Yes there is. Maddy takes this position in Perception and Mathematical Intuition, and so do recent mathematical Aristotelians. The alternative of believing it all real usually comes with full blown Platonism (forms in a separate realm), and is not very popular, see however Brown's Platonism, Naturalism, and Mathematical Knowledge for a modern defense. Let me add however that many modern realists would pragmatically admit fictional mathematical entities beyond merely constructible ones, like inaccessible cardinals or Lebesgue non-measurable sets, although Aristotle might have been more conservative.
Here is a long quote from Franklin's Aristotelian Realism, which I give in full because it seems to address the questions directly:
"The thesis defended has been that some necessary mathematical statements
refer directly to reality. The stronger thesis that all mathematical truths refer to reality seems too strong... Statements about negative numbers can refer to reality in some way, since one can make true conclusions about debts by using negative numbers. But the reference is indirect, in the way that statements about the average wage-earner refer to reality, but not in the direct sense of asserting something about an entity, ‘the average wage-earner’. Indirect reference of this kind is not in principle mysterious, though it needs to be explained in each particular case.
So it can be conceded that many of the entities mentioned in mathematics are fictional, without any admission that this makes mathematics unique; minus 1 can be seen as like fictional entities elsewhere, such as the typical Londoner, holes, the national debt, the Zeitgeist and so on. What has been asserted is that there are properties, such as symmetry, continuity, divisibility, increase, order, part and whole which are possessed by real things and are studied directly by mathematics, resulting in necessary propositions about them."
What I described are variations on "genuine" mathematical realism, but there is also another kind, where this issue doesn't even arise. Here is Quine:"I see no way of meeting the needs of scientific theory... without admitting universals irreducibly into our ontology... Nominalism... is evidently inadequate to a modern scientific system of the world". This came to be known as the "indispensability argument" for the existence of universals, Putnam joined Quine in accepting it in 1970s, when he was a realist. However, one reading this should keep in mind that for Quine "to be is to be a value of a variable" in a theoretical ontology, and ontologies, scientific or otherwise, are "myths" and "bridge of our own making". So "universals exist" only means that our current scientific scheme needs them as variables, and whatever else it needs, exists too.
That was then. Since then nominalists, like Chihara and Field, showed that sets and numbers were dispensable in science after all. As Burgess, Maddy's mentor and fellow Aristotelian, put it in Why I am Not a Nominalist:"Quine and Putnam have been false friends of numbers in making the case, for their acceptance seems to depend on a claim of indispensability".