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The literature on grounding has been a blast to read through, but I'm again confronted by armadas of formal systems too powerful for a lonely mortal like myself to easily withstand. For example, this treatment makes use of vast formalization, huge blocks/streams of symbols eventually show up here, this has a bunch of partly-mathematical musings going on,^⛓ etc.

A creeping concern seems to be over the fundamental viability of the "project" or "research program" of grounding theory. One reason for us to raise such a concern is the divergence of so much of the formalization. This can be dealt with to some extent (or in some way) via pluralism, then, but I am also roughly familiar with what is called "set-theoretic geology" (also "archeology": see the fn. on pg. 34), which seems like a well-grounded way to use the grounding analogy. Assuming that proper mathematicians count as scientists, and assuming a certain "deference thesis," is it per this thesis to defer to set-theoretic geologists in formulating a formalization of metaphysical grounding talk? The hope would be that the greater perspicuity of the mathematical treatment could be adapted to the philosophical case.

^⛓That one includes propositions like "the degree of reality at level i is zero" or "Consider a world that contains and [sic] infinity of levels" or (quoting someone else in the paper) "The 'transmission model' of being, whereby the being of an entity at a given level of reality L_n is fully obtained, in a yes/no, all-or-nothing fashion, from the entity or entities at the immediately prior level L_n−1." These descriptive options seem to suggest having levels-of-reality as themselves some sort of grounding relata, though whether they would be the primary such bearers is a question that seems to have a standard negative answer available to it (using the determinables-determinates analogy, it would be the more specific grounders and groundees that would anchor the grounding talk for their encompassing levels).

The literature on grounding has been a blast to read through, but I'm again confronted by armadas of formal systems too powerful for a lonely mortal like myself to easily withstand. For example, this treatment makes use of vast formalization, huge blocks/streams of symbols eventually show up here (paper by Kit Fine), this has a bunch of partly-mathematical musings going on,^⛓ etc.

A creeping concern seems to be over the fundamental viability of the "project" or "research program" of grounding theory. One reason for us to raise such a concern is the divergence of so much of the formalization. This can be dealt with to some extent (or in some way) via pluralism, then, but I am also roughly familiar with what is called "set-theoretic geology" (also "archeology": see the fn. on pg. 34), which seems like a well-grounded way to use the grounding analogy. Assuming that proper mathematicians count as scientists, and assuming a certain "deference thesis," is it per this thesis to defer to set-theoretic geologists in formulating a formalization of metaphysical grounding talk? The hope would be that the greater perspicuity of the mathematical treatment could be adapted to the philosophical case.

^⛓That one includes propositions like "the degree of reality at level i is zero" or "Consider a world that contains and [sic] infinity of levels" or (quoting someone else in the paper) "The 'transmission model' of being, whereby the being of an entity at a given level of reality L_n is fully obtained, in a yes/no, all-or-nothing fashion, from the entity or entities at the immediately prior level L_n−1." These descriptive options seem to suggest having levels-of-reality as themselves some sort of grounding relata, though whether they would be the primary such bearers is a question that seems to have a standard negative answer available to it (using the determinables-determinates analogy, it would be the more specific grounders and groundees that would anchor the grounding talk for their encompassing levels).

The literature on grounding has been a blast to read through, but I'm again confronted by armadas of formal systems too powerful for a lonely mortal like myself to easily withstand. For example, this treatment makes use of vast formalization, huge blocks/streams of symbols eventually show up here, this has a bunch of partly-mathematical musings going on, etc.

A creeping concern seems to be over the fundamental viability of the "project" or "research program" of grounding theory. One reason for us to raise such a concern is the divergence of so much of the formalization. This can be dealt with to some extent (or in some way) via pluralism, then, but I am also roughly familiar with what is called "set-theoretic geology" (also "archeology": see the fn. on pg. 34), which seems like a well-grounded way to use the grounding analogy. Assuming that proper mathematicians count as scientists, and assuming a certain "deference thesis," is it per this thesis to defer to set-theoretic geologists in formulating a formalization of metaphysical grounding talk? The hope would be that the greater perspicuity of the mathematical treatment could be adapted to the philosophical case.

The literature on grounding has been a blast to read through, but I'm again confronted by armadas of formal systems too powerful for a lonely mortal like myself to easily withstand. For example, this treatment makes use of vast formalization, huge blocks/streams of symbols eventually show up here, this has a bunch of partly-mathematical musings going on,^⛓ etc.

A creeping concern seems to be over the fundamental viability of the "project" or "research program" of grounding theory. One reason for us to raise such a concern is the divergence of so much of the formalization. This can be dealt with to some extent (or in some way) via pluralism, then, but I am also roughly familiar with what is called "set-theoretic geology" (also "archeology": see the fn. on pg. 34), which seems like a well-grounded way to use the grounding analogy. Assuming that proper mathematicians count as scientists, and assuming a certain "deference thesis," is it per this thesis to defer to set-theoretic geologists in formulating a formalization of metaphysical grounding talk? The hope would be that the greater perspicuity of the mathematical treatment could be adapted to the philosophical case.

^⛓That one includes propositions like "the degree of reality at level i is zero" or "Consider a world that contains and [sic] infinity of levels" or (quoting someone else in the paper) "The 'transmission model' of being, whereby the being of an entity at a given level of reality L_n is fully obtained, in a yes/no, all-or-nothing fashion, from the entity or entities at the immediately prior level L_n−1." These descriptive options seem to suggest having levels-of-reality as themselves some sort of grounding relata, though whether they would be the primary such bearers is a question that seems to have a standard negative answer available to it (using the determinables-determinates analogy, it would be the more specific grounders and groundees that would anchor the grounding talk for their encompassing levels).