If this thing exists, it means that it has beeped infinity times after 1 second(t=1),which doesnt make sense. If the machine has a monitor on it that shows how many times it has beeped so far, there is no number that can be shown in t=1.
It's true, that no monitor (imagined as a monitor with a finite number of digits on its display, a number that needs to be fixed in advance before the experiment starts and that cannot change afterwards) could ever show "how many beeps" there were when the (imagined) clock reaches the 1 second mark. But this is not essentially different from saying: It's impossible to count past 1000 and write down all the counted numbers (in decimal notation) using at most only 3 digits. Or: It's impossible to count past the number n (any number n) and write down n+1 using at most n digits (in unary notation). This is true, but doesn't seem very remarkable.
Even though the experiment you described could not be realized physically, we can make sense of "infinite number" of beeps by giving a precise definition of what we mean by that phrase. One way of doing so is by saying:
Given any natural number n, at some point in the experiment, but before the 1 sec mark has been reached, the number of emitted beeps will have become greater than n.
[Of course 'emitted beeps' here means imagined beeps. We're not talking about physical experiments or actual sounds. So having beeps or having a monitor representing numbers - that's all the same, and we'll consider anything to be possible in this realm except what is self-contradictory.]
In other words, it's true that no fixed-width monitor (or counter) will do for this (imagined) experiment. But we can say: Indeed, and that is exactly what we mean by "infinite" number! What's not clear? We will need a counter that can also keep growing wider indefinitely. Physically impossible, but perfectly imaginable -- conceivable without running into inconsistencies, at least, so it would seem, so far. We can count, cannot we? ("Conceivable without any derivable contradictions" is not a simple concept, however.)
Now, you may say: "Wait, but your definition only talks about before the 1 sec mark has been reached. I wanted to know what is the case when the 1 sec mark has been reached (or passed)."
I could dismiss that and say: "Well, we just agreed to imagine a counter that can grow indefinitely. In other words, one that can keep growing. At the 1 sec mark, it will have grown to infinite length. What's the problem?"
But according to some people there is a problem. There is a difference, they say, between a potential infinity (which is covered by the earlier definition) and actual infinity. The question is: Can we imagine an infinity as one completed whole? Is that a coherent concept? Can we conceive of that without running into contradictions? -- I have to confess that I never fully understood or saw this distinction. But see: Infinity.
[We are limited, because we exist as physical creatures. Does this mean what we can imagine -- in the broadest sense -- is also limited? We cannot picture or completely visualize an infinite sequence of 1's, of course, but does this imply that infinity itself is an inconceivable or incoherent concept? If it was, how would we know that we can not completely visualize it? "It" would not have a determinate meaning then.]
You could say: "Well, you just admitted that before the 1 sec has passed the counter will become greater than any fixed number n. This would imply that when the 1 sec mark is reached, we cannot have any particular number n showing in the counter. And I cannot imagine an actual infinite sequence of 1's." To which I could answer: "Ok. Let me try to tickle your imagination. Let's just imagine our counter resets at that point, and let it display a number shown as ω and which represents that countably infinite steps have been done." -- In other words, the relevant question, so far, just seems to be: Can we work with that? -- It turns out we can. Grep for "transfinite ordinals" in Early Set Theory. Quote:
The transfinite ordinals were introduced as new numbers in an important mathematico-philosophical paper of 1883, Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre (...). Cantor defined them by means of two “generating principles”: the first (1) yields the successor a + 1
for any given number a
, while the second (2) stipulates that there is a number b
which follows immediately after any given sequence of numbers without a last element. Thus, after all the finite numbers comes, by (2), the first transfinite number, ω (read: omega); and this is followed by ω + 1, ω + 2, …, ω + ω = ω ⋅ 2, …, ω ⋅ n, ω ⋅ n + 1, …, ω2, ω2 + 1, …, ωω, … and so on and on. Whenever a sequence without last element appears, one can go on and, so to say, jump to a higher stage by (2).
UPDATE
Thomson's lamp could be seen as the problem of how to extend modular arithmetic to transfinite ordinals. If we look at the sequence, bottom-up as it were, the problem seems indeterminate. It's unclear what (if any) the answer might be. The pattern suggests it must be 0 or 1, but which of the two?
0 % 2 = 0
1 % 2 = 1
2 % 2 = 0
3 % 2 = 1
...
ω % 2 = ???
Could John Conway's surreal numbers come to the rescue? The reference given in @Philomath's answer suggests that there could be two valid answers to ω % 2 = ?, depending on how the switching is done. But this is a bit awkard. We cannot have ω % 2 = 0 and ω % 2 = 1, because then 0 = 1 would make our system crumble and flash out with a "ploof". But perhaps the "on" and "off" state at the end
should not be seen as equivalent to the finite numbers 1 and 0?
In Conway's system ω/2 is well-defined. It turns out that
ω = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...|}
ω/2 = {0, 1, 2, 3, ... | ω, ω-1, ω-2, ω-3, ...}
So, whatever ω (mod 2)
may be, if we can give it a determinate meaning, we must have
ω/2 ≡ ω (mod 2)
We could leave it at that and say that the lamp at the end is in the ω/2 state. But is that "on" or "off"?
But is the Earman and Norton's construction referenced in @Philomath's answer really more illuminating? With one method of switching we get "on", and with the other we get "off" as end state of the supertask. But that only seems to show what we also already knew:
ω + 1 ≡ ω (mod 2)
(if that is indeed a true modular equivalence; I didn't try to prove it).
I personally prefer ω/2 as answer, but don't know how to map that to the "on" or "off" (or both) demand. Also, it would seem that there are infinitely many solutions for a ≡ ω (mod 2), and a = ω/2 is merely the one born first...?