loop version of the Trolley problem, so apparently Kantians tried to show that it wouldn't, that's one of them. And apparently for picking an option is ambiguous and that you can't simply assume the Tili case, but there could also be a Manuela case. | |
| Aug 18, 2022 at 13:15 | comment | added | user62233 | I just don't understand why Thomson introduces Tili, what difference it makes. I might read the paper. | |
| Aug 18, 2022 at 13:11 | comment | added | haxor789 | Because Tili would use the single person merely as a means to an end and Manuela wouldn't. The original answer includes the link to the paper. Also what do you mean by overuse? | |
| Aug 18, 2022 at 13:09 | comment | added | user62233 | OK so then why do they disagree on the footbridge? and why doesn't Tili overule Manuela rather than vice versa? I may be able to work out why, let me think... | |
| Aug 18, 2022 at 13:07 | comment | added | haxor789 | Her argument is that an impermissible reason doesn't make an action impermissible. So even though Tili's reasoning is impermissible, because she uses the single person as road block rather than treat them as person, the action itself is permissible. As Manuela who would act upon Kantian reasoning could come up with the same action. And she would come up with that same action because it's essentially the same as the bystander example where the single person is simply not part of Manuela's reasoning. Now I find that claim dubious already for the bystander, but Thomson is using that as well. | |
| Aug 18, 2022 at 12:59 | comment | added | user62233 | I don't understand paragraph 5. it makes sense to say an action is impermissible, not a reason for doing something, which I agree on and find helpful, and may correct the idea that not fooling yourself (as in the loop but not the bystander) does not make something moral. but the reasoning in the paragraph is unclear. why does 'not treating as means' involve diverting in the loop scenario? does Thomson explicitly say "because it's indirect use" and if so then what difference does adding Manuela make? | |
| Aug 18, 2022 at 11:06 | history | answered | haxor789 | CC BY-SA 4.0 |