In a previous question I have referred to eudaimonia and mentioned that, I guess at least in hellenistic tradition the good life is a happy one. However, now I wonder whether there is a counter to this?
My main concern is based on what we define the good life, and then how this would be different from the happy life. Any recommnedations for literature or philosophers to get into?
A utilitarian like Peter Singer would argue that the morally good life is one that maximizes happiness for the greatest number of people, which likely involves being vegetarian or vegan, and donating most of one's wealth to others. Intuitively, it seems like Singer's moral life is less happy than a selfish or hedonistic one.
But eudaimonia isn't exactly happiness, right? My vague memory is that eudaimonia is something like "that which we should pursue as humans" or "having lived life well", and that Plato spends a lot of time writing about how happiness or wealth is insufficient for eudaimonia.
So we can potentially try to unite eudaimonia and Singer by arguing "Living without the guilt of causing animal suffering and with the knowledge that you are doing the most good you can is essential to eudaimonia." in the same way Plato argues justice is essential.
But that seems odd and leads to some unpleasant conclusions. If the greatest pleasure all humans seek is living a utilitarian life, then Singer-inspired effective altruism should be focused on teaching people across the globe utilitarianism, instead of providing medicine or resources. And the argument there is pretty bizarre. "The good life is one spent advocating for eudamonia-utilitarianism (EU), because a life cannot be truly well-lived without EU, and so you should maximize the number of people who believe in EU." It becomes almost like a virus or a chain letter, and loses sight entirely of the "improving people's lives" portion of utilitarianism!
So in practice, I think Singer-style utilitarianism bites the bullet and claims that the moral life is less happy (potentially far less happy) than an immoral life. Obviously, one should still be happy to the degree one can, but not at the expense of contributing to broader global well-being.
Materialists (I'm thinking of Horkheimer, whom I have read very little of) do not think that happiness and the objects of desire are virtues, only that it is a fact that some people have virtue (such as solidarity), and virtue needs no justification, just as pursuing happiness does not. Without absolutism, our behaviours can be more or less socially sanctioned, but that doesn't mean that social status justifies our actions: I would think the exact opposite.
My point would be that happiness, as opposed to "selfless dedication to the causes of humanity", may be lacking, because the latter is not "in contradiction to materialist convictions" and claims otherwise "lack every philosophical justification", whereas justification "may indeed be quite appropriate in a particular society for particular actions".
Quotes from Materialism and Metaphysics.
