It might be suggested that we need a "better"/clearer grasp of the continuous/discrete distinction itself, before we can make the kind of headway on this question that we'd like to. For a long time, the mass/count noun distinction was a qualitative way of interpreting the difference; as Conifold remarks:
[Those two distinctions] are more or less the same, and go back to the age-old distinction between counting and measurement that predates Cantorian dissociation of the continuum into an uncountable multiplicity. The latter, while technically convenient in mathematics, is rather artificial conceptually, and linguistic use is likely informed by Aristotelian intuitions of the continuum as not assembled from points and not being a multiplicity at all.
C.f. the SEP article on continuity and infinitesimals (we will be quoting from that text much in this answer):
Atomism was challenged by Aristotle (384–322 BCE), who was the first to undertake the systematic analysis of continuity and discreteness. A thoroughgoing synechist, he maintained that physical reality is a continuous plenum, and that the structure of a continuum, common to space, time and motion, is not reducible to anything else. His answer to the Eleatic problem was that continuous magnitudes are potentially divisible to infinity, in the sense that they may be divided anywhere, though they cannot be divided everywhere at the same time.
It continues:
Aristotle identifies continuity and discreteness as attributes applying to the category of Quantity.
So just as the alchemy-chemistry transition was mediated by a certain prioritization of quantitative over qualitative understanding (not an exclusion of qualitative reasoning, to be sure), we can see a shift in attempts to understand continuity attendant upon the emergence of the infinitesimal calculus as an understanding of continuity in terms of how many points are connected in a space, rather than a "hazier" sense of how the points are connected "intuitively."
But so theories of infinitesimals still involved qualitative variations. The default "image" of an infinitesimal was "the reciprocal of infinity," but compelling geometrical reasoning suggested nilsquare terms as well:
Additionally, the old "doctrine of neglect" (that infinitesimal terms can be treated as zeroes at the "end" of local calculations) seemed to be somewhat clarified by this idea of nilpotence: for example, in the typical expression (x+e)2-x2/e, treating e2 as 0 and e/e as 1 lets us collapse the expression to 2x without an otherwise seemingly unmotivated decision to "ignore" e's presence in the sequence of expressions.
Nowadays, we have a multitude of theories of continuity still. Smooth infinitesimal analysis works primarily off nilpotent infinitesimals operating in a paracomplete logical background. Hyperreal analysis focuses on reciprocals of infinities and makes use of a "standard part function" in place of the doctrine of outright neglect (a sensible maneuver from the model-theoretic point of view, since we would of course imagine functions in model theory that go to and from various standard and nonstandard inputs). And now while Bishop may have lamented, "Now we have a [theory of calculus] that can be used to confirm [novice students'] experience of mathematics as an esoteric and meaningless exercise in technique," I daresay that standard calculus might be taken for an esoteric matter of "technique" as well, or indeed any theory of calculus must be technically precise! So Bishop's complaints are not sufficiently insightful to decide the issue.
For better or worse, though, even if we stick to the mainline representation of continuity in terms of sets of real numbers, we still lack a determinate enough representation of "the" continuum. Set-theoretically, the powerset axiom can be combined with the axiom of infinity to deliver the term ℘(ℕ) apart from the axiom of choice and hence apart from the well-ordering lemma. So it is not essential to the natural powerset, that it must be a well-ordered set with an aleph for its cardinality. But even when a natural powerset is formed in a strictly well-ordered world of sets (such as any ZFC world, then), absent peculiar assumptions like the axiom of constructibility or those covered in Moore[00?], next to nothing can be said about which aleph "the" continuum's cardinality partakes of. For all we know (modulo ZFC), 2ℵ0 = 2ℵ1 = 2ℵ2, among other things, for example.
Furthermore, it is not very difficult to venture into other worlds of sets where the natural powerset is inflated to the size of a proper class. This happens in a sort of trivial way in intuitionism and predicativism, but in Matthews[21] we have:
Or consider the surreal numbers. There is a surreal reciprocal of any transfinite ordinal, so there are surreal terms 1/ωa for any ordinal a. So then as far as the surreal number line goes, there are absolutely infinitely many infinitesimals between every single point on this line. (C.f. Ehrlich[10].) Moreover, we can then take a surreal reciprocal of infinity and use it as the power of a finite number, e.g. 21/ω, which goes to some x such that xω = 2. As the limit of the square, cube, etc. roots of 2, this x is some 1 + y such that (1 + y)ω = 2. But then that addend y represents an infinitesimal extension past the number 1, on the number line. Then there are also 21/ω1, etc. So besides the local contingua of surreal reciprocals (summing to unity), there is this multiplicative continuum of infinitesimals among the surreal numbers.
That, in turn, faintly echoes Cantor's unusual claim that infinitesimals would be x such that x times A, for some infinite ordinal A, is still less than any finite number. But whereas Cantor used such a definition in an attempt to disprove infinitesimals, we can now recognize that he accidentally stumbled upon merely another kind of these things.
So is continuity best understood first in qualitative or quantitative terms? If a curve is an infinilateral polygon, composed of infinitely small straight lines—or if the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem allows us to collapse a theory with uncountably many propositions to one with countably many, even if one of the propositions retained is a claim that uncountable sets exist—whence the strength of the discreteness/continuity distinction? If the cardinality of "the" continuum is greater than ℵ1, then between the cardinal form of a contiguum and the form of a continuum, aren't there intermediary forms? When is an infinitesimal term an image of something plausibly apparent in physical (or at least a priori) intuition, and when is it an abstract fiction, a sample of mere formal "technique"? Without more resolute answers to such questions, and to the subquestions that can be extracted therefrom, it is perhaps not quite possible to know whether physically observed phenomena do or do not well-satisfy the descriptions of these matters embedded in these many and varied theories.