As Kuhn keeps insisting, there is not that much difference between what Kuhn and Popper suggest for most science as we see it function. What Kuhn labels 'Normal science' includes most of what Popper identifies as science at all. Where they differ, is upon what happens at major theoretical shifting points. Take Darwinism as an example.
Popper sees what Kuhn is calling a paradigm as simply a large and audaciously risky single question. For instance, you can think of Darwin's entire theory of evolution as a single proposition on species creation. To meet Popper's demarcation criterion, then, you have to imagine what would be necessary to make it falsifiable, given that what is and is not a species is somewhat subjective. Since it originates well before DNA and the other parts of the fossil record that we ultimately tested it against, that leaves Popper confused as to how it succeeds as a theory.
For a significant period of Popper's own career, he did not believe that Darwinism met his demarcation criterion, and declared that it must, instead, be considered a mere philosophy attempting to contribute to science, instead of a scientific theory.
It was not falsifiable as proposed, but it became so, largely on the basis of theories that sprung up after it. So when did it become 'real' science? Why would anyone proceed to study the biology that was not yet 'really' scientific long enough to get it to the point it was testable? So, as in this case, Popper's demarcation criterion sometimes has problems putting cause and effect in the proper temporal order.
Kuhn's way of looking at those periods is to see that what is shaping development is more basic than simply being a single high-risk hypothesis. Darwinism is an entire way of shaping how one looks at biology. For those who found it compelling, Darwinism was not simply a theory, but a new paradigm. Finding data that fit into it, or that tested it became a focus that directed study. And they were not open to easily abandoning it. When it was mature, it displaced the preceding attempts at paradigms and simply took over the discipline as a whole.
Until then, it was contending with other established systems in terms of which it was simply wrong, starting from the assumption that species were individually created and held relationship to one another in terms of an overall design, meant to fit nicely together into niche structures for the best use of the environments available. If one simply took the data at hand and insisted upon a traditional interpretation, every newly discovered species fit nicely into the existing cladism, with no intermediary forms, so Darwin was immediately falsified.
If, instead, you cut the new theory any slack at all, it was hard to see where to stop, and at what point it could be interpreted as having been adequately challenged, and not coddled out of animosity to the reigning sense of predetermined order. There is no logical place to make that cutoff. But the call got made. Darwinism passed the modified tests. So it seems that the tests themselves got chosen on some basis other than sheer falsifiability and experimental challenge.
Kuhn looks at the history of a science in terms of the succession of paradigms, each focusing development in a given way, instead of Popper's alternately smooth and rocky succession of simple theories with different levels of risk and implication, that are not 'layered' in any way, but any one of which faces all the others on equal terms.
It is very hard to really tell these two apart in practice, and Kuhn's theory is layered upon that of his mentor, so they also do not really conflict obviously. Kuhn, in his successive publications, keeps alternately emphasizing this ultimate lack of conflict, and pointing out how much more he favors his own ideas, which, in the end, does not improve our clarity. But the notion of paradigm does seem, to many, to fit the pattern of historical periods of peace and strife within a discipline, as periods where paradigms had been chosen and times when they were in contention with one another.
Kuhn's whole theory seems to have trouble identifying the edges between disciplines that would allow one to identify the given paradigm. E.g. Is Durkheim's study of suicide a sociological, psychological or an anthropological theory. Sociologists claim him, and the other two acceded, but on what grounds? His test criteria are against sociological factors -- national wealth, social class expectations, family structure etc. But the theory is ultimately about an individual, and not a group action, so it is psychology. And the economic, tribal and class factors themselves make sense only in the overall cultural history of Europe, not generalizing to the rest of the world, so it is anthropology.
Given that, one may need to see the layering of paradigms on a number of scales at once, and see Kuhn's own theory through a sort of fractal prism of super-, and sub-disciplines. One can respond to this by falling back onto Popper's unlayered uniformity, or by seeing the layering of networks of assumptions as a more basic characteristic that determines Popper's "level of risk" according to the size of the part of the paradigm that would be reconfigured by finding a conflict.
I propose the latter approach as a general theory of knowledge evolution that applies not just to science, but to social convention, logical foundations, and individual perception.