This question is inspired by the related question How could both Occam's Razor and complex theories like Quantum Mechanics be correct at the same time?. The accepted answer reasonably argues:
The more complex and numerous the phenomena that are to be explained, the more complex the theories with ever more necessary entities that have to be proclaimed for explaining them.
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The complexity of quantum mechanics and the like is simply due to the vast variety and distinctiveness of phenomena we encountered in experimental environments. They necessitate all these fields/entities to be included because without them, not all of these phenomena could be explained (or rather: described).
My question concerns the necessitate aspect. What types of observations necessitate postulating more complex theories? Specifically, the accepted answer mentions phenomena, not observations, but it is implicit that these phenomena are observed by observers. This raises the question: what types of observations justify an observer in postulating a more complex theory of reality than the one they previously held? For instance, consider people who have mystical experiences and claim encounters with what they perceive (i.e. observe) as actual mystical phenomena. As a result, they postulate a mystically enhanced theory of reality (related discussion). How should such cases be understood in the context of observations necessitating more complex theories?
See also: Is simplicity the most important criterion when choosing between theories?