Conway and Kochen have proved a theorem about free will (no to be confused with the related Kochen–Specker theorem, which rules out hidden variables), which states that if we have a type of libertarian free will (our present actions are to some extent independent of our past), then some elementary particles must have freewill as well. In their own words:
It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe.
David Chalmers, in an attempt to solve the hard problem of consciousness while maintaining some form of physicalism, proposed that consciousness in an independent physical property of matter, like the charge or the spin of an elementary particle, a position which seems like a form of panpsychism.
At first glance, Chalmers's idea and Conway-Kochen's theorem seem very similar, and it is almost trivial that their theorem is indeed an argument for Chalmers's proposal.
But is this true? Or am I missing something in either the theorem itself or the relationship between the two ideas?