Dennett claims qualia is a faux pas, a logical fallacy, held by the philosophical community, but this is based upon specific sources that remove some "qualities" of qualia. For instance, not all thoughts apply as qualia. If we think of qualia in terms of a computer it seems like qualia is analogous to pointers and data and the representation of that data in a medium that is human understandable (a monitor, for instance, to represent data within a jpg needs translation of a jpg, pointers to a jpg, drivers for the monitor, and the jpg data itself). If we represent qualia as software versus the physical reality would this address Dennett's concerns for the reality of qualia?

  • Qualia are not software as such. They are more like the subjective experience of running as an executable instance. Mar 22, 2020 at 15:41


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