These types of unanswerable questions are somewhat related to the Liar Paradox. Consider:
This statement (S) is false. What is the truth value of S?
- a) S is true
- b) S is false
If I pick a
, the statement being true leads to the conclusion that the statement is indeed false (S). If I pick b
, the statement being false leads to the conclusion that the statement is indeed true (¬S). So the statement is either both true and false or neither true nor false and the question is unanswerable.
The unsolvability of the Liar Paradox question, however, can be easily rectified.
This statement (S) is false. What is the truth value of S?
- a) S is true
- b) S is false
- c) S true and false
- d) S is neither true nor false
We know that S is not true and S is not false (because we'd run into a paradox) so (implicitly) S cannot be both true and false, therefore the correct answer is d where S is neither true nor false. There are various proofs for this sketch. So the Liar Paradox question is, in fact, solvable in our second form.
I only introduced the Liar Paradox to show how deep unsolvability can go. Your question, however, is a much simpler breed. Consider E1:
The color of this statement (S) is "red". What is the color of S?
- a) S is blue
- b) S is green
Would this question perplex you as much as your original one? Probably not. The correct color simply isn't a choice. This question is just as unanswerable as yours - no more no less. Why your question seems more interesting is because it makes a key assumption (just like the first incarnation of the Liar Paradox question did - namely, that a statement is either true or false).
Specifically, it makes the assumption that the probability of getting a correct answer is 50%. This is incorrect. The probability is, I would argue, mathematically indeterminate. Consider E2:
The color of this statement (S) is "red". What is the color of S?
Consider E3:
The color of this statement (S) is "red". What is the color of S?
E1 has a 0% probability of someone randomly selecting the correct answer. E2 has a 50% probability of someone selecting the correct answer. E3 has a 100% probability of someone selecting the correct answer. Unless it's posited that one (or two, or three, etc.) of the answers is/are correct, your assumption that:
If you randomly chose one of the answers, then each of them is chosen
with a probability (that depends on the number of answers and is in
this case) of 50%.
...is logically unsound. So lets go back to your original question; if you amend your question and posit that 50% of the time you'll hit a correct answer, the answer to the question is simply 50%. The fact that it's not part of the answer set simply makes the question unanswerable (see E1). If you don't posit that 50% is the magic number, then there is no answer.
The problem with the question is that it's is not specific enough, allowing for up to three solutions (0%, 50%, 100%) - therefore, being mathematically indeterminate. The problem with your reasoning is that you start out on the 50% path, but end up on the 0% when you should, instead, say "my brain tells me 50% should be the correct answer, but I don't see it in the answer set therefore the question has no answer."
Note that there is no paradox here (as many people seem to think on the linked G+ thread). Either way, interesting question :)
Edit: This answer has sprung up a lot of discussion. I believe I am right for several reasons, one being that what is described here could be described as a form of The Problem of Rational Choice - it's a well defined problem in many philosophy papers, including Isaac Levi's On Indeterminate Probabilities (1974). It's also covered by statisticians in some regard, ex: Indeterminate Probabilities on Finite Sets (Robert F. Nau - 1992).
The Problem of Rational Choice: Given a corpus Kx,t and a credal state
Bx,t at t, how should X make decisions between alternative policies
from which he must choose one at t?
Not to mention that the question reminds me of Bertrand's paradox in which our good friend Bertie tried to make a clever probability paradox out of the ambiguity of the question. Read E.T. Jaynes' reply in The Well-Posed Problem in which he argued for a principle he defined as "maximum ignorance" (incidentally, I've been using a similar form of the argument). Read more about how it defeats Russel's paradox on Wikipedia and elsewhere.