Timeline for For Frege, how do we grasp the sense of a sign?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
13 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Aug 14, 2020 at 23:49 | comment | added | L. Siqueira | @Conifold thanks for the answer! | |
| Aug 14, 2020 at 23:48 | vote | accept | L. Siqueira | ||
| Aug 13, 2020 at 9:10 | comment | added | user47436 | The general idea of the reference of an expression is that it determines the truth or falsity of sentences in which it is a constituen. Frege establishes the realm of references as consisting objects and functions | |
| Aug 13, 2020 at 9:00 | history | tweeted | twitter.com/StackPhilosophy/status/1293834705897488384 | ||
| Aug 13, 2020 at 8:57 | answer | added | user47436 | timeline score: 0 | |
| Aug 13, 2020 at 8:47 | comment | added | user47436 | Senses are the locus of objectivity: reasons, justifications and truths are or pertain to thoughts, and thoughts are senses of sentences. They comprise and are built out of senses of predicates and of names. | |
| Aug 13, 2020 at 8:33 | comment | added | user47436 | Fregean senses are real and objective, but neither objects nor functions. They are real because of their objectivity and their being references in oblique contexts. And yet they are not objects: they don't have the mode of being of objects - independent self-subsistent identifiable entities - neither are they functions. Thus, Freges ontology includes another ontological category, that of sense, having its own special mode of being. On the Ontological Status of Senses (Sinne) in Frege GILEAD BAR-ELLI | |
| Aug 13, 2020 at 8:27 | comment | added | user47436 | Every reference of representations, even that of sensations, may be objective (and then it signifies the real in an empirical representation); save only the reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in the Object is signified, but through which there is a feeling in the subject, as it is affected by the representation.courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-classicreadings/chapter/… | |
| Aug 13, 2020 at 8:22 | comment | added | user47436 | In its strict sense a definition for Frege is a stipulation of synonymy, as it stipulates identity of sense between definiendum and definiens. The definiendum in fact gets its meaning from the definiens through this stipulation. Clearly in such a conception the distinction between reference and some notion of sense is mandatory. Frege also recognized another, less strict notion of definition in which the definiendum is a term in current use, already endowed with meaning. Gilead Bar-Elli, SENSE AND OBJECTIVITY IN FREGE'S LOGIC | |
| Aug 13, 2020 at 8:04 | comment | added | user47436 | Frege's notion of sense is usually presented as stemming from epistemological considerations, as carrying the "cognitive value" or informativeness of expressions and sentences. Senses are conceived as parts of thoughts with their building blocks. The sense of a sentence is identified with the thought it expresses and the senses of its constituent expressions are presented as their contribution to that thought. | |
| Aug 13, 2020 at 8:00 | comment | added | user47436 | Sense, in Frege's philosophy, appears to belong to logic . The notion of sense characterized as Sense as a Mode of Being Given and Sense as a Constituent of Thought | |
| Aug 12, 2020 at 21:34 | comment | added | Conifold | Frege was a platonist, i.e. senses are as objective as physical objects. The access problem you raise did not come into focus until Benacerraf long after Frege's death, but what he says in passing puts him close to modern rationalist theories of abstract objects:"In arithmetic we are not concerned with objects which we come to know as something alien from without through the medium of the senses, but with objects given directly to our reason and, as its nearest kin, utterly transparent to it", see Reck. | |
| Aug 12, 2020 at 20:27 | history | asked | L. Siqueira | CC BY-SA 4.0 |