When planning or strategizing in everyday life, it's useful to distinguish between goals ("ends") and the tools or techniques one will apply to try to achieve them ("means"). For example, if one's end is to eat hamburgers for dinner tonight, then one's means will likely involve walking to the supermarket, purchasing meat, storing it one's refrigerator until near-dinnertime, and forming and then cooking the patties. Very rarely do any of those individual steps carry value in their own right. More importantly, a change of plans might involve different means (driving to the supermarket?), but not different ends (eggs for dinner).
In my (very limited) experience, most Western moral philosophy since Aristotle imports this distinction relatively uncritically. That is, the theories assume that one can distinguish between terminal goals and instrumental checkpoints.
But on longer time horizons in everyday life, multiple goals interlock, and the distinction between means and ends disappears. For example, I think many people value bodily integrity, happy friends and family, and the power to change the world.1 And yet:
- Few activities can take place in a hospital room; bodily integrity eases bonding with friends and family.
- A supportive family environment de-risks high-yielding career moves to acquire power.
- And power to change the world can also be redirected to protect one's safety and health, ensuring bodily integrity.
In value web, there is no clear partial ordering to separate out which values are ends and which are means.
Have any famous philosophers developed a moral philosophy resilient to such cycles? (Although I am only familiar with Western philosophy, I expect most such philosophers will come from other traditions, and welcome such answers.) If not, what is the conventional argument for why some means-ends distinction ought hold?
1 "…for the better," they'd say, but I'm trying not to prematurely import value judgements.