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Can "freedom toward death" can have 'freedom' translated out of it?

The term "freedom toward death" appears in Heidegger's Being and Time, e.g. p255

to be itself in the passionate anxious freedom toward death, which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.

Notwithstanding my impression that "concern that takes care" is a virtue, and not the basis of being lost in the they self, as that very page seems to suggest, I am reluctant to think about the goal of philosophy etc. in terms of freedom. Mostly because freedom seems like a political goal, not one for individuals to realise, at least given our current social make up.

So, is there a way of explaining "the characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-towards-death"  (again, p255), which steers away from the ideal of "freedom"?

Can "freedom toward death" can have 'freedom' translated out of it?

The term "freedom toward death" appears in Heidegger's Being and Time, e.g. p255

to be itself in the passionate anxious freedom toward death, which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.

Notwithstanding my impression that "concern that takes care" is a virtue, and not the basis of being lost in the they self, as that very page seems to suggest, I am reluctant to think about the goal of philosophy etc. in terms of freedom. Mostly because freedom seems like a political goal, not one for individuals to realise, at least given our current social make up.

So, is there a way of explaining "the characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-towards-death"(again, p255), which steers away from the ideal of "freedom"?

Can "freedom toward death" have 'freedom' translated out of it?

The term "freedom toward death" appears in Heidegger's Being and Time, e.g. p255

to be itself in the passionate anxious freedom toward death, which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.

Notwithstanding my impression that "concern that takes care" is a virtue, and not the basis of being lost in the they self, as that very page seems to suggest, I am reluctant to think about the goal of philosophy etc. in terms of freedom. Mostly because freedom seems like a political goal, not one for individuals to realise, at least given our current social make up.

So, is there a way of explaining "the characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-towards-death"  (again, p255), which steers away from the ideal of "freedom"?

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Can "freedom toward death" can have 'freedom' translated out of it?

The term "freedom toward death" appears in Heidegger's Being and Time, e.g. p255

to be itself in the passionate anxious freedom toward death, which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.

Notwithstanding my impression that "concern that takes care" is a virtue, and not the basis of being lost in the they self, as that very page seems to suggest, I am reluctant to think about the goal of philosophy etc. in terms of freedom. Mostly because freedom seems like a political goal, not one for individuals to realise, at least given our current social make up.

So, is there a way of explaining "the characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-towards-death"(again, p255), which steers away from the ideal of "freedom"?