Timeline for What are exactly intuitions in Kant's philosophy?
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| Mar 19 at 20:15 | answer | added | user73173 | timeline score: 0 | |
| Dec 10, 2017 at 1:52 | history | bumped | CommunityBot | This question has answers that may be good or bad; the system has marked it active so that they can be reviewed. | |
| Nov 10, 2017 at 0:58 | history | bumped | CommunityBot | This question has answers that may be good or bad; the system has marked it active so that they can be reviewed. | |
| Oct 11, 2017 at 16:40 | comment | added | Gordon | What could this pre-sorting (productive imagination) of appearances be? It seems to be making judgments, it has some sort of categories in order to sort. Could it be public language a la Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations)? If language does this, why do we need Kant? Anyway I don't know enough Wittgenstein to answer this question. You might want to look at Hamlyn, and this also regarding Hegel's attempt to solve this problem: google.com/amp/s/bat020.com/2011/05/20/… I would read both, the Hamlyn first. | |
| Oct 11, 2017 at 16:00 | comment | added | Gordon | "Sorted by productive imagination...", as suggested by Philip's professor, sounds to me like a mystification. Of course the professor is dealing with a difficult problem left to us by Kant, it's no fault of the professor's. | |
| Oct 11, 2017 at 15:46 | comment | added | Gordon | "What determines whether experience can suitably be brought under any putative concept? No such principles are provided by experience itself." (Metaphysics, D.W. Hamlyn, Cambridge Univ. Press 1984, p.24). Discussing Hegel's criticism of Kant. This boils down to the problem of the one and the many. | |
| Oct 11, 2017 at 0:57 | history | bumped | CommunityBot | This question has answers that may be good or bad; the system has marked it active so that they can be reviewed. | |
| Sep 10, 2017 at 21:52 | answer | added | Ram Tobolski | timeline score: 1 | |
| Sep 8, 2017 at 13:15 | history | tweeted | twitter.com/StackPhilosophy/status/906144082828939264 | ||
| Sep 5, 2017 at 11:54 | comment | added | user20253 | The definition you use states "An intuition is a "conscious objective direct representation of an object". I would strongly disagree with this definition, which appears quite daft from here, so find the question difficult. | |
| Sep 5, 2017 at 9:17 | comment | added | infatuated | I see but in the quote you've supplied there's no talk of "intuition". It might be in the context but I haven't checked. | |
| Sep 5, 2017 at 8:49 | comment | added | Ouazzani | @infatuated No, if you read A320/B376-77, he does talk about representation with consciousness, but he also explicitly subsume intuition under it. | |
| Sep 5, 2017 at 6:29 | comment | added | infatuated | Maybe we can interpret "objects appearing to us" in the quotation as not meant as being understood through the categories, but only as impressing our senses which could be unconscious in which case they won't be "related to functions of the understanding." This would be consistent with what Kant wrote in your first citation. There he explicitly introduces representation as a general genus under which stands conscious representation. He doesn't explicitly name unconscious representation but articulating it as a second kind would be quite consistent with his other definitions. | |
| Sep 4, 2017 at 19:53 | comment | added | Philip Klöcking♦ | One trait of "the greatest philosophy classics" is that their concepts are never "simple" on a second look - that is why they are classics and still worth consideration imho. I think the definition of Duns Scotus provided by Conifold works quite well if we do not put too much ontological and epistemological commitment into it: Something somehow caused by outer world, mediated by senses and understanding (without the latter, we couldn't grasp it as something), and presenting itself as (only) object of experience. Mind particular intuition of something vs. (manifold of) intuition. | |
| Sep 4, 2017 at 18:41 | comment | added | Ouazzani | @Philip Klöcking. Thanks for your answer. Your second comment is I think the alternative I was adressing in my last paragraph. It seems that even given that, there is little we could positvely say about intuitions, and how we could then be justified in introducing them in a theory of cognition. This is what you expressed in your comment to Conifold's answer too. So I suppose Kant is the one to blame. But since the Critique is considered to be one of the greatest philosophy classics, it is sad to find out that even one of its basic and simple concepts is rather obscure and contradictory. | |
| Sep 4, 2017 at 18:17 | comment | added | Philip Klöcking♦ | Second thought to ponder: Kant (not completely coherently, again) distinguishes between object as such, possible object of thought and possible object of experience. It is often worth a try to sort which one is actually meant when. | |
| Sep 4, 2017 at 18:15 | comment | added | Philip Klöcking♦ | My professor (having had worked on Kant for quite a while) used to put it that way: Although there are (ALWAYS) textbits that suggest otherwise, one will be safe in generally thinking of intuitions as already sorted by productive imagination through categories and schematism. I think this is the main problem here: He states (quite often) things that have to be relativised after the deduction. One of these is the actual division between intuition and concept imho. | |
| Sep 4, 2017 at 18:06 | history | edited | Ouazzani | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| Sep 4, 2017 at 18:02 | comment | added | Philip Klöcking♦ | Possible duplicate (no offence here, search seems to be broken): What is "intuition" for Kant? | |
| Sep 4, 2017 at 18:01 | history | edited | Ouazzani | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| Sep 4, 2017 at 17:54 | history | asked | Ouazzani | CC BY-SA 3.0 |