David
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Member for 9 years, 6 months
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Notions of Right and Wrong in Perfectionist Ethics
Which is a proposition I think most perfectionists would protest.
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Notions of Right and Wrong in Perfectionist Ethics
Of course, to distinguish imperfection from immorality might imply that, if something is imperfect, it is not necessarily immoral. In other words, some perfectionist acts would then be considered supererogatory -- nice to have, but not absolutely essential.
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Notions of Right and Wrong in Perfectionist Ethics
Then again, maybe I've taken too much of a reductivist approach by trying to place such people on a spectrum from immoral to moral. A perfectionist might see the selfless glutton is "morally complex" rather than partly (or totally) immoral. Although I'm not sure if there's a philosophical term for this, the idea I'm getting at is that the selfless glutton meets the demands of perfectionism in some ways, but falls short in others. Maybe "imperfect" would be a better term than "immoral."
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Notions of Right and Wrong in Perfectionist Ethics
But, as you convincingly mention in your own post, perfectionism does not distinguish between self and other regarding duties. Still, it would seem strange to call a selfless man "immoral", if he can't manage his high blood pressure. And, as you mention there are other terms we could use to describe the man's condition (weak-willed, insensible, lacking ambition, and impassive) but what I really I wonder is where such individuals fall on the immoral-moral spectrum under a perfectionist standard.
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Notions of Right and Wrong in Perfectionist Ethics
Consider an individual with severe hypertension, who can't abstain from his favorite burger restaurant (an example of weakness of will--a failure of his self-regarding duty to his physical condition.) But, the man volunteers his time to meaningful charitable causes and strives on behalf of the needy (we consider altruism a core account of what it means to be human.) Is such a man moral by the perfectionist standard, or immoral?
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Notions of Right and Wrong in Perfectionist Ethics
It's interesting that you bring up insensibility (anaisthesia), lack of ambition (aphilotimia) and impassivity (aorgnesia.) When I originally wrote this post, I was thinking of imperfection in terms of another term used by Aristotle: weakness of will (akrasia). How should a perfectionist regard an agent who understands that it is better to do A than B, all things considered, but does B anyway due to a lack of conviction? How should the agent regard him/herself?
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Is the following application of Kant's Categorical Imperative valid?
Really, although we can be abrasive at times on stackexchange, people on this site are out to help others. Consider my advice and further your reading on Kant. The categorical imperative is a subtle concept and I think you’d benefit from a deeper reading of the topic.
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Is the following application of Kant's Categorical Imperative valid?
No I understood. I just reiterated my previous point (which incidentally isn’t my point, but Kant’s) about the “always tell the truth” being an example of a categorical imperative.
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Intention and Means-End Reasoning in Epistemology
You know what, that's exactly it. Thank you! I don't know why it took me so long to connect these dots, but yes, cherry picking fits the bill. Also, for "characterize[ing] arguments by the intent of the agent making the argument (honest or malicious.)" I suppose could just say an argument is honest or disingenuous.
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Intention and Means-End Reasoning in Epistemology
I suppose I’ve come to associate the term “rhetoric” with healthy debate, rather than this sort of malicious “debate hacking." But, if that's the only applicable term, then I suppose it's close enough. I guess I was wondering if there was a way to characterize arguments by the intent of the agent making the argument (honest or malicious.) Whether that argument is a scientific one or not wasn't my primary concern.
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Intention and Means-End Reasoning in Epistemology
Yes, it’s exactly this “flair of maliciousness “ that I’m getting at. Like Descartes’ evil genius, but within the context of argument (or scientific inquiry), agents like A are malicious and intend to mislead (or at least achieve ends other than reaching the truth). Although, most problematically, they mislead without ever saying anything explicitly untrue. A’s argument is sound; his application of the agreed upon methods, however, is selective, which allows him to focus only on the points that support his conclusions.
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Intention and Means-End Reasoning in Epistemology
The real life example I had in mind was a staff scientist paid by cigarette companies to reach the conclusion that cigarettes are healthy. Said scientist would purposely structure the study to reach his desired conclusion. I see your point, though. The A, B scenario I described looks exactly like using rhetoric for debate. I suppose what I forgot to mention was that, unlike in a debate, there’s a presumption of neutrality here; that both parties ought to follow the truth wherever it leads without an agenda in mind. In the case I outlined, A clearly has an agenda that B is unaware of.