Is there any openly pro-mortalist philosopher?

Question

Pro-mortalism is the rather unpopular view that it would be ethical to kill all humanity instantly and painlessly to prevent further suffering if that was feasible. Sam Harris and David Benatar reject this view in a recent episode of the Waking up Podcast, and R. N. Smart's also attacks it in his "benevolent world-exploder" thought experiment. Does anybody know of a philosopher who actually openly subscribes to this view?

It's easy for me to see why somebody would keep such an opinion private, since there's a lot of stigma around it and I think many universities and institutions would prefer to avoid associating with people with these views, so some philosophers may avoid this in order to preserve their reputation. Also, it's hard not to be diagnosed as depressive by your interlocutors, leading people to start investigating and speculating about your personal life. But I was wondering if anybody has been brave enough to face all these obstacles and "come out" as a pro-mortalist.

Answer 1

Since there is some doubt - see comments above - whether anybody actually holds this position, a useful first step might be to probe it philosophically for ourselves. It's better than nothing.

1. If all humanity were instantly and painlessly killed, this would not prevent all further suffering. At most it would prevent all further human suffering.

2. Even this is not certain, since in the present conditions of terrestrial life, evolution might re-create humanity, replete with all its sufferings.

3. There seems to be an implicit premise that there is a balance of suffering over happiness, pleasure, well-being. If suffering is a disvalue, then these other states when valorised might (how can you calculate ?) outweigh the disvalue of suffering - might be morally more significant than suffering. In which case the termination of a no longer sufffering humanity would create a less valuable world than one in which a suffering humanity enjoyed a balance of happiness, pleasure or well-being over suffering. Even is this premise is not implicit, my argument still applies.

Answer 2

Many philosophers have published papers that attempt to show that Benatar's argument for antinatalism also implies pro-mortalism. Most of them take this as a reason to reject antinatalism, but since this question was asked at least one philosopher has taken it as a reason to support pro-mortalism. Jiwoon Hwang published what is AFAIK the only paper taking this position:

Jiwoon Hwang: Why it is Always Better to Cease to Exist

Quote from the paper:

according to Professor Benatar, one of the authors thinks purported pro-mortalist implications of Professor Benatar’s arguments as a reductio ad absurdum of his arguments[8]. I shall argue that Benatar’s Asymmetry combined with (exclusively) hedonistic view of harms and benefits entails pro-mortalism, but I, rather than thinking the pro-mortalist implications as a reductio, believe in a soundness of pro-mortalism.

Jiwoon Hwang wasn't associated with a university, but your question asks for a philosopher, not a professional philosopher.

Sadly, Huang ended his life in 2018.

Answer 3

You might want to look at the arguments made with regard to the philosophy of David Benatar, a professor of philosophy at the University of Cape Town in Cape Town, South Africa. I realize you mentioned he does not see himself as a pro-mortalist but this paper may be of interest to you nonetheless.

Benatar’s anti-natalism equates to pro-mortalism paper