Timeline for if only one thing exists, nothing exists?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
27 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 25, 2023 at 11:21 | comment | added | CriglCragl | What is a 'thing'? All our answers involve some other thing coming to know it. In a very real sense 'thingness' is an illusion, there is only a network of unfolding events, which we 'chunk' together for our convenience. See 'Is the idea of a causal chain physical (or even scientific)?' philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/70930/… | |
| May 22, 2023 at 16:20 | comment | added | Hudjefa | I wanted ta say "look yer boat is leaking" except for the tiny, lil fact that I'm on it too!! Good luck figuring things out mon ami! You're presumably getting quite good at it! | |
| May 22, 2023 at 15:34 | answer | added | oTTo | timeline score: 1 | |
| Oct 18, 2018 at 19:32 | vote | accept | Francesco D'Isa | ||
| Oct 18, 2018 at 17:30 | answer | added | user20253 | timeline score: 3 | |
| Oct 18, 2018 at 10:20 | comment | added | user20253 | @FrancescoD'Isa - I feel you are right.;To exist is to 'stand out' and this requires two things. The idea of one thing existing is incoherent regardless of how we define it or whether we can. | |
| Oct 18, 2018 at 7:20 | comment | added | Francesco D'Isa | @Conifold I agree with this. That's the reason why I started the question with "if". I think there are good reasons to think so, here's just the premise. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 23:58 | comment | added | Conifold | Disagreements are about positions. If your position is that only that exists which can be differentiated from another, and not just modal another but actual another, then so be it, no problem. But you should not pretend that you have an argument for it, at least not to yourself. It is unavoidable that some premises are adopted without argument, there needs to be something to argue from. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 22:16 | comment | added | Francesco D'Isa | No differences = no things. Plain and simple. I tried to explain you why there are not the fallacies you said, but as far I can see we can’t agree. Thanks anyway for your useful comments. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 22:12 | comment | added | Conifold | And we are back to existence by way of definitions. Given how many fallacies this line of thought has got you into may I suggest that you reconsider and move on. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 22:03 | comment | added | Francesco D'Isa | @Conifold without differences it can’t be defined at all, you are always postulating differences | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 22:00 | comment | added | Conifold | No boundaries, sure, why not? Space, time, vague collections, etc. What makes the inference empty, or more precisely circular, are the caveats like "as an individual thing" and "without any identity". You are trying so hard to get your inference you gerrymandered the definition of "exist" to get it, please look up question begging definitions. But it still does not work, even rhetorically, perhaps this "single not thing" is defined by its very singularity, its non-otherness, that is how neoplatonists describe the One. And dialecticians deny that your "definite things" exist at all. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 21:51 | comment | added | guest1806 | I don't see that anyone has yet mentioned: this idea is often explored under the slogan no distinction without difference; e.g. for the claim that A is B to be meaningful, A needs to be contrastable with at least one other object, C, s.t. C is not B (which further implies that for "A is B" to be meaningful, there must be a set of entities - e.g. A and C - with a more basic property, B', s.t. if K is B', then [it is possible that] K is B or is not B). | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 21:15 | comment | added | Francesco D'Isa | Well, not so extraordinary, I doubt you are monist. “What is absolutely not definable can not be (as an individual thing)” is not empty verbiage but maybe hard to manage in a comment. It can’t be something definite, and a thing is something definite. It has no limits, no boundaries, no otherness; but things have. Does something indefinite, without any identity “exists”? It depends on how you use “exists” of course, but it looks a lot closer to the use of ‘nothing’ than ‘something’ | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 20:58 | comment | added | Conifold | You do infer that "not a thing" plainly does not exist in the post, "not a thing does not exist as a thing" is just a vacuous tautology. The ending is an equally vacuous equivocation on "nothing". So if "what is absolutely not definable can not be" is not just empty verbiage then it is postulated, not argued. Moreover, it is an inference between existence and definability, and since we have ample grounds to believe that such inferences are fallacious as a class the burden of proof is on you to show that this one is different. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I see none. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 20:34 | history | edited | Francesco D'Isa | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
grammar improvements
|
| Oct 17, 2018 at 20:31 | comment | added | Francesco D'Isa | @Conifold the analogy with the ontological argument is very interesting but misleading, because using similar techniques does not mean that the arguments are the same; here I've just proposed an argument against monism. What is absolutely not definable can not be, it's not an epistemic limit, but ontological – at least, it can't be as an individual thing as I argued. It can exist as, well, something we can't conceive (like "nothing"), but it can't be a thing. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 19:43 | comment | added | Conifold | Spinoza does not agree: omnis determinatio est negatio applies to definition, not being. The idea that what is not definable can not be is the fallacy of the ontological argument in reverse. There it was argued that because God is defined to exist he does exist, in your version because the single thing is not definable it does not exist. This gives definitions way too much credit, they have no such awesome powers over existence. The limits of language do not mark the limits of being, as Kant put it, "existence is not a predicate". | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 18:30 | comment | added | Francesco D'Isa | @EliranH I modified the question in order to avoid the ambiguity, thank you. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 18:25 | history | edited | Francesco D'Isa | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added specifications
|
| Oct 17, 2018 at 13:27 | comment | added | user20253 | I believe you are exactly right. Existence depends on duality. This would be why it is so vitally important in metaphysics to distinguish between monism and non-duality. I might disagree about set-theory since I think this is actually Russell's paradox in disguise, as does Spencer Brown who was a colleague of Russell, but on the absurdity of one thing existing I would agree and feel it is a crucial metaphysical insight. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 13:13 | comment | added | E... | Your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise. How does "no identity" entail "no existence"? Unless you're simply using "identity" to mean "existence", and then I don't see how your premise (no difference -> no identity/existence) is justified. | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 11:21 | answer | added | Bread | timeline score: 2 | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 9:59 | answer | added | Ted | timeline score: 2 | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 9:45 | comment | added | Mauro ALLEGRANZA | Having said that, how can we conceive a single-entity universe ? Obviously, if I conceive it, this single-entity universe will be me. But then, due to the fact that the "me-universe" is the only existing entity, according to Spinoza I cannot say that I'm one, because there is no "other" with respect to whom I can "define my identity". | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 9:42 | comment | added | Mauro ALLEGRANZA | See some lines above : "a thing can only be called one or single in respect of existence, not in respect of essence. For we do not conceive things under the category of numbers". In other words, the "number" is not part of the essence; from this, the conclusion that it is not correct to call God "one or single". | |
| Oct 17, 2018 at 9:31 | history | asked | Francesco D'Isa | CC BY-SA 4.0 |